From the Bush Doctrine to the Obama Doctrine: The Return of Preventive Wars
Published in RTBF
(Belgium) on 24 September 2014
by Olivier Corten (link to original)
(Belgium) on 24 September 2014
by Olivier Corten (link to original)
Translated from
by Rachael Robinson.
Edited by Kyrstie Lane.
Beyond the problem concerning the legality of the strikes in Syria, recent statements made by the Obama administration seem to have upgraded the old “preventive war” doctrine, which was proclaimed by George W. Bush after Sept. 11. It is also one of the stakes of the intervention that a new coalition is currently leading against the Islamic State.
A new war has been in the news headlines for a few days now: a war aiming to put an end to the criminal extremist activities linked to the Islamic State group, which controls a part of Iraq and Syria. Nobody seems to have challenged the appropriateness of such a cause, even though we can legitimately ask ourselves whether the method employed – i.e. launching a military strike campaign along with a massive dispatch of weapons in the region, in favor of Washington’s allies – can create more disadvantages than advantages. The cases of Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and above all, Iraq itself, cannot but demand the attention of those who lightheartedly go to war, thinking that the problem will be resolved in a few weeks’ time through a new military campaign.
In this context, international law does not appear to be of concern for the various actors in this new global spectacle. Contrary to what we were able to observe in 2003 when Bush launched the Gulf War, it is true that this war does not involve attacking a “state” in the legal sense of the term, but rather an irregular criminal group. Moreover, military action is being taken at the request of the Iraqi authorities, with the Security Council having “urge[d] the international community, in accordance with international law to further strengthen and expand support for the Government of Iraq as it fights ISIL and associated armed groups.” In the case of Syria, local authorities may not have formally given their consent, but this can easily be inferred through the government’s reaction when strikes were first launched. Not only did Damascus show no signs of protest against the launch, even though the U.S. gave them the heads up just moments before, but they also declared their support for “any international effort” that aims at combating the Islamic State jihadi. At the time when an official report was being drafted, Syria had still not shown any opposition. Though some ambiguity remains in this regard, we could thus consider that this war is compatible with the respect for the regional states’ sovereignty, and is being led under the aegis of the Security Council, without authorization nonetheless. This is why the U.N. secretary-general recently welcomed “the international solidarity to confront this challenge.”
Yet, the problem is actually the fact that the highest U.S. authorities refrained from relying on the argument of (implicit) consent from the Syrian state. However, over the past few days, the U.S. has asserted its power to act, where necessary, against Damascus’ will. In his speech delivered on Sept. 10, Obama stated, in very general terms, that “we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are,” just as Bush similarly stated after the Sept. 11 attacks, as well as Vladimir Putin, who, soon after taking up his presidential duties, asserted that we must “waste terrorists in the outhouse.” More precisely, in a letter to the Security Council dated Sept. 23, the day the strikes commenced, the U.S. maintained a legitimate defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. According to the text, the Islamic State and “other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond.” This threat would justify the strikes in Syria, since Syria would be “unwilling or unable” to put an end to the very same threat. It is obvious that such a position does not reflect international law, which stipulates that in the event of a threat originating in a state which does not hold total control over its territory, parties must either gain consent from the government of said state, or place themselves under the Security Council’s authority. While it could have followed at least one of these routes with a real chance of success, the Obama administration opted for a radical and bellicose line of action, giving itself the extensive power to intervene in any country in the world, without conforming to the U.N. framework. Here we can see the notion of “preventive war” in a broad sense, a doctrine that has been repeatedly condemned by an overwhelming majority of states, especially during the onset of the war against Iraq in 2003 – the current events of which incidentally stem from its prolongation. Initially, Barack Obama was greatly opposed to such rhetoric, since he had insisted on the need to realign the U.S. with a multilateral vision that is more respectful of international law. It seems that these statements of intention no longer stand today. In light of the official position that he chose to adopt, President Obama appears to be taking the preventive war doctrine on board … along with all the potential consequences that it may hold for other states in the international society.
A new war has been in the news headlines for a few days now: a war aiming to put an end to the criminal extremist activities linked to the Islamic State group, which controls a part of Iraq and Syria. Nobody seems to have challenged the appropriateness of such a cause, even though we can legitimately ask ourselves whether the method employed – i.e. launching a military strike campaign along with a massive dispatch of weapons in the region, in favor of Washington’s allies – can create more disadvantages than advantages. The cases of Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and above all, Iraq itself, cannot but demand the attention of those who lightheartedly go to war, thinking that the problem will be resolved in a few weeks’ time through a new military campaign.
In this context, international law does not appear to be of concern for the various actors in this new global spectacle. Contrary to what we were able to observe in 2003 when Bush launched the Gulf War, it is true that this war does not involve attacking a “state” in the legal sense of the term, but rather an irregular criminal group. Moreover, military action is being taken at the request of the Iraqi authorities, with the Security Council having “urge[d] the international community, in accordance with international law to further strengthen and expand support for the Government of Iraq as it fights ISIL and associated armed groups.” In the case of Syria, local authorities may not have formally given their consent, but this can easily be inferred through the government’s reaction when strikes were first launched. Not only did Damascus show no signs of protest against the launch, even though the U.S. gave them the heads up just moments before, but they also declared their support for “any international effort” that aims at combating the Islamic State jihadi. At the time when an official report was being drafted, Syria had still not shown any opposition. Though some ambiguity remains in this regard, we could thus consider that this war is compatible with the respect for the regional states’ sovereignty, and is being led under the aegis of the Security Council, without authorization nonetheless. This is why the U.N. secretary-general recently welcomed “the international solidarity to confront this challenge.”
Yet, the problem is actually the fact that the highest U.S. authorities refrained from relying on the argument of (implicit) consent from the Syrian state. However, over the past few days, the U.S. has asserted its power to act, where necessary, against Damascus’ will. In his speech delivered on Sept. 10, Obama stated, in very general terms, that “we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are,” just as Bush similarly stated after the Sept. 11 attacks, as well as Vladimir Putin, who, soon after taking up his presidential duties, asserted that we must “waste terrorists in the outhouse.” More precisely, in a letter to the Security Council dated Sept. 23, the day the strikes commenced, the U.S. maintained a legitimate defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. According to the text, the Islamic State and “other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond.” This threat would justify the strikes in Syria, since Syria would be “unwilling or unable” to put an end to the very same threat. It is obvious that such a position does not reflect international law, which stipulates that in the event of a threat originating in a state which does not hold total control over its territory, parties must either gain consent from the government of said state, or place themselves under the Security Council’s authority. While it could have followed at least one of these routes with a real chance of success, the Obama administration opted for a radical and bellicose line of action, giving itself the extensive power to intervene in any country in the world, without conforming to the U.N. framework. Here we can see the notion of “preventive war” in a broad sense, a doctrine that has been repeatedly condemned by an overwhelming majority of states, especially during the onset of the war against Iraq in 2003 – the current events of which incidentally stem from its prolongation. Initially, Barack Obama was greatly opposed to such rhetoric, since he had insisted on the need to realign the U.S. with a multilateral vision that is more respectful of international law. It seems that these statements of intention no longer stand today. In light of the official position that he chose to adopt, President Obama appears to be taking the preventive war doctrine on board … along with all the potential consequences that it may hold for other states in the international society.