U.S.-Russia Relations Reset to ‘Factory Settings’*

Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

We’re witnessing a reset to the default settings right now. The liberal world order is officially over. The U.S. has declared the rivalry of the great powers to be the main focus of international politics.

Everybody has been waiting for this for so long that there’s a risk of getting carried away with excitement. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. What has actually happened so far?

U.S.-Russia relations have been reset to their “factory settings.” That includes strategic rivalry, conflicting interests on most issues, and fundamentally different views on each one’s place in the world. There’s also a natural difficulty in mutual understanding given the stark differences in culture and communication styles. However, these “built-in” dynamics don’t necessarily include an outright desire to inflict a “strategic defeat” on the other side or an immediate risk of nuclear confrontation.

That level of hostility has come later — something like a group of “user settings” that developed over decades after the Cold War was put on pause. Over time, both parties shifted their objectives toward changing the nature of their counterpart — though in asymmetric ways. One side believed it could reshape the other to its advantage. The other thought it could transform itself to achieve harmony with its rival.

The first assumption held strong until recently, though the preferred methods evolved — from a paternalistic approach (encouraging self-improvement) to coercion (verging on the use of military force). The second assumption, on the other hand, had been fading for a while and pretty much ran out of steam about a decade ago.

In other words, the sudden end of the Cold War in the late 1980s opened up new possibilities. Many assumed this shift was permanent, even inevitable. But when it became clear that: a) it was a set of circumstances, b) it could, in fact, be reversed, and

c) it might have been an anomaly in international relations, tensions started to rise.

Letting go of the belief in a decisive victory meant accepting that the post-Cold War world order wasn’t set in stone (1946–1990). Those who benefited from it resisted this reality, while those who felt sidelined pushed back harder. That’s how we ended up here, with Ukraine at the center of it all.

We’re witnessing a reset to the default settings right now. The liberal world order is officially over. The U.S. has declared the rivalry of the great powers to be the main focus of international politics. The U.S. signaled this shift back in 2018 (during Donald Trump’s first term), and now it’s being fully implemented — without the ideological packaging. This doesn’t bode well — especially since the entire global order is still shifting. But one silver lining is that the most unrealistic illusions of advanced liberalism, which could have led to chaos over imaginary issues, are fading. In their place, we’re left with a more rational — if still unpleasant — struggle for real advantages. In that kind of contest, as the classics put it, what matters isn’t intentions, but capabilities.