The World’s Weary Policeman

With their lightning fast advance toward the gates of Baghdad, the black-clad fighters of ISIL have demonstrated just how unstable Iraq continues to be. Prime Minister Maliki, who initially came to power with American help, may have thought his leadership had been consolidated after elections in late April. In reality, however, Maliki’s authority never extended beyond the Shiite territories. The collapse of state order in the Sunni north under ISIL’s onslaught is reminiscent of the unexpected seizure of northern Mali by Islamist rebels a year and a half ago. As the capital there stood on the brink of collapse, gendarme from a distant land — France — came running and put a quick end to the horrific episode. It’s obvious who’s best suited to assume the role of world policeman this time; however, Sheriff America is keeping its head down. Of course, it has good reasons for this: Baghdad, the capital, is not immediately threatened; air strikes alone are hardly enough to repel the jihadis; and there is doubt that Maliki can do what’s necessary to include the Sunnis politically. Above all, the Americans don’t want to step back into the Iraqi quicksand.

Borders Become Relative

Reasonable arguments were made, too, when President Obama reversed his decision for military action in Syria; when, during the Crimea crisis, he treated President Putin with kid gloves; and recently, when he announced the complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2016.

However, the overall image that emerges from these decisions is one of foreign policy weakness. For the superpower, re-engagement in Iraq represents a glaring humiliation: The territories overrun by ISIL were once brought under U.S. control and paid for in much blood. Until 2009, the Americans had largely neutralized the Islamist State in Iraq, the precursor organization to ISIL. Now, it appears that these efforts were just as futile as its billion-dollar rebuild of Iraqi security forces. When Obama asserted during the withdrawal of the last American troops in late 2011 that Iraq was now stable and could stand on its own two feet, he obviously got carried away by wishful thinking.

Were the Sunni extremists able to establish their “state of God” permanently, it would represent more than the threat of a refuge for terrorists. It could also be the end of an effective, nearly 100-year-old territorial order in the region. In effect, Iraq has already disintegrated into three parts, with the ISIL territory traversing the state border between Iraq and Syria. Not that the lines once drawn by France and Great Britain were ideal, but the Americans have invariably understood themselves to date as the guarantors of the territorial division bequeathed by the colonial powers. During the Gulf War in 1991, they re-established Kuwait’s independence, and as the occupying power in Iraq, they insisted on the unity of this multiethnic state at the height of the civil war. This decision stemmed from the realization that the drive for a new territorial order would be accompanied by bloody chaos and would also awaken external desires to shift borders. In Europe, the stability of the worldwide system of state borders is taken for granted. However, over past decades, the system has relied on the will of the U.S. to defend it. Seventy years ago, President Roosevelt solemnly promised “to end future wars by stepping on their necks” before they are able to escalate. In Washington, the will for this has noticeably ebbed.

Against this backdrop, the annexation of Crimea by Russia acts like a beacon. The West’s spiritless sanctions were an invitation to Moscow to go forward with its nasty game. As expected, it did not stop with Crimea; meanwhile, Russia let tanks roll into eastern Ukraine and kept the secessionist movement alive by supplying it with modern weapons. Thus, borders that once appeared unalterable suddenly became relative. This had a signal character well beyond the region. Long-standing Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki compared Putin with a wolf who can kill sheep unhindered without a shepherd intervening.

American weakness is not lost on China. Increasingly unabashed, it asserts extortionate claims in the South China Sea, recently laying claim even to artificial islands to secure offshore bases and thereby preempt territorial claims. Its desire to expand is coupled to displacing America as the hegemonic power in East Asia. Washington admittedly realizes this and renews its alliances with China’s troubled neighbors. But how far would Obama really go in a serious show down? It is already difficult to imagine that the American people would be inclined to stand by Japan in a war over a few rocks like the Senkaku Islands. What is more, according to American journalist Robert Kagan, the problem cannot simply be reduced to war-weariness. Kagan diagnoses a fundamental change in his fellow Americans that impacts their readiness to take over global responsibility.

The Gardener’s Disregarded Advice

Obama has the home crowd behind him when he underscores how Iraqis must resolve their conflicts themselves. But foreign policy is more than just short-term reactions to acute crises. Former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson once compared his métier to that of a gardener: One does not achieve success overnight; rather, patience and careful tending are important. Now, having barely heeded Mesopotamia since withdrawing and not committing its diplomatic weight to dissuade Maliki from his anti-Sunni course of action, the United States’ chickens are coming to roost in Iraq. It would have been wiser to strengthen the moderate rebels in Syria before the ISIL terror-guerrillas could spread there. But Maliki will not win any horticultural prizes either. Three years ago, he showed the American military the door; now he beseeches Washington for support. He experiences something that others may repeat elsewhere. As sinister as Sheriff America appears to some, it will be truly sinister when this world policeman stops answering the call for help.