America's Allies: Angry and Regretful

Within the circles of the governing elite in Arab countries, the Gulf countries in particular, there are feelings of disappointment and bitterness towards the United States’ policies in the region. The position of American President Barack Obama’s administration on the crisis in Syria has revealed buried feelings of injustice that even extend to the policies of the previous Republican administration headed by President George W. Bush, who embarked on the warpath in Iraq and Afghanistan and met with great support from the Gulf countries in particular.

Today, some Gulf politicians don’t hesitate to express their regret for supporting America’s efforts to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. They ask openly, “What was the result?” Where Iraq previously acted as a blockage to Iranian aspirations, it has now fallen into Iran’s grasp and the Gulf countries have become exposed to the Iranian danger.

The Obama administration is in a much worse situation: In the eyes of those Gulf politicians, it is powerless in Syria and surrendering in front of Russia’s growing power and influence in the Middle East. More so, this administration is persisting toward broaching a historical deal with Iran at the expense of America’s allies in the Gulf.

Obama will hear accusations like these and more in Saudi Arabia at the end of this week. During this visit, the American president will try to mend deteriorating relations with Gulf countries. But how much bitterness can he contain? Saudi Arabia itself is angry, Bahrain is annoyed because the American administration has criticized it and opened up to the Shiite opposition, Qatar is perplexed by America’s hesitation in Syria, and the UAE wants America’s complete support for Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and participation in the war on the Muslim Brotherhood.

But the Gulf countries’ approach to American policy contains some degree of astonishing contradiction: They are disappointed by the results of the occupation of Iraq, yet angry about the lack of military intervention in Syria.

Gulf politicians, along with other Arabs, do not want to understand or accept the change occurring in American foreign policy and Obama’s new approach; the Middle East is no longer the main center of attention for policymakers in Washington. With the exception of Israel’s security and interests, there is no American red line in the Middle East. The interest in the Iran issue stems, first and foremost, from concern for Israel’s security and the United States’ need for larger regional settlements that connect to its higher interests.

The Obama administration, in contrast to previous administrations, looks at the outside world through the lens of purely domestic interests known to the American citizen, who, after a stifling economic crisis and foreign wars depriving America of hundreds of billions of dollars, is inhibited by immediate economic and bread-and-butter priorities.

Some people are betting that America will change its policy as the climate of Cold War bipolarity between it and Russia returns, and causes its traditional allies in the region to reclaim their traditional place in the context of its desire to reinforce its global front against the expanding Russian alliance.

In the short term, in the climate of the enflamed Ukrainian crisis, this kind of analysis seems logical. But for it to turn into policy takes a long time. America is a massive political machine inside which changing course is not as easy as it is in small countries that swap policies whenever the moods of their rulers change.

Until Obama’s second term ends, it is unlikely that America’s approach to the Middle East will change, regardless of how agitated and angry its allies become.