A Blow to BRICS*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

Political analyst Ivan Loshkarev discusses what the U.S. doesn’t like about the organization, and who Washington has chosen as a “target.”

During his election campaign, Donald Trump suggested that seeking an alternative currency for mutual settlements within BRICS is unacceptable. After his election, the 47th president of the U.S. threatened to isolate the BRICS countries from the “wonderful American economy” if the dollar was replaced in international settlements. Since the share of the dollar in mutual settlements last year amounted to about 29%, Trump’s threats, it seems, come a bit too late.

However, in the administration’s current policy, it’s not the public claims that matter, but the countries and organizations to which they are presented. Real interests and a grand strategy lie behind the passionate tirades aimed at certain states and international institutions.

Why doesn’t Trump like BRICS? The current administration sees two fundamental problems. First, the fact there are alternative settlements in the organization clearly shows that using of the dollar has ceased to be voluntary, and the American currency is turning from the equivalent of a convenient exchange into a political burden. In other words, BRICS’ alternative settlements demonstrate the crisis of U.S. leadership in the currency market. Trump, like many others in Washington, doesn’t like to be constantly reminded of the negative trends in the international standing of the “beacon of freedom.”

Second, BRICS is expanding and attracting countries to its ranks that, for many years, have been loyal U.S. allies and partners, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia, which are far from the least players in their region. After we learned about a new BRICS partner country last year, we could be talking about the formation of a network coalition of countries in different regions with varying degrees of participation in BRICS but with the same wish to interact voluntarily and profitably.

The various degrees of network cooperation that are emerging differ sharply from the hierarchical agreement in which the U.S. defines not only the political guidelines for its allies, but also the amount of their participation fees. Moreover, it’s harder to fight such network structures, since there is no clear center of decision-making, no uniform set of connections between the participants and no ideological guidelines (only pragmatic ones). Accordingly, in the medium term, the Trump administration has no understanding of what it can really challenge BRICS with in the ideological field of cooperation, and in terms of who one can choose as a key opponent (China, Iran, Russia or another state).

Consequently, American leadership has resorted to the classic strategy of poking the hornet’s nest. The U.S. has chosen a target that could bring anxiety to the ranks of BRICS members and fail to bring them together in the face of a mutual threat. On Feb. 7, President Trump signed an executive order halting U.S. aid to South Africa under the pretext that Pretoria’s authorities discriminate against its white population. Indeed, earlier in January, South Africa passed a law that in certain cases, seizure of private land for public purposes could be done without compensation. On Feb. 5, President Cyril Ramaphosa called billionaire Elon Musk, who’s close to Trump, and, provided the necessary explanation of the law, which didn’t stop the United States from withholding aid.

The official version of discrimination against white farmers in South Africa and the concern of Washington about them that has emerged so suddenly shouldn’t distract us from the fact that South Africa is one of the main initiators of BRICS expansion. At one time, South African leaders were the ideologues behind founding the African Union and served as the mediators in settling many conflicts on this continent. Economically and militarily, South Africa is slowly surrendering its positions to Egypt, Nigeria, and other African countries, but ideologically, this is the intellectual center of Africa, the laboratory of new concepts of cooperation and Pan-Africanism.

The few things that usually bind international network structures include a mutual vision of the future, the belief that participation in this network is beneficial and the opportunity for every participant to claim their niche field in the network (“culture head,” “peacekeeping head,” etc.). It’s hard to underestimate the role of Pretoria and South African diplomacy. By escalating tension with South Africa, the Trump administration is sending a message to all BRICS members that a mutual future is impossible without the U.S., that the benefits will have to be measured in dollars at least partially, and that the biggest enthusiasts for the BRICS format may have the biggest problem headed their way.

The author is an associate professor of the Department of Political Theory at MGIMO MFA of Russia, candidate of political sciences