Interview with Hubert Védrine: An America with Relative Leadership
Published in L'Expansion
(France) on 1 June 2010
by Hubert Védrine (link to original)
(France) on 1 June 2010
by Hubert Védrine (link to original)
Translated from
by Rachel Towers.
Edited by Piotr Bielinski.
According to the ex-minister of foreign affairs, the American president is right to prefer realism to the use of force, made obsolete in our multipolar and unstable world.
The leader of French diplomacy under Lionel Jospin doesn’t seem to be fiercely pro-American. He defends here, however, the foreign policy implemented by Barack Obama with arguments that, once more, run contrary to prevailing ideas.
Q: How can we assess the first year of Barack Obama’s foreign policy?
A: It’s premature — and complicated — to judge after such a short time. Who remembers how the situation was after a year of Clinton or Bush? Obama has, I think, the ambition to completely redefine the foreign policy of the United States. He broke away from the doctrines of the Bush administration, a cocktail that allied the neoconservatives (aligned with the Israeli Likud), the evangelists and the classic nationalists.
We mustn’t judge him according to the disproportional expectations aroused, especially in Europe, by the election of a black man to the presidency. That is irrelevant, and he had explained this point magnificently during his speech in Philadelphia. He is a very intelligent man, who has a global vision rather than just an American one, and who wants to maintain the U.S as a leader, cognizant that this leadership will be henceforth relative. He is inviting everyone to a revolution of the mind, which the American people, and the Western world in general, are not ready for.
We must therefore view him as someone who is attempting something immense — who does it calmly, but who also moves his pawns with a certain audacity. For example, he had no urgent reason to pronounce his speech in Cairo and to speak at the beginning of his mandate to the Arab-Muslim masses (and not directly to their leaders), except if he were convinced that Samuel Huntington’s ideas of clash of civilizations had merit; or at least that it wasn’t wrong to speak of the risks involved in the clash between Islam and the West — which we must find a way to stop. This tactic overhangs all his initiatives in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. He has a historical vision of these problems. We are only at the beginning. I fear that this will again be misunderstood, and especially that European leaders are not well-organized enough to lend him a hand.
Q: Do you think that he has a global vision for the world? Is he less American-centered than his predecessors?
A: Of course! He is the president of the United States, but he knows that relative American leadership will have to be exerted in a multipolar world that is very competitive and unstable, and not schematic and congealed as during the time of the Cold War. But he was elected first and foremost to respond to the crisis, hence the priorities given to the relations with China: interdependence with that country has become top priority.
This intuition contradicts the belief system of a majority of powerful Western figures and elitists, who continue to believe it is their personal mission to administrate the world, either through their superior military power (as was the case under the Bush administration) or through their moral superiority, as is the case for Europeans when it comes down to “human rights” and universal norms.
Obama seems to be very realistic. He’s an idealist in ambition and a realist in analyzing the relationships between world forces. He has considerable potential … if he has the time to leave his mark.
Q: Can we say that he has opened up relations with Russia, notably in reaching a new agreement about denuclearization?
A: With Russia, he is not looking for a “friendly” relationship but a strong and functioning one. He has therefore worked to enforce a mutual reduction of strategic nuclear arms, and an agreement has just been signed in Prague, relaunching the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This should very much please France, which has always pleaded for dissuasion at minimal costs, especially since Obama is clarifying the rules of weapons deployment, and will perhaps seek to eliminate their use, if Russia concurs. It is intelligent. In abandoning the antimissile shields that had been designed under Bush, and in suspending the useless enlargement of NATO, he has created a constructive relationship with Russia.
Q: But has he made any progress with the crisis in Iran?
A: No one has a miracle solution. In conforming to the possibility of civil technological transfers, in re-legitimizing the NPT, Obama can hope to isolate Iran: He is saying to other countries that what Iran is doing is not acceptable. I do not think that he wishes to launch a military operation. He is not jumping on Likud’s bandwagon.
