The Politics of the US “Pivot” to Asia

Published in Zaobao
(China) on 26 April 2012
by Yu Shiyu (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Brian Tawney. Edited by Lydia Dallett.
There is a bewildering array of developments in the politics of the Asia Pacific region: the swift responses of Western governments to the evolving internal politics of Myanmar, including unprecedented official visits from the U.S. Secretary of State and the UK Prime Minister; the first group of American marines to be stationed in Darwin, which the Australian Minister of Defense has declared a “historic day”; joint naval exercises between the U.S. and Philippines in the midst of the dispute between China and the Philippines over the island of Huangyan [Scarborough Shoal]; India’s first successful test of an ICBM, strengthening its military armaments; revelations by the Washington Post that the Pentagon will take advantage of its expiring lease in 2016 to give up the strategic base in Diego Garcia directly south of India, and move eastward to Australia’s Cocos Islands.

Not only has America accelerated its economic and military cooperation with Vietnam, its mortal enemy of half a century ago, but on April 21 Japan also convened a summit of the five nations of the Mekong basin in Tokyo and produced a “Cooperation Strategy for 2012”; Tokyo promised to Thien Sein, the first President of Myanmar to visit in the last 30 years, that it would forgive $3.7 billion in debt and renew its development aid. The Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, publicly invited the U.S. and Japan to “take part in solving” the South China Sea sovereignty dispute.

Behind this series of developments there is clearly the silhouette of Uncle Sam, and the international climate that accompanies China’s sudden rise to become the second largest economy in the world. From a historical perspective, what I have summarized is the classic strategy of transferring from strong points to weak points for the last 10 years and more. The recent crucial move is the “pivot” made by the Obama administration after its recent rise to power: deemphasizing political conflict with the Islamic world after the 10-year war on terror and turning to China, its most powerful economic competitor, as the main opponent in the contest of civilizations.

In the Obama administration’s “pivot” one can clearly see that the greatest threat to America’s position of international hegemony is really economic strength, and not the new specter of political Islam that haunts the world. Aside from this, it is also an examination into the way Washington uses the tactic of the moral “high ground” and “low ground” with different international opponents, especially the soft power of “universal values” that won the Cold War against the Soviets, as well as the huge force of public opinion that NATO directed against the Warsaw Pact. 10 years of the war on terror have shown that America can’t effectively use these two Cold War weapons against political Islam, but still possesses great potential with regard to the current pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. Washington’s series of tactical moves from Europe to East Asia, especially in Myanmar, which is in China’s backyard, are clearly cases of the “universal values” and public opinion tactics — indeed putting Beijing in the “low ground” position.

As I have stressed many times, Beijing’s great problem is the deficit of moral authority. Not only does this give rise to “troubles within the family,” but may end up giving an advantage to foreign aggressors. The recent scandal involving the leader of Chongqing [Bo Xilai] is a clear example of this.* It exposed corruption at the highest level, and could be compared with the Lin Biao affair, which ultimately destroyed the personality cult of Mao Zedong at the time. Internationally, this scandal not only directly involved prominent overseas figures, but the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong also revealed that it led to Europe and America paying greater attention to the appearance of similar corruption at high levels in the Chinese military.

International allies are another vulnerable spot for Beijing. Let us consider the larger trends of the ebb and flow of strength in the East Asia region.

One notable point is the decline of Japan. The New York Times and the Washington Post both recently published special reports on the conditions that trumped Japan’s sudden rise after World War II: the decline of manufacturing, especially in consumer electronics, where they were once the world’s leader. For example, Sony, Sharp and Panasonic, who had been industry leaders for many years, continue to lose money and lay off employees, while Sharp has been forced to sell stock and factories to Taiwan-based Hon Hai Precision Industry Company.

In contrast with this is South Korea’s sudden rise, beginning to surpass Japan both in traditional manufacturing and in the electronics industry. In the international arena, not only has the “Korean Wave” spread overseas, but their disproportionate influence on world affairs can be seen in the fact that a South Korean national is the Secretary General of the United Nations, and a person of South Korean descent is the president of the World Bank.

On the subcontinent, the economic success of India is reflected in its guided missile tests, but in contrast the economy of Pakistan is sluggish, and politically it continues its slow collapse. Members of the U.S. Congress even recently recommended a motion in support of independence for the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Furthermore, Beijing has identified a direct connection between this year’s terrorist violence in Xinjiang’s Kargilik county and Islamist organizations in Pakistan.

One can take a lesson from history. The Franco-Prussian War of unification created the German Second Reich, which experienced a sudden rise in economic strength at the time, soon leading the European continent and moving toward becoming a global superpower. This trend was reversed by the First World War; one crucial reason for this was the international allies that Germany chose. At the beginning of the World War, after Germany’s famous general, Erich von Ludendorff, paid an official visit to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he reported to the Kaiser: “We are allied with a corpse.”

The real misfortune was that Germany had made alliances with two corpses, the other corpse being the waning Ottoman Empire.

