7 Differences between Cuban Missile Crisis and Ukrainian Conflict*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

It is now fashionable to compare the current Ukrainian conflict with the famous Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. In fact, we are approaching the 60th anniversary of the crisis. On Oct. 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, bringing the crisis to a boiling point.

Even though the two political and military crises are clearly similar, there are some fundamental differences between them that illustrate the unprecedented danger of the current situation, even when compared to the dramatic events of the early 1960s. Here are the seven major differences between the two crises:

First, the Cuban Missile Crisis was short-lived. It lasted less than two weeks, starting with Kennedy’s decision to blockade Cuba and ending with Nikita Khrushchev’s promise to dismantle the Soviet nuclear missile sites on the island. In contrast, the Ukrainian conflict has been going on for 7 1/2 months and has now become an integral part of the new geopolitical reality. Moreover, the conflict has not even reached a climax.

Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis was solely a nuclear missile crisis. In fact, the U.S. wanted the Soviet Union to withdraw its R-12 missiles from Cuba and in exchange, Washington was willing to abandon its effort to overthrow Fidel Castro’s regime. As an additional condition, Moscow demanded that the U.S. withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The current crisis is not only about nuclear threats. It is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. has long been indirectly involved in a large-scale military confrontation with Russia, providing Ukraine with extensive military, intelligence and economic support.

Third, the stakes in the current crisis are higher for both sides than they were 60 years ago. Although Cuba was of great symbolic and practical importance to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the fate of Ukraine is more important. Moscow’s unequivocal defeat would put at risk not only the current Russian leadership but also Russian statehood. On the other hand, if Washington doesn’t succeed in Ukraine, it could trigger the collapse of NATO, end efforts to restore America’s undermined global leadership and guarantee a change of leadership after the 2024 presidential elections.

Fourth, both Moscow and Washington’s nuclear missile arsenals today are fundamentally different from those they had at their disposal in 1962. For example, in the early 1960s, there were no state of the art high-precision missiles, while small and super-small nuclear warheads were still under development. Accordingly, the line between nuclear and conventional war was very clear. Nowadays this line is more obscure: Both Moscow and Washington periodically talk about whether a limited nuclear conflict is acceptable under the circumstances.

Fifth, 60 years ago, the level of mutual respect and even mutual trust between Moscow and Washington was much greater than it is today. In the decisive days of October 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev both believed that their agreements would be implemented one way or another. Today, neither the Kremlin nor the White House is sure whether they will reach any agreement. Moreover, both sides in the conflict seem to be fully convinced that their adversary is in a deep and irreversible state of decline, and, therefore, any strategic arrangements would make no sense.

Sixth, the main diplomatic communication channels still worked during the Cuban Missile Crisis: Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin met with Robert Kennedy on many occasions and stayed in touch with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Today, the Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov can only dream of such access to top U.S. officials. Meanwhile, newly nominated United States Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy has not yet arrived in Moscow. Moreover, it is not even clear when she will finally show up at Spaso House.

Finally, Khrushchev and Kennedy both personally experienced all the horrors and hardships of World War II. Their countries won many battles across Europe and the Pacific Ocean. In contrast, Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden belong to the post-war generation. Although Biden was born in 1942, he is unlikely to remember anything about the war. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the 46th U.S. president can imagine the consequences of a new world conflict as vividly as the 35th president could.

Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Ukrainian conflict are different, it is important to remember what President Kennedy said at American University on Jun. 10, 1963, six months after the two superpowers decided to make peace: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy or of a collective death wish for the world.”

There is no doubt that his words are more relevant than ever.

The author is a Valdai Discussion Club** expert, and general director of the Russian International Affairs Council.

**Translator’s note: The Valdai Discussion Club is a Moscow-based think tank and discussion forum, established in 2004.