The International Order and the Transformation of Unipolarity

The extent of the influence of the international financial crisis on the future of the international system and the effective parties within it, headed by the United States, is visible to any observer. This crisis has caused some international relations scholars to anticipate an end to the unipolar era.

The development of the international order and its movement from one stage to another does not stand solely on the strength of any number of active factions and their national capabilities, but rather on the status of values and the ideological system the order is based on. The global order is also based on the nature of the standing alliances between the controlling power and those subject to it that, to a great extent, preserve the balance of power from within.

Before analyzing past indications of a shift from hegemony toward another international order, we must answer the following question: Is the United States in unified, hegemonic control of the international system?

Conversation about the end of the unipolar era stirs up a number of questions and doubts around such a reality, because the U.S. is still militarily superior worldwide and occupies the highest rung in average military spending, which reaches 4 percent of the U.S.’ gross national product (GNP), and American military bases are the only ones spread all across the globe. Likewise, U.S. GNP adds up to $13.78 trillion, and we must combine the GNPs of four of the most important national economies — China, Japan, Germany and Britain; that is, $4.4 trillion, $4.3 trillion, $2.8 trillion and $2.6 trillion respectively, for a total of $14.1 trillion — in order to surpass the American GNP by a little.

The strength of the United States can be partially traced back to the American economic and monetary system, which stands by virtue of the strength of the dollar, as well as the ties of many national economies to the value of the dollar and the American economy, regardless of the world financial crisis.

Therefore, it is possible for us to say that the U.S. is still the predominant world power. One can illustrate this by comparing the world of the Bush period with that of the Obama period. In the age of the previous American administration, the world witnessed great unrest, especially between countries with various geographical and historical linkages, whereas the age of President Obama has witnessed many crises of dissolution, retreat and instability.

We notice, then, how relations changed between the acting alliances of the international order, with the essential transformation in U.S. behavior indicating that these changes are changes in the old international order’s values. Some respond that these changes come not as the result of a total transformation in U.S. policy, but rather because the world is witnessing a global financial crisis. Here we answer that the financial crisis has great influence, but it impacts American policy and subsequently the world; i.e., the principal change is in American policy.

In parallel, we notice some indications that may point to America’s receding role in global strategy. At the end of 2009, the American government’s debt reached more than $11 trillion, a debt increase of $3.7 billion per day. This is what puts America in the situation of issuing financial bailouts for its jobless and destitute in continuous and unending succession. Likewise, the unemployment rate in the United States in January of 2009, according to the official numbers, reached 9.7 percent, the highest rate in 26 years.

From a political standpoint, the U.S. is still unable to achieve any progress in the Middle East peace process, or to achieve stability in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are the essential means of judging the level of success or failure of American policy in the world.

By way of the preceding, it is still possible to say that America is the predominant power in the international system, but America faces manifold indications of its receding role.

We are able to determine the other primary competitive players in the international community (China, Russia, Japan, India, and the European Union). But do they possess the national capabilities to make possible a shift into a different, multipolar global system?

By looking into the past national capabilities of the preceding actors, we see that China continues to raise its military expenditures in a proportional manner, and so this increase in expenditures was the largest in the world in 2009. Russia is the largest of all countries in the world, among the strongest militarily and among the richest in terms of natural resource wealth. But both Russia and China suffer from demographic problems and separatist conflicts. The military outlays of Japan come to only 0.8 percent, although Japan is a great economic power. That is, there is no political desire, past or present, to cast off its subservience to the United States. India is also counted among the fastest-growing countries economically and militarily, and enjoys an ideal geographic position, but its geographic environment is extremely troubled. The E.U. represents a great economic power, which makes it a possible superpower in the international order if it follows a united agenda, but likewise, the E.U. does not possess military might comparable to its economic power.

We find that all of the preceding powers possess capacities that would enable a move toward a different, non-hegemonic global order. Yet at the same time, they have many problems that depress their roles in the global order.

As for the ideological system that may preside over the hypothetical world order, there is the regulated capitalism in conformity with the principal capitalist countries and the mixed-economy states. This system is fundamentally different from the repudiated free market capitalist one that led to the global financial meltdown. Regulated capitalism affirms the role of the central banks in financial and monetary supervision in the affairs of investment and the economy.

By observing the interrelationships of many of the preceding states, we find that the level of cooperation between them is substantial. Certainly, we cannot call these pairings “alliances,” but we cannot ignore the extent of their linkages and obvious mutual involvements. That is, we are now in the shadow of an interdependent world. This interdependence will lead to the realization of security and peace between these countries, making it difficult for one of them to abandon another as a result of the economic losses that would follow from one country trying to push another away.

Harmonious diversity gives the major regional states a more positive role in the international system, wherein Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria witness more significance in the Middle East, just as Venezuela and Brazil do in South America, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa, and South Korea and Indonesia in Asia.

In the convergent, diverse international order, power will be more diffuse than centralized, and the influence of nation-states will decline with the increasing authority of non-state international actors. And this assumes the settling of regional conflicts that evolve against the interests of the larger states.