Checking the Pressure

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

Analyst Tigran Meloyan discusses the trajectory along which the relationship between Russia and the U.S. will develop.

On Feb. 18 in Riyadh, an hours-long meeting between high-level Russian and American delegations took place, the results of which have been considered by both Moscow and Washington to be positive. The usefulness of such talks is confirmed by the fact that the sides of these talks “didn’t just listen but heard each other.”

This approach gives us hope that Washington is beginning to better understand the Russian position and, in the future, will possibly take Russia’s interests into account when conducting U.S. foreign policy. America’s change of tone and expression of readiness for a business-like conversation with Russia were something we may not have seen since the end of the Cold War. This has become one of the most significant breakthroughs for Moscow.

Meanwhile, it’s too early to link the negotiation process at its current stage with the nearing of the end of the Ukrainian conflict, although a range of prerequisites has been identified. First is the goal of restoring direct contact between Moscow and Washington. Removing accumulated irritants in bilateral relations and restoring the full functionality of the Russian diplomatic mission in the U.S. remain top-priority issues for Moscow, with the U.S. in agreement. According to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the meeting in Saudi Arabia was aimed at establishing effective channels of communication; it is abnormal for two world nuclear powers to be without them, especially during times of acute crisis.

At the same time, movement toward normalizing the relationship between Russia and the U.S. could not have been more warmly welcomed by the global majority; the next step could have been the direct clash of two nuclear powers. Thus, Moscow cannot help but be pleased with the fact that the Trump administration is seeking peaceful solutions to problems inherited from the previous U.S. administration, instead of following the path to further escalation.

However, Europe has its own opinions about the matter. Many European capitals are concerned about these fledgling peacemaking processes and point to the weakening of trans-Atlantic connections as a result of the U.S. halting support for Ukraine and of the EU’s representatives being excluded from the negotiators’ ranks.

Those most perceptive linked the events of recent days, particularly the rapprochement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, with the desire to drive a wedge between Russia and China, a feat once successfully accomplished by the U.S. under President Richard Nixon. In other words, the White House set a course not for delivering a strategic defeat to Russia, but for dissolving its strategic partnerships. At the beginning of the 1970s, such a strategic step turned the tide in the Cold War, causing a rift in Soviet-Chinese relations and strengthening the position of the U.S. on the global stage. Today, Trump is trying to accomplish something similar.

In practice, however, that would be extremely hard to do, considering that Beijing and Moscow’s foreign policies have become more coordinated over recent years. Apart from that, it threatens the unity of the West itself. For example, the partial departure from anti-Russian rhetoric, together with demands posed to Kyiv to reimburse the U.S. for the funds spent supporting Ukraine, distance Washington from its European allies. With that in mind, there are no guarantees whatsoever that Russia might refuse an alliance with China.

It can’t be ruled out that the farther Russia and the U.S. move along the negotiation path, the more misaligned interests and other underwater currents they will meet along the way. Restoring consultation on geopolitical problems, urgently assigning envoys to the capitals of both states, and mutual enmity toward Volodymyr Zelenskyy are the only points on which Moscow and Washington currently have a mutual understanding. Debates are raging around other points, and their result is, as of yet, undetermined.

Nonetheless, no matter how the negotiation process develops, it is critical for Russia not to lose focus on Ukraine and on achieving goals that were set within the special military operation. Forcing Russians and Ukrainians to sign a peace treaty now would be the greatest of diplomatic feats for the Americans, thus freeing up resources for their struggle against China. Moreover, with that in mind, after pressure has been applied to Ukraine, we should prepare for pressure to be applied to Russia — a time for real bargaining. After all, with the U.S., we’re dealing with a diplomatic initiative backed not only by real proposals, but also by threats.

The fact is that it is doubtful Washington could achieve its desired results through applying pressure on Russia.