Profiteer US Drives Deeper Wedge between China and Japan

Published in Guancha News
(China) on 10 July 2022
by Hu Xijin (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Andrew Engler. Edited by Gillian Palmer.
After the assassination of Shinzo Abe on July 8, I read through online posts and the international news and, upon reflection, I would like to share my take.

It is time to pry out the deep wedge between China and Japan.

It must be pointed out that the bad blood between China and Japan is mainly due to the Japanese. In modern times, it is Japan which invaded China, particularly the war of conquest against China following the 1931 Mukden Incident. This brought great suffering to the Chinese people. Japan has not only failed to reflect properly on its war crimes, but also continued to rub salt in the wounds of history by prime-ministerial visits honoring the Yasukuni Shrine and by textbooks whitewashing Japan’s war crimes. In recent years, Japan has enthusiastically echoed U.S. calls to implement a China containment strategy, further aggravating our “strategic distrust,” the suspicion that the U.S. is pursuing a long-term strategy that is to our detriment. The mutual antagonism between China and Japan which is flourishing in public opinion only serves to deepen the perilous chasm between our two countries.

So why do we need to smooth things out between China and Japan? Japan is a permanent neighbor, and this should sober us up to focus on China's current national interests rather than hashing out historic grievances.

For the U.S., desiring to surround us with a united, anti-China alliance, Japan is one of the two levers of a pincer. Deep bitterness between China and Japan is the lifeblood of U.S. containment policy. Were China-Japan relations improved and Japan's hostility toward China substantially reduced, the U.S. pincer would lose a lever and cease to function.

Is it possible dislodge the wedge between China and Japan? Admittedly, this is a major challenge, due to the continued U.S. military occupation of Japan, binding it in an alliance that makes it somewhat like a U.S. colony. The U.S mostly calls the shots in forming Japan’s strategy, diplomacy and defense.

At the outset of the 1970s, when China-U.S. relations improved, China-Japan relations improved. Later, when China-U.S. relations became complicated, China-Japan relations became complicated. The pattern is clear: Until the U.S. fundamentally adjusts its current China strategy, Japan’s icy tension with China will also not thaw. It is difficult to achieve a breakthrough in China-U.S. relations, so the difficulties of drawing Japan into an alliance go without saying.

Note that, although it is impossible to convert Japan from a U.S. ally into our strategic partner, we can greatly reduce China-Japan tensions, making it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to use Japan in its anti-China strategy. This is a very important option for China. There are very few pressing national security conflicts between China and Japan. Strategic competition is not real; the strength of Japan’s national power is not of the same order of magnitude as China’s, which the Japanese are reluctantly but gradually accepting. The historical problems between China and Japan are complicated, but there are clues to understanding it, from ideological conflict and diplomatic struggle to the collision of wills. The explosive result of this conflict would be as big as you please, but it is also up to us to restrain the issue. The biggest territorial dispute with Japan is over the Diaoyu Islands, but please note, of the large number of disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests in Asia, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is of small practical interest. Yet, it has become one of the biggest drivers of friction and disputes in our diplomacy with Japan.

The high tensions brewing over the Diaoyu Islands issue and historical issues originate largely in a breakdown of China-Japan relations. Formerly, these matters were manageable, but a toxic atmosphere is accelerating the deterioration of China-Japan relations and leading to an escalation of the rivalry over these issues. Japan has failed to come to terms with China’s rise; it is adapting poorly, and so it rehashes these issues, seeking cathartic release of its collective anxiety and sense of crisis. We, in turn, are offended; this triggers more and more warped interactions between China and Japan, forming a vicious cycle.

The China-Japan conflict, however, is far more than a diplomatic issue. The two societies hold each other in contempt, and it is unfortunately politically correct to be at each other’s throats. A poll revealed negative views of Japan have increased in China where 66% now report unfavorable opinions, the highest since the diplomatic normalization between China and Japan. Japan’s negative views of China were even higher, polling at an astonishing 91%. The fierce public opinion on both sides is an impediment to our governments taking measures to ease relations, and to our media discussing China-Japan relations objectively and rationally. Whether in China or Japan, harsh speech about the other nation finds positive popular reception. This is very detrimental to improving relations.

Whether and how to break the deadlock is a major issue for both sides. Japan is one of the United States’ dogs of war straining at a contained China, but the Japanese side has not yet given free rein to its hostile strategy. For some time, Japanese strategists have noted the ebb and flow of power between China and the U.S., raising doubts about the sustainability of relying solely on the U.S. and its allies in confronting China. Nonetheless, Japan’s institutional inertia and passivity hold back strategic realignment.

To improve relations, China must take the lead, but this is easier said than done. First, the public’s lack of understanding carries a high political cost. Additionally, China-Japan interactions are restrained by the U.S. It is highly uncertain that China's measures will bear fruit.

What is to be done by China is not the subject of my article, and I am not a geopolitical expert, but I want to shine a light on this for the public. Improving China-Japan relations importantly aligns with our national interests, while it is in the interest of the U.S. to provoke China and Japan into being increasingly hostile opponents. The Chinese public needs to understand this situation and be supportive as our country combs through China-Japan relations to find remedies and give our professional diplomatic teams more room to operate. China is a great power, and our strategic ambitions demand we constantly overcome. We cannot allow another great power to profiteer by driving a wedge between us.


