America’s Offer of Reason

The U.S. answer to Russian demands has long been known. So, should it all get thrown out? Why the written exchange may be a way out of the crisis.

Vladimir Putin created the Ukraine crisis; the escalation in recent weeks has been driven by his will alone. The U.S. administration’s written response to Russian illusions of a new European security order is only a building block in this construction, whose rationale cannot be known. If the Russian goal had been to conduct negotiations over eastern Ukraine, weapons, maneuvers or cyberthreats, there would have been easier ways to achieve them. Offers have been on the table for years.

Thus, the response formulated in Washington to the two presumptuous draft agreements was, content-wise, above all just a formality. What is written in it has been publicly stated in many rounds of discussion. Of course, NATO will not compromise on the principle that membership is open to every country that fulfils certain prerequisites (which Ukraine presently does not). Of course, the U.S. will not withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe, which for decades have been part of a calculated deterrence that applies to all sides, Russia as well as the West. One could do without these weapons if they were considered superfluous, but that is wishful thinking. And of course, the membership of the Baltic nations, Poland or southeastern European countries will not be rescinded. These nations have chosen to enter the alliance through a democratic process and thus through a sovereign decision. No one forced them to join.

Thus, there is hope that Russia will use the written answer in its attempt to demand a new order as a point of entry into serious negotiations and an exit from the crisis. There are enough subjects remaining to be negotiated, including, of course, the threat perceived by the Russian government. One can thus talk about short- and intermediate-range missiles, nuclear disarmament, the scale and location of maneuvers, the exchange of officers to build trust. All this has been regulated previously in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and NATO, and there have been repeated calls to renew it.

Negotiations Would Constrain Putin

But is that the point? Of course not. Whoever includes Putin in the logic of negotiations takes away his greatest tactical advantage: to act whenever and however he wants. It is this element of surprise that creates the pressure that the West finds so painful, that divides societies and that provokes disagreements in legislatures, including here in Germany. It is the piercing power of not knowing that produces paralysis, helplessness and weakness.

So, would it have been better to just do without the written response or, more simply, to not take Putin’s bait? No, it would not have been, because only through the exchange of written proposals does it become possible to relocate the conflict from the parade grounds on Ukraine’s eastern border to the negotiating table in Geneva. The U.S., NATO, the West — their only option is to rationalize this conflict and to force it into the corset of diplomacy. No attempt in this direction is too small to be meaningful.

Unity and decisiveness are also meaningful now. The U.S. and its allies have done what was reasonable and possible. Putin must now decide if he wants to wage a war. He knows the cost of that.