If we examine the present situation, Beijing’s main allies in Asia are the military governments of Pakistan, North Korea and Myanmar. It might be too much to call them “corpses,” but they aren’t exactly living, thriving, reliable partners. They aren’t even sustainable entities in the long term, which gives one something to ponder.

*Editor’s note: Bo Xilai, former party chief of Chongqing, ran a wire-tapping system across Chongqing that was discovered when it tapped into Hu Jintao’s phone line.


美国战略“枢轴转向”的亚太地缘政治
[于时语] (2012-04-26)

亚太地区一系列地缘政治发展令人目不暇接:西方政府对缅甸内政演变的迅速反应,包括美国国务卿和英国首相的破天荒访问;第一批美国海军陆战队人员进驻达尔文港基地,被澳大利亚防长宣布为“历史性的一天”;美国和菲律宾在中菲两国黄岩岛对峙中开始“肩并肩”联合海军军演;印度首次成功试验远程洲际导弹,强化军备;《华盛顿邮报》却透露:在使用租约2016年满期后,五角大楼准备放弃印度正南的战略要地迪戈加西亚基地,而东进澳大利亚的科科斯群岛(Cocos Islands)。
  除了美国与半个世纪前的死敌越南加快经济和军事合作,日本也与湄公河流域五国21日在东京召开峰会,提出《合作战略2012》;东京对近30年来首访日本的缅甸总统吴登盛允诺免除37亿美元债务,并重新提供发展援助。越南总理阮晋勇则在东京公开邀请美日等“参与解决”南中国海主权争议问题。
  这系列发展后面,明显都有山姆大叔的身影,以及中国崛起成为全球第二大经济体的国际大气候。从历史角度,这是我十多年就归纳过的离强合弱经典战略。近期关键则是奥巴马政府上台以来美国的国际战略“枢轴(pivot)转向”——淡化十年“反恐战争”以来与伊斯兰世界的政治冲突,而把“文明冲突”的主要争雄对象,转向最有经济竞争实力的华夏文明。
  奥巴马政府的“枢轴转向”,明确看到了对美国国际霸主地位的真正威胁是经济实力,而不是政治伊斯兰这一徘徊世界的新“幽灵”。另外也是检讨了华盛顿针对不同国际对手的“上驷”和“下驷”,尤其是赢得对苏冷战的“普世价值”软力量,以及北约针对华沙条约在民意支持上的巨大优势。十年“反恐”显示,美国在冷战中这两大利器,对付政治伊斯兰不无对牛弹琴,但是今天“枢轴转向”到亚太地区,还是具有很大的潜力:华盛顿新近从澳洲到东南亚,尤其中国“后院”缅甸的一系列攻势,显示“普世价值”和民意牌,确实是北京的“下驷”所在。
  我多次强调,道德权威赤字是北京的重大问题,不仅催生祸起萧墙的内忧,更会成为授人以柄的外患。新近的重庆领袖丑闻是个显例,直接暴露最高层次的腐败,而可以与当年林彪事件最终摧毁基层社会的毛泽东个人迷信类比。在国际上,此事不仅直接牵涉海外人士,据香港《南华早报》披露,更导致欧美上层开始关注中国军内的类似高层腐败现象。
  国际盟友是北京的另一重大软肋。不妨先看一下东亚地区的实力消长大势。
  一个显著的看点是日本的没落。《纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》新近都特别报道了二战后日本崛起的王牌——制造业的衰落,尤其是曾经称霸全球的消费电子业。多年的行业巨头索尼、夏普、松下等公司持续亏损裁员,夏普被迫向台资鸿海精密出售股份和工厂,都是例证。
  对比之下是韩国的崛起,在传统制造业和电子产业上都开始超越日本。在国际舞台上,不仅“韩流”文化风靡海外,韩国籍联合国秘书长和韩国裔世界银行行长,都显示不成比例的世界性影响。
  在次大陆,与导弹试射反映的印度经济成就对比,巴基斯坦经济停滞不前,政治上继续缓慢崩解。美国国会议员新近甚至引进支持巴国俾路支斯坦省“自决独立”的议案。今年的新疆叶城恐怖暴力事件,也被北京指认与巴国伊斯兰组织直接有关。
  可以重温一项历史教训。普法战争催动统一的德意志第二帝国,当时在经济实力上迅速崛起,一时颇有主导欧洲大陆、成为全球大国的远景。这一趋势被一次大战逆转,一个关键原因便是德国选择的国际盟友。大战初期,德军名将鲁登道夫对奥匈帝国实地访问调查后,向德皇报告说:“我们和一具死尸结成了同盟。”
  更不幸的是德国其实与两具死尸结成了联盟,另一死尸便是与奥匈帝国一样日薄西山的奥斯曼帝国。
  在当今世局中观察一下北京的主要亚洲盟友:巴基斯坦、朝鲜、缅甸军政府。形容为“死尸”也许过分,但决都不是生气勃勃的可靠对象,甚至不是天长日久的可持续实体,令人深思。
作者在北美从事科研工作
《联合早报网》
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