The Return of a Superpower

The U.S. and other Western countries are reacting loudly and emotionally to the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, giving priority to criticism of and opposition to the stance Moscow has taken. The actual facts fade into the background in the process, as these countries’ desire to ram their viewpoints through no matter what prevails.

There is every reason to legitimately assert that the United States’ political anxieties and foreign-policy actions against Russia have to do with Russia’s calm, well-thought-out and increasingly rigid opposition to Washington’s ready-made scenarios. Despite the pressure and threats directed its way, Moscow is acting openly and successfully, defending its national interests before the very eyes of the entire world. Following the events in Crimea, it has become quite obvious that the process of restoring the Kremlin’s clout and influence — major milestones of which were the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 and Syria from 2011-2014 — is, in effect, complete.

Today it is possible to speak of an emerging, qualitatively new arrangement of powers in the world that has replaced the mono-polar model that settled into shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To be frank, the accelerated modernization of the army and navy, traditionally Russia’s two “most reliable allies,” which was carried out on Vladimir Putin’s initiative, had a decisive significance for the strengthening of Russia’s role. The new arrangement of powers is characterized above all by the existence of not one, as in the recent past, but now three, main centers of power —t he United States, China and Russia. Whether it’s necessary to call these three nations “superpowers” is not very important. The point remains the same: A set of military, economic and other factors distinguishes this troika from a number of other players.

The U.S. furiously resists the loss of its exceptional role in the international arena, trying to maintain its special influence on the course of world events, but doesn’t succeed whatsoever. The Americans let China’s promotion to the world stage slip by, and now, from the looks of it, can’t even influence Russia’s emphatically independent position on key international and regional problems. Today, they are prepared to go very far in order to check the further growth of Russia’s influence and power.

But it turns out that at the current stage, Washington’s arsenal is extremely limited and works poorly. The path of sanctions against Moscow is an ill-conceived contrivance that has, for all intents and purposes, nothing but a very emotional character to it. Resorting to the long worn-out and unjustified practice of sanctions is yet more proof that today, Washington’s expertise in international affairs is at an extremely low level.

Russia is a self-sufficient country. The only sanctions that are truly dangerous for Moscow are those that could significantly affect the operations of the military-industrial complex and somehow impact the country’s defense capabilities. But it is precisely this segment of our economy that is best protected.

Much has been said already about the possible impact of sanctions. Russia’s commercial and economic exchange with the U.S. is minimal, while Europe, caught in the backlash, might end up with far more painful counter-sanctions.

Having restored our status as a superpower, we should deal with them in the most rational way possible, not repeating the mistakes of the former Soviet Union — nor those of the Americans. What are some concrete suggestions regarding Russia’s policy in the near term?

First of all, it’s necessary to sharply define and characterize the situation in Ukraine. If we have assessed the events in Kiev as an illegitimate change of power, it’s necessary to strictly and consistently stick to that line. It is especially important in the context of our likely refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the future presidential elections, held according to the templates of people who usurped power in Kiev via a criminal path that cost many their lives.

Still other arguments — for example, references to the turbulent atmosphere in various regions of the country — are not without their faults. Such arguments, incidentally, could likely be used in the future as a precedent for not recognizing election results in other countries in crisis, for instance in Syria.

It’s also necessary to outline in no uncertain terms Russia’s rigid position with respect to the responsibility and inevitability of punishing members of the Ukrainian military, politicians and all other citizens for war crimes, which are at their core, crimes against humanity. It may have a sobering effect on many of the participants in the events in Ukraine.

Ukrainians, who have suffered from the junta’s actions, should receive all necessary assistance. Precisely worded inquiries on human rights violations in Ukraine should be forwarded to European organizations. The European bureaucracy should not be guided by the “cheap, little pictures” from slanted news media, but should know the real facts, and take into account the people’s opinion. It’s also important to urgently move forward with the compilation and publication of excerpts from the white paper on the crimes of the junta, which seized power through a bloody coup.

It is also imperative to decide on the optimal way of using force, if the course of events leads to it. I think the armed forces should not be used for participation in the political struggle in Ukraine, but strictly in the context of countering what Vladimir Putin has described as “punitive operations” by Kiev’s illegitimate authorities.

In this context, any possible military actions should be targeted and within the limits of peacekeeping operations in accordance with enforcing peace and repelling the use of Ukrainian troops against civilians. Perhaps, it would be mostly operations by airborne forces, which would return to their bases upon completion of the operations.

In light of the placement of additional NATO forces in Poland and other countries near Russia, a detailed explanation of the inevitable consequences of such military demonstrations for the population of these countries is required, including the rapid targeting or retargeting of our striking forces at the corresponding locations along the perimeter of our borders.

And last, the U.S. leadership’s criticism of television broadcaster Russia Today is a reflection of the definite successes of our propaganda. However, there is still a long way to go toward achieving the necessary positions in the sphere of “soft power.” Today, there is a need to provide further support to the domestic agencies of foreign-policy propaganda. One can expect much more from Russian NGOs as well. It is important to revive the various forms of practical cooperation along social lines with those foreign leaders and organizations that truly share democratic values and oppose diktat and the politics of double standards.