Munich’s Tempest in a Teapot
The nicest thing about the Munich Security Conference is its theatrical drama. The conference is a lot like the Oscar festivities in Hollywood: Everyone with a name in global security has to be there, but the difference in Munich is that there are no awards for special achievement in film artistry. In spite of that, there is usually one shining star. It’s noteworthy that the star is always the villain of the movie. In 2007, that role was played by former Russian President Vladimir Putin — the award given for his sharply anti-Western speech reminiscent of the Cold War days. In 2003, it was former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for his stone-faced reaction to German Defense Minister [Joschka] Fischer’s “I am not convinced” reply to Rumsfeld’s assertion that war against Iraq was necessary.
And this year it was Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. His appearance was a surprise — that was the first (small) thing to kick off the media hype — then he trotted out the usual old suggestions and that led to the second (slightly larger) round of media hype. Then, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad announced, contrary to Mottaki’s suggestions, that Iran itself would indeed enrich its uranium to 20 percent, the third (and really big) media circus broke out at the Munich Security Conference.
When all the excitement dies down, we’ll see a familiar old conflict: Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium; the U.N. Security Council doesn’t trust the Tehran regime’s motives, suspecting it of trying to produce an atomic bomb. In response, the council has decided on a course of sanctions against Iran designed to force them to cooperate more closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Iran doesn’t reject that completely, but neither will it compromise. Therefore, further sanctions are again being discussed.
All the noise emanating from Munich would lead one to conclude that Iran has finally and irrevocably crossed a line drawn in the sand. That’s not so. Iran will have crossed that line if and when it ever possesses an atomic bomb. Until then, there’s only suspicion, but no tangible proof. And until then, everyone will have to continue negotiating using tenacious, high-pressure diplomacy. There is no alternative.
And this year it was Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. His appearance was a surprise — that was the first (small) thing to kick off the media hype — then he trotted out the usual old suggestions and that led to the second (slightly larger) round of media hype. Then, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad announced, contrary to Mottaki’s suggestions, that Iran itself would indeed enrich its uranium to 20 percent, the third (and really big) media circus broke out at the Munich Security Conference.
When all the excitement dies down, we’ll see a familiar old conflict: Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium; the U.N. Security Council doesn’t trust the Tehran regime’s motives, suspecting it of trying to produce an atomic bomb. In response, the council has decided on a course of sanctions against Iran designed to force them to cooperate more closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Iran doesn’t reject that completely, but neither will it compromise. Therefore, further sanctions are again being discussed.
All the noise emanating from Munich would lead one to conclude that Iran has finally and irrevocably crossed a line drawn in the sand. That’s not so. Iran will have crossed that line if and when it ever possesses an atomic bomb. Until then, there’s only suspicion, but no tangible proof. And until then, everyone will have to continue negotiating using tenacious, high-pressure diplomacy. There is no alternative.
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