OPD 6/4
Edited by Becca Prashner
Amid the United States’ clamor over its “return to Asia,” Japan, which is situated in the region and has been in a “departure from Asia” for the past half century, still shows no sign of its own return. The present Japanese government already rarely speaks of an “East Asian community.”
Within the United States’ return to Asia, otherwise known as their strategic shift towards the East, a key objective is to take advantage of the eastward shift of the global economy’s center of gravity. This allows them to draw strength from Asia’s economic growth while guarding against China becoming a bellwether for the collective rise of emerging nations, which would weaken both the U.S. hegemony and Western-centric ideology. However, the U.S. is unwilling to allow its ally Japan to mount a similar return to Asia. For example, it backs the minor Asian countries of the Philippines and Vietnam in their challenges to China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Obviously, this is completely antithetical to the original basis for the return to Asia position supported by Japan’s “pro-Asia” politicians, who wish to end Japan’s so-called departure from Asia and unite forces with other Asian nations.
However, in the great wave of economic globalization, Japan’s economy has become increasingly integrated with other areas in Asia, as a few years ago China became Japan’s largest trading partner and consumer of Japanese exports. A Japanese return to Asia should fundamentally be in its interest, and is also part of the demands of the Asian people for ending the centuries-long nightmare of what they call an “advanced Europe and backwards Asia.” They promote Asia’s peaceful development and advocate realizing a revitalized Asia.
So, can Japan make a return to Asia? Under the present circumstances, this would be rather difficult, as the requirements for a Japanese return conflict with those for a U.S. one. In America’s view, if Japan and China unite, its own presence and interests in Asia will be significantly weakened and shouldered out. Because of this, when America “returned Okinawa” to Japan in 1971, it planted the “mine” of the Diaoyu islands between China and Japan. The resulting conflict over ownership of the island has been the cause of constant friction which shows little chance of reconciliation. This is exactly in line with America’s wishes for Sino-Japanese relations.
Since the U.S. does not wish to allow a Japanese return to Asia, Japan simply cannot return, as to this day it remains a country under U.S. control, or as a well-known Japanese commentator on military affairs put it, “remains a nation under U.S. occupation.” Ever since Ichiro Ozawa was accused of violating the Political Funds Control Law, astute individuals have begun to unravel the hidden forces which used every means at their disposal to pressure Ozawa, all traced back to one hand – that of the CIA. After the incident, the CIA came up repeatedly in the Japanese media. Later events increasingly revealed that America’s penetration into and influence within Japanese internal affairs, from media to political circles, is sufficient to make the Japanese prime minister dance on America’s puppet strings. Those who offend the U.S., like former Prime Minister Hatoyama, who only wanted to make U.S.-Japanese relations more equal, are forced to resign. The scope of America’s, and particularly the CIA’s, influence over its long-time partner Japan has given politicians and bureaucrats who take issue with America’s domineering attitude no choice but to endure it silently.
Under these circumstances, a Japanese return to Asia would indeed be difficult to manage, but things are not entirely hopeless. This is due to a multitude of factors: the ever-increasing cohesiveness of China’s, Japan’s, and other Asian countries’ economies and cultures; the collapse of the “China Threat” theory under the reality of China’s unwavering insistence on peaceful development; the gradual relaxation of the Japanese people’s initial uneasy reaction to China’s rise; the persistent struggles of Japan’s “pro-Asia” camp and peaceful, democratic power rooted deeply among the people; and the increasing urgency of a collective Chinese and Japanese response to climate change and regional environmental problems. Japan, which was called a “country with destiny” by the monk Jianzhen, will recognize in the end that “a distant relative is not as helpful as a close neighbor,” and sincerely start on the path towards a return to Asia.
The author is an honorary member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.