An Investment of Authority

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

Andrey Kortunov, an expert of the Valdai Discussion Club, expresses his opinion on whether Donald Trump will pursue Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s resignation, and discusses the prospects of the U.S. applying pressure on Ukraine.

It would seem that American President Donald Trump doesn’t really favor his Ukrainian colleague Volodymyr Zelenskyy — a fact the latter could clearly confirm during their last personal meeting in the White House on Feb. 28.

There are quite rational reasons for such an attitude. Back in the day, the Kyiv leader was too eager to bet on Joe Biden and put too much hope on the second term of Democratic Party rule in Washington, which never came to be. Perhaps Trump also has some sort of subconscious aversion toward Zelenskyy; however, they are “political animals” of sorts. They both belong to different species, or maybe even to different biological families in the diverse world of politics.

It’s interesting that the American leader, in practice breaking all established diplomatic norms, is openly criticizing the head of a partner country. The administration in the U.S. has recently been floating more and more often the idea of Zelenskyy’s resignation from his presidential position. As noted by Bild, Trump no longer considers Zelenskyy to be his ally. Because of that, he seeks his resignation, using political pressure to that end.

Such publications aren’t being refuted in the White House; however, it’s not easy to get on Trump’s good side. There are few modern political heavyweights who have managed to earn genuine connection or at least the honest respect of the capricious and egocentric 47th president of the U.S. At least the majority of the current leaders of European countries and senior officials of the European Union, as well as the leaders of the immediate neighbors of the U.S. — Mexico and Canada — are not doing well in that department.

It seems that Trump feels much more comfortable talking to uncompromising but credible partners of the masculine type, like Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu or Russian President Vladimir Putin.

However, in politics as in business, you often have to deal with those you don’t like. When Trump, in his previous occupation, was striking big deals in the highly criminalized real estate market of New York, he probably had to negotiate with people who were quite unpleasant to him, with their business reputations far from being among the best. But business is business, and in this regard, politics doesn’t really differ.

It would seem that Zelenskyy doesn’t really interest Trump as a person at all. If required, the president of the U.S. could invite to the White House ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi; Zelenskyy’s Head of the Office Andriy Yermak; or perhaps Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Kyrylo Budanov (listed by Rosfinmonitoring as a terrorist and an extremist), not to mention the charming Yulia Tymoshenko.

Ukraine, however, interests Trump as an asset in which the U.S. has already heavily invested. And although Trump himself didn’t make the direct decision on these investments and probably deemed them unacceptably risky from the start, he obviously would like to recoup the financial and political investments that have already been made as much as possible; thus, his great attention to rare earth metals, transport and logistics infrastructure, fertile soil and any other material asset of this country. Therefore, Washington doesn’t simply want to leave, slamming the door and writing Ukraine off as an article of net loss.

But to get compensation for the American billions invested in Ukraine, a settlement has to be made with Kyiv after all, and that may happen on March 11 at a bilateral meeting in Riyadh*. We probably won’t see the repeat of the Feb. 28 scenario: The Ukrainian side will be forced to quietly accept all of the main conditions offered by Washington, including agreement to a full or partial cease-fire in the very near future.

Before that meeting, Zelenskyy finally apologized to Trump for the Oval Office incident, directing a letter on the matter to the U.S. president. It was reported by Steve Witkoff, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East. We can assume that the reciprocal steps by the U.S. will be relatively modest and purely preliminary: promises to restore some volume of military supplies, to provide some sort of space intelligence data, and so on.

After the Washington embarrassment, Trump doesn’t see any potential for Kyiv to negotiate, and it’s unlikely that he would agree to pay sufficiently in advance for services that have not yet been provided to him. And so, Trump will have to settle it with Moscow, and the faster the better. This conversation promises to be a harder and more problematic one for Trump than the meeting in Riyadh. Moscow, unlike Kyiv, is now acting from a position of strength, and possibly will not be ready to accept the package of American conditions if it considers them excessive or simply irrelevant at the moment.

It’s useless to pressure Putin, as Trump might have learned over the years of his first presidency. But Trump also can’t simply accept Moscow’s conditions without losing face at home. So Trump will consider the talks with Russia rather than with Ukraine to be the central link in the chain of his peacemaking efforts.

Finally, the last scene in this diplomatic play of the American president and his team — if the previous act hasn’t failed —could be the unpleasant but inevitable conversation with the many European partners of the U.S. In one form or another, they will have to recognize and accept the agreements reached by Trump — whom they don’t particularly like — without their direct involvement.

Such recognition and acceptance is a hurtful and somewhat humiliating matter for the Europeans. Especially because in that case, a major part of their own investments in the “Ukrainian project” will be lost. The Europeans, however, won’t have a choice.

*Editor’s Note: Ukraine expressed readiness to accept the U.S. proposal to enact an immediate, interim 30-day cease-fire. As recently as March 18, Russia has continued to attack Ukraine.