The US Wants To Turn Japan and Korea into Bargaining Chips


Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in Japan today, where they will hold face-to-face, “two-plus-two” talks with Japanese officials. Later they will travel to Korea for a similar round of talks. The U.S. has firmly emphasized the importance of these two talks in strengthening the United States’ system of alliances. Austin stated that the United States’ goal is to ensure that it has the “capabilities and the operational plans and concepts to be able to offer credible deterrence to China or anybody else who would want to take on the U.S.”

On Thursday, Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan will meet with Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi in Alaska. The more Washington emphasizes the importance of the “two-plus-two” talks with Japan and Korea, the more it makes them seem like preparation for the strategic dialogue with China.

In reality, the focus of this round of tightly scheduled discussions with its allies is the U.S.-China relationship. These allies have been turned into props like never before, and have become bargaining chips in the United States’ haggle with China.

However, the United States’ logic in this case is not sound. Washington is plagued with worry and troubles these days, but the cause is not slackened relationships with its allies. Japan and Korea both rely on the U.S. for security; that hasn’t changed. What Washington really sees as a threat is China’s constant economic development, as well as the comprehensive growth that it brings. How can the U.S. solve that by going to its allies to hear some pleasant language?

China and Japan have disputes, but those disputes are mediated by the two countries’ shared interests. Japan’s greatest challenge is managing its relationships with the U.S. and with China, and building a particular strategic balance centered on its own interests. Even the most foolish of Japanese politicians wouldn’t drag their relationship with China and the U.S. into a zero-sum mode. Japan certainly hopes to strengthen its relations with the U.S., and it’s willing to step on some toes to do it, but the tactical ability of a U.S-Japan alliance to counter China can only go so far.

Korea is even less likely to be the vanguard in a U.S. strategy to blockade China. The scale of Chinese-Korean economic cooperation completely outmatches that of Korea and the U.S. Pushing Korea to decouple from China is equivalent to snatching an apple from Korea’s hand and giving it a crabapple in return.

Japan and Korea both hope that Blinken and Austin can provide them with the resources and bargaining chips they need to gain influence and advantage in negotiations, but they hope the Americans don’t put a knife in their hands and ask them to use it on China, or to cut off a piece of their own flesh.

The U.S. made up many charges against China and criticized it for “breaking the rules,” and slowly but surely it succeeded in fooling itself. Since then, the U.S. has firmly believed that its problems are China’s fault, and that blockading and decoupling can restore its position of absolute dominance and render the U.S. untouchable.

In reality, all of the United States’ problems trace back to its shrinking competitive edge in the age of globalization; it became addicted to military and financial hegemony; its speed and ability to innovate is decreasing, and its labor force is growing lazy. It isn’t focusing on creating new kinds of competitive advantage, it is only trying to preserve the advantages it already has, like milking a cash cow. If the U.S. goes on like this, it would be no surprise if it led to problems.

Globalization changed some of the global economic system’s DNA. The U.S. once led a small clique of its allies in hoarding wealth and keeping everyone else down while it enjoyed the spoils, but those days are gone forever. The globalization of economic development cannot be reversed. Humanity has now generally become civilized, the benefit gained through gunboat policies has decreased significantly, and the meaning of national security has been transformed. There’s a fundamental misalignment in replicating these Cold War era strategies, like trying to install a part that was a best seller decades ago into a modern automobile. It’s a failure to grasp the main point.

Alaska is the true focus of international politics this week. Blinken and Austin’s talks in Korea and Japan should focus more on their bilateral relationships; if they turn them into a campaign for support in the upcoming strategic U.S.-China talks, then they will just be exploiting Korea and Japan even further. Although Japan and Korea are both happy to welcome the American secretary of state and defense secretary, they need to be careful, or the U.S. could hijack them in their bid for a mutually beneficial relationship.

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