The Main Contradictions of the Iraqi-American Security Agreement
Published in Al Arab
(Qatar) on 11 December 2008
by Major General Tal’at Ahmad Muslim (link to original)
The security agreement between the United States and Iraq concerning the status of forces, which is called the “Agreement Concerning the Withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq,” contains a number of contradictions which came as a result of an attempt to beautify the agreement in Iraqi and international opinion. Perhaps the most important contradiction is the one between Article 4 concerning “Missions” and Article 24 concerning “Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq.”
Where Article 4 reads:
“The government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups and remnants of the former regime.”
We see that Article 24 begins with the phrase:
“Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by said Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:…”
In other words, it can be understood from Article 4 that the government of Iraq is not capable by itself of capitalizing on its security forces’ capabilities to realize security and stability. That is why it requests temporary assistance from the United States Armed Forces, while you see recognition of the Iraqi Security Forces’ performance and their increasing capabilities in Article 24 and their assumption of full security responsibilities. So if the beginning of Article 24 is true then there would be no need for assistance from the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability.
The second contradiction appears in the two articles, for in Article 4 we find:
“The parties shall continue their efforts in cooperating to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces.”
There is no time limit for this assistance, which opens the door to the American forces’ staying in Iraq after the end of 2011. This is in contradiction to what Article 24 says:
“All of the United States Armed Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
The contradiction is completed in Article 28 concerning the Green Zone. It says:
“The government of Iraq may request from the United States Armed Forces limited and temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of security for the Green Zone. Upon such request, relevant Iraqi authorities shall work jointly with United States Forces authorities on security for the Green Zone during the period determined by the government of Iraq.”
In other words, these types of missions may be a back door that allows the American forces to remain in Iraq, both inside and outside the Iraq cities, villages and localities after the final date for withdrawal of United States forces.
Article 24 says that the United States forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages and localities and be stationed in agreed upon facilities and areas. This is in the interest of the United States in that it takes them out of the areas where Iraqi resistance is active, but it gives them the right to undertake operations described as being against al Qaeda, other terrorist groups, outlaw groups and former regime elements. It also allows the United States to use Iraq as a launching point for attacks on Iraq’s neighboring countries.
Moving on to article six of the agreement, it says:
“The United States Armed Forces shall assume control of entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for its exclusive use. The parties shall coordinate the control of entry into agreed facilities and areas for joint use and in accordance with mechanisms set forth by the JMOCC (Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee). The parties shall coordinate guard duties in areas adjacent to agreed facilities and areas through the JMOCC.”
In other words, it strips Iraqi supervision of these facilities and areas, making them jointly-controlled. Iraq cannot impose control over them by itself, nor can it impose on the adjacent areas. That is in contradiction to the beginning of the article, which speaks of “full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq.”
Article 12 of the agreement concerns legal jurisdiction. Here we see the stripping away of Iraqi legal jurisdiction. Outside the facilities and areas where American forces are found, Iraqi law will have jurisdiction over contractors and contract employees, while the United States will have legal jurisdiction over members of the American forces and the civil component in matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas, during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas and in minor felonies. Even then the Iraqi legal jurisdiction is conditional, which is the opposite of the statement recognizing:
“Iraq’s sovereign right to determine and enforce the rules of criminal and civil law in its territory…”
In the event that
“[M]embers of the United States Forces and of the civilian component are arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities, Iraq must immediately notify the authorities of the United States Armed Forces and hand them over within 24 hours from the time of detention or arrest.”
But if Iraq exercises its jurisdiction, then
“[C]ustody of an accused member of the United States Armed Forces or of the civilian component shall reside with United States Forces authorities. United States Armed Forces authorities shall make such accused persons available to the Iraqi authorities for purposes of investigation and trial.”
Of course, there are no similar paragraphs in case American forces arrest Iraqi individuals.
The article also states that
“The government of Iraq agrees to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 1 above (concerning members of the United States forces and the civil component), only after it has determined and notifies the United States in writing within 21 days of the discovery of an alleged offense, that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be exercised.”
In other words, the jurisdiction that the agreement grants the government of Iraq is conditional, and may be challenged by the United States in a manner that effectively cancels it!
