Has the Democratic Progressive Party Found Its Golden Branch of Hope? Misjudgment Is More Dangerous than Placing a Wrong Bet

Three days ago, the Joe Biden administration released its “Interim National Security Strategy Guidance,” emphasizing that the United States will support Taiwan as a democratic country and economic and security partner. The news came like a golden branch of hope to Democratic Progressive Party supporters, who had been depressed for the past several months; they have completely forgotten about the wrong bet they had placed, as though possessed, for almost the entirety of last year.

What’s interesting to note is that Executive Yuan President Su Tseng-chang also acknowledged in an interview that people had been ridiculing the government for placing the wrong bet. Clearly unimpressed with Su’s wry words, Chao Shao-kang* countered that “the DPP bet on Donald Trump in the first place ― is placing a wrong bet something to be happy about?”

It has not been uncommon for Taiwan to put its eggs in the wrong basket in regard to a U.S. election. In the 1948 election, Chiang Kai-shek placed his bets on Republican Thomas E. Dewey, but Democrat Harry Truman won big. Because Chiang had been so supportive of Dewey, the relationship between the Truman administration and the Chiang administration was not very cordial. But after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States still sent the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait.

As we all know, last year, Tsai Ing-wen mobilized the DPP in support of Trump, and many TV shows were cheering for Trump for several days straight, as if Taiwan were actually participating in the U.S. presidential election.

Last year, Tsai played favorites among the two parties’ congressional candidates, but Biden is now demonstrating his generosity, still regarding Taiwan as a key priority for U.S. support. In the “Interim Guidance,” the White House declares: “We will support Taiwan, a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, in line with longstanding American commitments.”

However, while the Tsai administration may be complacent, it should not forget, let alone misjudge the potential direction in which U.S.-China relations may be headed. First of all, since this is a provisional guide, there will certainly be an enhanced version of this guide in the future; it is too early to say whether there will be adjustments or changes in its contents.

Second, U.S.-China relations will take time to settle, and in general it may take as long as two years, as during the Reagan presidency, from an intention to resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan prior to the election to the signing of the “August 17 Communiqué” with China. It may also take as little as a year, just as it did with George W. Bush first declaring that the president wished to defend Taiwan, then Vice President Dick Cheney changing the words to say that the U.S. would “assist” Taiwan in defending itself and the lines of alliance finally transforming into a joint U.S.-China effort to fight terrorism.

The U.S. and China have just now entered into a period of transition; future developments will involve interactions with many variables that are difficult to predict.

Moreover, while the White House’s “Interim Guidance” openly supports Taiwan, it still does so under the “One China” framework. In other words, no matter how friendly the U.S. may seem to Taiwan, in the end it still has its own national interests at heart. Once the present administration discovers that the “exchange” between U.S. and Chinese interests is worth more than any exchange between the U.S. and Taiwan, the situation may become volatile.

Last, as the international situation is changing rapidly, we cannot become complacent with the status quo, let alone make misjudgments under optimistic premises.

*Translator’s Note: Chao Shao-kang is a Taiwanese media personality and politician.