中日之间有一个很深的结,让美国吃足了渔翁之利
安倍8日被刺杀后,看了很多网上的帖子,也看了很多国际新闻,有一些思考,我想把它们说出来。
中日之间有一个很深的结,是时候把这个结逐渐打开了。
必须指出,中日之间的结主要是日本方面系上的。近代以来是日本实施了对华侵略,特别是1931年九·一八事变之后的侵华战争,带给了中国人民巨大苦难。日本不仅对战争罪行反思不足,而且不断通过靖国神社和教科书等问题捅历史伤疤。最近这些年,日本又积极呼应美国遏制中国战略,进一步强化了中日之间的战略互疑和民间舆论的相互敌视,导致中日之间“旧恨新仇”越缠越乱,也越缠越紧。
既然这样,我们还有什么必要争取逐渐解开中日之间的这个结呢?我想说,因为日本是中国搬不走的邻居,也因为这是中国国家利益的强烈提示。
美国要在中国周边构建反华统一战线,最根本的支点、最大的杠杆就是日本。让中日之间的仇恨越结越深,这几乎是美国遏华战略的生命线。中日关系如果得到比较明显的改善,日本的对华敌意实质性降下来,美国在亚太的布局就会像皮球漏了气一样,失去弹力并且变瘪。
那么中日之间的结有可能解开吗?首先必须承认,这样做的难度很高。根本原因是美国至今在日本保有驻军,从某种意义上说,它延续了对日本的军事占领,并且用美日同盟把日本捆住了,日本有点像是美国的“殖民地”,在战略上任由美国摆布,它的外交和防务自主权是有限的。

上世纪七十年代开始,中日关系改善,那是因为中美关系改善了。之后中美关系变得复杂,中日关系跟着复杂。直至美国根本性调整对华战略,日本的对华态度也像进入了冰河期,这样的逻辑关系是明显的。现在中美关系很难突破,我们重新把日本拉近的难度可想而知。
然而要看到,我们虽不可能把日本从美国的盟友变成中国的战略伙伴,但是大幅降低中日关系的紧张度,使得美国今后在战略上利用日本反华的困难增加,却是有可为的,而且这对中国非常重要。中日之间国家安全级别且非常紧迫的冲突很少,两国之间被夸大了的战略竞争也不真实,日本的国家实力与中国不是一个量级的,这一点日本人在不情愿中逐渐看清了。中日之间的历史问题非常复杂,里面捆绑进了越来越多从意识形态到外交斗争、再到意志对抗等线索。这个问题的爆炸能量,要多大可以有多大,但却是可以管控的。两国最大的领土争端是钓鱼岛,但是请注意,亚洲地区有大量领土和海洋权益纠纷,中日钓鱼岛之争所涉及的现实利益是其中相对比较小的一个,但它导致的实际摩擦量和对争议双方外交的整体牵动度却是最高的之一。
无论历史问题还是钓鱼岛之争,它们的发酵在很大程度上是因为中日关系整体上出问题了。原本这些问题可以管控,但是两国关系加速恶化的氛围推动双方在这些问题上进行烈度不断升高的较劲。中国持续崛起,日本人不服气,他们的心理调适不好,就需要折腾出一些事来,宣泄集体焦虑和危机感,引发了中日之间越来越拧巴的互动,形成恶性循环。

现在中日矛盾已经远远不仅是外交层面的了,它已经变成两国社会的相互看不顺眼,彼此的政治正确针锋相对。一项民调显示,中国人对日本的负面看法上升到了66%,这是中日邦交正常化以来最高的,然而日本人对中国的负面看法更高,达到惊人的91%。中日民意的激烈对峙对两国政府采取缓和彼此关系的措施已经形成牵制,也对两国媒体客观理性谈论对方和中日关系形成阻碍。无论在日本还是在中国,现在冲对方说重话、狠话都更受欢迎。这非常不利于中日关系的整体改善。
该不该打破以及如何打破中日关系僵局,这对双方都是重大课题。日本被美国绑上了遏制中国的战车,但是日方并非已在战略上完全破罐子破摔。一段时间以来,一些日本战略学者看到了中美力量消长的变化,对完全依靠美国并且与中国对抗国家路线的可持续性产生了一些困惑。然而日本就战略调整有机制上的惰性,而且比较被动。

要改善中日关系,中国肯定要做引导方,但中国的引导说易做难。首先民意的不理解就意味着相当高的政治成本,另外中日关系是互动体,又有美国牵制,中国采取措施能否得到回报有很高不确定性。
中国具体该怎么做不是老胡这篇文章要讨论的主题,老胡也不是这方面的专家。但我想在舆论场上捅破这层窗户纸,即改善中日关系是中国国家利益的一个重要契合项,而美国的利益则是要把中日变成越来越彼此敌视的对手。中国公众需要了解这个态势,并且支持国家把中日关系放到战略全局中进行调试,给专业外交团队更大针对中日关系的操作空间。中国是大国,我们的战略抱负决定了需要不断做出超越,我们不能让另一个大国针对我们不断收割渔翁之利。

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