When he proposes new sanctions, targeting the Pasdarans [the Iranian Revolutionary Guards], he knows that it will not overthrow the regime, but it is a way to contain the Israeli interventionists. The declarations of Gen. Petraeus go along the same vein, when he emphasizes that military intervention could not be limited to air bombing, and that it would be, in fact, a true war.
To reinforce sanctions hints at a military intervention, and to reach out disturbs a regime that was more comfortable in its confrontation with Bush. This whole forms a strategy.
Q: What can we say about the attitude of the Europeans?
A: I am actually quite surprised that the Europeans are not more active along these lines, and that France in particular seems to hang on to a certain neoconservatism. It is strange. Public opinion and the media were enthusiastic because America had elected a black man. Not having read his speech in Philadelphia, they did not understand that it was not about that. Obama is not African-American, he does not portray himself as a victim; he is a mulatto, from an African father and an American mother.
You would think that European governments, fed up with the Bush administration, would gladly want to cooperate with Washington. In fact, there really has not been a collective European expression — no recommendation concerning relations with China, Russia or Iran. On the contrary, we have had a bit of a regular competition; everyone is trying to find their place in this picture, to be the first one to be noticed. Everything that does not hold interest at the moment — for it was clear from the beginning that Obama was elected to solve this current crisis (relations with China, Russia and also with the entire Arab world) — and that, for him, Europe was neither a problem nor a solution. Instead of supporting this, Europeans have hesitated and now are starting to take a pessimistic stance about Obama, without offering any alternatives. I was not shocked that Obama chose to not waste time with a European-American summit, or that he did not go to Berlin: Europe, uncertain about the present and worrying about the future, is obsessed with commemorations. It doesn’t really seem to understand this new reality.
Q: Hasn’t Obama been a bit deceptive on the subject of human rights?
A: Compared to whom? I ask because he is vehemently supportive of human rights. But the question of human rights in foreign policy is Westerners forcing them on foreign nations. Obama knows very well that it is not going to be the way to bring democracy to China or human rights to Arab countries.
He is not wasting his energy demanding things he knows he’s not going to get. It’s a break from interventionist Democratic thinking — one which is found in my friend Madeleine Albright or in those in France pleading for interference — as well as from neoconservatism. He’s rather close to a moderate Republican tradition when it comes to foreign affairs. In short, China is, for him, a partner with whom he will solve crises, and not a place to which he will send troops.
Q: What do you imply when you speak of “Western Chimeras?” (1)
A: Honorable and idealistic ambitions become chimeras because we no longer have any way of imposing them. Continuing to believe that “civilizing missions,” even if the terms change, must stay at the heart of Western politics implies that we will always be on top, always in charge. Those who believe this, militarists or human rights activists alike, think that we will always be the ones calling the shots in the world. That’s no longer the case.
At the end of the Cold War, when the Western world believed it had won, imposing democracy, human rights and a deregulated market all the while talking about the “end of history,” that train hid another one behind it: the ascending power of emerging nations. Henceforth, the Western world doesn’t have the monopoly on power, on morals and values that it has held since the 16th century. We’ve been tossed to the side in this fight without being mentally prepared. The Western educator, while well-intentioned and idealistic, has also conquered, colonized and dominated. It becomes a chimera the moment it no longer has the means to implement its proselytized ambitions. Look at the evidence: The progress in human rights over the last 30 years is very weak. During this time, other societies evolved by themselves.
Q: Protectionism is no longer taboo. Is free trade being reconsidered?
A: It is nearly impossible to maintain integral economic liberalism, which is the doctrine of the World Trade Organization. Also, larger countries aren’t completely applying it. To consider enclosures — social and environmental — at the European level is not that easy, but we no longer have the right to interfere in this debate. But then, for Adam Smith, economic liberalism was the ideal for comparable societies.
The savage competition between tens of millions of poor Asian workers and European salaries benefiting from an elaborate system of social protection is becoming downright devastating. The fable of “happy globalization” is no longer tolerated by Western public opinion.
