Negotiating with the Taliban: the United States’ Last Way Out

This is the American military’s final year in Afghanistan. With or without a transition plan, the Afghan government alone will be responsible for the country’s future by the end of the year.

Coalition members fear that the fragile regime will fall; they even believe that the country could return to its pre-Sept. 11 state and be controlled by an oppressive Taliban government tied to al-Qaida.

The problem is that no one knows how to avoid this catastrophic scenario.

Since January of last year, when President Obama announced that troops would be completely withdrawn before the end of 2014, the number of transition options has slightly decreased.

For the Taliban, this announcement has meant waiting out the clock until the Americans leave. To keep the meager gains wrested from the powerful Taliban since 2001, the United States has realized that negotiating with the enemies they are currently fighting is inevitable.

Since 2011 the Americans, the Afghan government and the Taliban have been negotiating. There are many challenges and the talks have been interrupted several times, but American leaders do not have a better choice.

Any withdrawal without first resolving the conflict with the insurgents would inevitably mean certain doom for the Afghan government. The “decent interval” (a term used by Kissinger about Vietnam) before its collapse would just be a fig leaf for an American defeat.

Whether the withdrawal is quick or gradual and whether it decides help the Afghan government from afar or not, the United States has two choices: a costly defeat or a very costly defeat. The obvious problem is finding a compromise that can satisfy three parties with, at the very least, divergent goals, without it being an ineffective, vague synthesis.

The Benefits of Negotiation for the Taliban

If the Taliban hold the upper hand, then why would they agree to negotiate? There are three incentives for them.

First of all, it would mean the end of their clandestine status. They have certainly shown their ability to wage a war of attrition with limited resources, but they are under constant pressure from hostile Afghan, Pakistani and especially American forces, whose drones can strike anywhere. Even with the withdrawal of ground troops, a continuation of the conflict would certainly mean maintaining drone strikes.

Second, a compromise would mean recognizing their status as major political actors. For the Taliban, becoming a legitimate political party would be a definite gain despite their relative popularity in Afghanistan and their terrorist label.

Finally, legally ascending to positions of power would allow them to advance their societal reformation program. Of course, this program is unpopular in the West (and among some Afghans), but it is impossible to ignore that a significant part of the population supports it.

What does the democratic Afghan government stand to gain? First of all, the current regime would be preserved, at least for the most part.

Ending the conflict would also finally allow precious resources to be allotted to reconstruction. From society’s point of view, political pluralism would put an end to all-powerful parties (or tribes) controlling the reins of power.

The Taliban could use their reputation of integrity to denounce corruption. Generally, power stops power: A political stage divided between the majority and the opposition limits excesses.

Of course, many acquired rights are at risk (especially for minorities and women), but decisions would result exclusively from Afghan debates and would not be accused of being “values imposed by foreigners.”

For the United States, are these possible developments worth the effort compared to simply withdrawing? For one, the White House could embellish its “victory” and say the 2,300 soldiers that died in Afghanistan did not do so in vain.

If the compromise results in a pluralist political arena where conflicts are resolved peacefully, Afghanistan would stabilize and be able to focus on its development.

Additionally, bringing the Taliban within the regime would give them reason to defend it (against dissident factions that refused the compromise, for example).

Beyond the need to save face, the United States’ main demand is the guarantee that Afghanistan will not become a haven for international jihadism again. If this demand is accommodated, a large part of al-Qaida’s central sanctuary will disappear.

Naturally, there are many obstacles standing in the way of an “ideal” negotiated transition — that is, one in which the Taliban and other political forces would obediently support democracy and only serve the interests of Afghans.

From now until the end of the year, talks can definitely be called off if the Taliban believe they have more to gain by continuing the war. If they accept a compromise, hard-line factions can always dissent.

Finally, if the government remains plagued by inefficiency and corruption, the odds of it falling multiply.

From this angle, the two conditions put forward by the Taliban as prerequisites for serious talks (the departure of both President Karzai and American troops) will have been fulfilled. What the Taliban decide to do after that is unclear, to say the least.