The West at the Crossroads*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

In the opinion of Kommersant’s columnist Maxim Yusin, the offensive by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region presents a difficult choice for the West.

The head of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Rustem Umerov, reported that Kyiv asked for permission from Paris to strike Russian territory with French weapons. At the same time, a representative of the Bundestag for Defense stated that Germany doesn’t see a problem in using German weaponry in the Kursk Region; however, there is no official proof of its usage in the Russian region. In turn, U.S. President Joe Biden called the strikes against Kursk “common sense,” according to the U.S. Department of State spokesman Vedant Patel. Kommersant columnist Maxim Yusin believes the offensive of the Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region presents a difficult choice for the West.

The offensive of the Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region presents Western politicians with a dilemma: What is the right response to such a situation? Of course, there’s always a purely emotional response. A two-and-a-half-year-long battle against Russia has resulted in a clear concept of “us versus them,” with all sympathy reserved for one side. Meanwhile the problems and misfortunes of the other side are perceived with contentment, with pleasure: schadenfreude. This schadenfreude is easy to spot in the social media of delegates from the parliaments of Poland and the Baltic states. Marcus Faber, head of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag, has reported on the events unraveling on the Russia-Ukraine border with clear glee, even anticipating a change of power in Moscow as a result of the Kursk offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal editorial board (the very publication that employed Evan Gershkovich, who was pardoned and exchanged by President Vladimir Putin) posited in a special article that Washington must now supply Kyiv with even more arms to strike the Russian rear. And that it should lift restrictions on the use of ATACMS missiles.

The point made by all is that this latest situation should be used to its fullest to help Ukraine succeed at last — to press to the finish, to deliver as much damage to Moscow’s image as possible — and then we’ll see what happens next.

This position is held most strongly by those politicians and journalists who in one way or another are personally involved in Ukrainian matters. They usually put blue and yellow flags on their profile photos, making no effort to hide their biases. Which means, in essence, that they have turned from being experts to being activists and “fans.” One could not expect a measured approach from them.

But, on the other hand, there is an opposing tendency. Western media regularly publish articles, the authors of which refer to unnamed officials in Washington and European capitals who have serious concerns. First, the situation has clearly escalated since the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive; the conflict is in a new phase during which talking or even thinking about a possible cease-fire until after the U.S. election would clearly be untimely.

Second, there is the menacing possibility of a Russian counteroffensive, one that could be quite harsh (matching the impunity of the Ukrainian offensive) and to which the West would have to respond. But how would it respond? After all, the main task of both American and European leaders is to avoid direct confrontation with Moscow. It is to ensure that the conflict remains restricted, predictable, controllable and in some sense hybrid, without a chance of its becoming a war without rules.

Third and finally, there are Western military analysts voicing their opinions, offering to view the situation not within a framework of emotion, hype and PR, but globally instead. And in this case, it becomes clear: Kyiv has undertaken quite a risky step.

By definition, the Ukrainian forces will not be able to make serious advances deep into Russian territory, Sooner or later the front line will stabilize. And from that moment forward, it will be Moscow that benefits from the situation; both its human resources and firepower are immeasurably larger. Which means that the stretching of the front line (if we forget for a moment about the damage to its image) is objectively beneficial for Moscow.

An acquaintance of mine, a Western military analyst, told me in a recent conversation, “In the long run, this situation only gives us a bigger headache. It isn’t what we needed right now.”