I really don’t think we are going to change over to protectionism. We are going to work toward a combination of principle, of targeted and transitory protections, of regulations and preparations for the future, a sort of policy mix. Its implementation will have to be made at the European level, on the condition that each nation has created its own strategy. If we attempt to create an overarching European one, of course, nothing is going to work.
(1) Le Temps des Chimères [The Time of Dreams], 2003-2009 (Fayard)
The leader of French diplomacy under Lionel Jospin doesn’t seem to be fiercely pro-American. He defends here, however, the foreign policy implemented by Barack Obama with arguments that, once more, run contrary to prevailing ideas.
Q: How can we assess the first year of Barack Obama’s foreign policy?
A: It’s premature — and complicated — to judge after such a short time. Who remembers how the situation was after a year of Clinton or Bush? Obama has, I think, the ambition to completely redefine the foreign policy of the United States. He broke away from the doctrines of the Bush administration, a cocktail that allied the neoconservatives (aligned with the Israeli Likud), the evangelists and the classic nationalists.
We mustn’t judge him according to the disproportional expectations aroused, especially in Europe, by the election of a black man to the presidency. That is irrelevant, and he had explained this point magnificently during his speech in Philadelphia. He is a very intelligent man, who has a global vision rather than just an American one, and who wants to maintain the U.S as a leader, cognizant that this leadership will be henceforth relative. He is inviting everyone to a revolution of the mind, which the American people, and the Western world in general, are not ready for.
We must therefore view him as someone who is attempting something immense — who does it calmly, but who also moves his pawns with a certain audacity. For example, he had no urgent reason to pronounce his speech in Cairo and to speak at the beginning of his mandate to the Arab-Muslim masses (and not directly to their leaders), except if he were convinced that Samuel Huntington’s ideas of clash of civilizations had merit; or at least that it wasn’t wrong to speak of the risks involved in the clash between Islam and the West — which we must find a way to stop. This tactic overhangs all his initiatives in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. He has a historical vision of these problems. We are only at the beginning. I fear that this will again be misunderstood, and especially that European leaders are not well-organized enough to lend him a hand.
Q: Do you think that he has a global vision for the world? Is he less American-centered than his predecessors?
A: Of course! He is the president of the United States, but he knows that relative American leadership will have to be exerted in a multipolar world that is very competitive and unstable, and not schematic and congealed as during the time of the Cold War. But he was elected first and foremost to respond to the crisis, hence the priorities given to the relations with China: interdependence with that country has become top priority.
This intuition contradicts the belief system of a majority of powerful Western figures and elitists, who continue to believe it is their personal mission to administrate the world, either through their superior military power (as was the case under the Bush administration) or through their moral superiority, as is the case for Europeans when it comes down to “human rights” and universal norms.
Obama seems to be very realistic. He’s an idealist in ambition and a realist in analyzing the relationships between world forces. He has considerable potential … if he has the time to leave his mark.
Q: Can we say that he has opened up relations with Russia, notably in reaching a new agreement about denuclearization?
A: With Russia, he is not looking for a “friendly” relationship but a strong and functioning one. He has therefore worked to enforce a mutual reduction of strategic nuclear arms, and an agreement has just been signed in Prague, relaunching the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This should very much please France, which has always pleaded for dissuasion at minimal costs, especially since Obama is clarifying the rules of weapons deployment, and will perhaps seek to eliminate their use, if Russia concurs. It is intelligent. In abandoning the antimissile shields that had been designed under Bush, and in suspending the useless enlargement of NATO, he has created a constructive relationship with Russia.
Q: But has he made any progress with the crisis in Iran?
A: No one has a miracle solution. In conforming to the possibility of civil technological transfers, in re-legitimizing the NPT, Obama can hope to isolate Iran: He is saying to other countries that what Iran is doing is not acceptable. I do not think that he wishes to launch a military operation. He is not jumping on Likud’s bandwagon.
When he proposes new sanctions, targeting the Pasdarans [the Iranian Revolutionary Guards], he knows that it will not overthrow the regime, but it is a way to contain the Israeli interventionists. The declarations of Gen. Petraeus go along the same vein, when he emphasizes that military intervention could not be limited to air bombing, and that it would be, in fact, a true war.
