The Middle East Beyond America

America will no longer be the Middle East’s watchdog. The new U.S. position in the region is a transformation that has upset the balance in effect for years. Even if it is too early for a new regional architecture to take shape, the old strategic moves are already in question.

Recently describing a more modest U.S. policy in the Middle East in The New York Times, Susan Rice, Barack Obama’s new national security adviser, identified three key priorities: negotiations with Iran, as well as those between Israel and the Palestinians, and the search for a political solution to the Syrian crisis. The overall goal, she explained, is to avoid the U.S. president becoming wrapped up in the ongoing crises in the Middle East, while other issues, such as those related to Asia, also compete for his attention.

The discussion with Tehran is the fundamental element of the ongoing transformation. Hassan Rouhani’s election as president of the Islamic republic, with the mission of attaining the lifting of Western sanctions in exchange for an agreement on nuclear power, triggered the first serious process of negotiations with Washington since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It is possible they will be successful.

Saudi Arabia expressed its disagreement by sulking at the United Nations Security Council, even though it is the country’s turn to hold a nonpermanent member seat. For Riyadh, an agreement between its main ally, the United States, and its main enemy, Iran, would bring harrowing changes. Since the alliance was finalized in 1945 between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz, also known as Ibn Saud, on board the warship USS Quincy, in the Suez Canal, the U.S. has ensured Saudi Arabia’s security in exchange for access to oil. The possibility of U.S. energy independence, promised by the revolution in shale gas, calls into question the market terms that have been underlying White House policy in the Midde East for over half a century.

The Arab revolts have put an end to this beautiful agreement, which had already experienced ups and downs, while many Saudis found themselves implicated in the attacks of 9/11. Now, it is Riyadh’s turn to worry about Washington’s attitude, its haste to let go of former allies — such as Egypt’s Mubarak in order to embrace the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood — and its refusal to act in Syria.

The Saudis are concerned about the American desertion of Mubarak and refusal to act in Syria. They know that an agreement with Tehran will not only provide guarantees for the Iranians’ nuclear program, but will also acknowledge Iran’s role in the region. As a Sunni power, hosting a strong Shiite minority in its oil-rich, eastern provinces, Riyadh has a strategic priority opposition to a rise in power of Shiite Iran and its allies.

Israel is in a similar situation to that of the Saudi monarchy vis-à-vis Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon: The enemy of my enemy is my friend — an agreement that, although impossible to announce, is being drawn up between Saudi Arabia and the Israeli government. Even if they do not maintain official relations, official contacts are on the rise and could become operational if deemed necessary.

No external power is going to replace Washington. The countries in the region are going to have to take more responsibility for their own security. In Israel’s case, this is nothing new; however, air raids against Hezbollah targets in Syria — whose origin has been curiously revealed by American sources — are a sign of Israel’s willingness to anticipate the changes underway, which could be out of its control.

Other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and Turkey, are going to have to reconsider their strategic calculations based on the light mark that the U.S. is now happy to leave in the Middle East.