Thus we see the prerogatives that the agreement gives to Iraq have many conditions which allow the left hand to take away what the right hand has granted. It’s possible to closely examine the contradictions article by article, but the preceding is enough!
Where Article 4 reads:
“The government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups and remnants of the former regime.”
We see that Article 24 begins with the phrase:
“Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by said Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:…”
In other words, it can be understood from Article 4 that the government of Iraq is not capable by itself of capitalizing on its security forces’ capabilities to realize security and stability. That is why it requests temporary assistance from the United States Armed Forces, while you see recognition of the Iraqi Security Forces’ performance and their increasing capabilities in Article 24 and their assumption of full security responsibilities. So if the beginning of Article 24 is true then there would be no need for assistance from the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability.
The second contradiction appears in the two articles, for in Article 4 we find:
“The parties shall continue their efforts in cooperating to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces.”
There is no time limit for this assistance, which opens the door to the American forces’ staying in Iraq after the end of 2011. This is in contradiction to what Article 24 says:
“All of the United States Armed Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
The contradiction is completed in Article 28 concerning the Green Zone. It says:
“The government of Iraq may request from the United States Armed Forces limited and temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of security for the Green Zone. Upon such request, relevant Iraqi authorities shall work jointly with United States Forces authorities on security for the Green Zone during the period determined by the government of Iraq.”
In other words, these types of missions may be a back door that allows the American forces to remain in Iraq, both inside and outside the Iraq cities, villages and localities after the final date for withdrawal of United States forces.
Article 24 says that the United States forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages and localities and be stationed in agreed upon facilities and areas. This is in the interest of the United States in that it takes them out of the areas where Iraqi resistance is active, but it gives them the right to undertake operations described as being against al Qaeda, other terrorist groups, outlaw groups and former regime elements. It also allows the United States to use Iraq as a launching point for attacks on Iraq’s neighboring countries.
Moving on to article six of the agreement, it says:
“The United States Armed Forces shall assume control of entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for its exclusive use. The parties shall coordinate the control of entry into agreed facilities and areas for joint use and in accordance with mechanisms set forth by the JMOCC (Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee). The parties shall coordinate guard duties in areas adjacent to agreed facilities and areas through the JMOCC.”
In other words, it strips Iraqi supervision of these facilities and areas, making them jointly-controlled. Iraq cannot impose control over them by itself, nor can it impose on the adjacent areas. That is in contradiction to the beginning of the article, which speaks of “full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq.”
Article 12 of the agreement concerns legal jurisdiction. Here we see the stripping away of Iraqi legal jurisdiction. Outside the facilities and areas where American forces are found, Iraqi law will have jurisdiction over contractors and contract employees, while the United States will have legal jurisdiction over members of the American forces and the civil component in matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas, during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas and in minor felonies. Even then the Iraqi legal jurisdiction is conditional, which is the opposite of the statement recognizing:
“Iraq’s sovereign right to determine and enforce the rules of criminal and civil law in its territory…”
In the event that
“[M]embers of the United States Forces and of the civilian component are arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities, Iraq must immediately notify the authorities of the United States Armed Forces and hand them over within 24 hours from the time of detention or arrest.”
But if Iraq exercises its jurisdiction, then
“[C]ustody of an accused member of the United States Armed Forces or of the civilian component shall reside with United States Forces authorities. United States Armed Forces authorities shall make such accused persons available to the Iraqi authorities for purposes of investigation and trial.”
Of course, there are no similar paragraphs in case American forces arrest Iraqi individuals.
The article also states that
“The government of Iraq agrees to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 1 above (concerning members of the United States forces and the civil component), only after it has determined and notifies the United States in writing within 21 days of the discovery of an alleged offense, that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be exercised.”
In other words, the jurisdiction that the agreement grants the government of Iraq is conditional, and may be challenged by the United States in a manner that effectively cancels it!
Thus we see the prerogatives that the agreement gives to Iraq have many conditions which allow the left hand to take away what the right hand has granted. It’s possible to closely examine the contradictions article by article, but the preceding is enough!