To reinforce sanctions hints at a military intervention, and to reach out disturbs a regime that was more comfortable in its confrontation with Bush. This whole forms a strategy.
Q: What can we say about the attitude of the Europeans?
A: I am actually quite surprised that the Europeans are not more active along these lines, and that France in particular seems to hang on to a certain neoconservatism. It is strange. Public opinion and the media were enthusiastic because America had elected a black man. Not having read his speech in Philadelphia, they did not understand that it was not about that. Obama is not African-American, he does not portray himself as a victim; he is a mulatto, from an African father and an American mother.
You would think that European governments, fed up with the Bush administration, would gladly want to cooperate with Washington. In fact, there really has not been a collective European expression — no recommendation concerning relations with China, Russia or Iran. On the contrary, we have had a bit of a regular competition; everyone is trying to find their place in this picture, to be the first one to be noticed. Everything that does not hold interest at the moment — for it was clear from the beginning that Obama was elected to solve this current crisis (relations with China, Russia and also with the entire Arab world) — and that, for him, Europe was neither a problem nor a solution. Instead of supporting this, Europeans have hesitated and now are starting to take a pessimistic stance about Obama, without offering any alternatives. I was not shocked that Obama chose to not waste time with a European-American summit, or that he did not go to Berlin: Europe, uncertain about the present and worrying about the future, is obsessed with commemorations. It doesn’t really seem to understand this new reality.
Q: Hasn’t Obama been a bit deceptive on the subject of human rights?
A: Compared to whom? I ask because he is vehemently supportive of human rights. But the question of human rights in foreign policy is Westerners forcing them on foreign nations. Obama knows very well that it is not going to be the way to bring democracy to China or human rights to Arab countries.
He is not wasting his energy demanding things he knows he’s not going to get. It’s a break from interventionist Democratic thinking — one which is found in my friend Madeleine Albright or in those in France pleading for interference — as well as from neoconservatism. He’s rather close to a moderate Republican tradition when it comes to foreign affairs. In short, China is, for him, a partner with whom he will solve crises, and not a place to which he will send troops.
Q: What do you imply when you speak of “Western Chimeras?” (1)
A: Honorable and idealistic ambitions become chimeras because we no longer have any way of imposing them. Continuing to believe that “civilizing missions,” even if the terms change, must stay at the heart of Western politics implies that we will always be on top, always in charge. Those who believe this, militarists or human rights activists alike, think that we will always be the ones calling the shots in the world. That’s no longer the case.
At the end of the Cold War, when the Western world believed it had won, imposing democracy, human rights and a deregulated market all the while talking about the “end of history,” that train hid another one behind it: the ascending power of emerging nations. Henceforth, the Western world doesn’t have the monopoly on power, on morals and values that it has held since the 16th century. We’ve been tossed to the side in this fight without being mentally prepared. The Western educator, while well-intentioned and idealistic, has also conquered, colonized and dominated. It becomes a chimera the moment it no longer has the means to implement its proselytized ambitions. Look at the evidence: The progress in human rights over the last 30 years is very weak. During this time, other societies evolved by themselves.
Q: Protectionism is no longer taboo. Is free trade being reconsidered?
A: It is nearly impossible to maintain integral economic liberalism, which is the doctrine of the World Trade Organization. Also, larger countries aren’t completely applying it. To consider enclosures — social and environmental — at the European level is not that easy, but we no longer have the right to interfere in this debate. But then, for Adam Smith, economic liberalism was the ideal for comparable societies.
The savage competition between tens of millions of poor Asian workers and European salaries benefiting from an elaborate system of social protection is becoming downright devastating. The fable of “happy globalization” is no longer tolerated by Western public opinion.
I really don’t think we are going to change over to protectionism. We are going to work toward a combination of principle, of targeted and transitory protections, of regulations and preparations for the future, a sort of policy mix. Its implementation will have to be made at the European level, on the condition that each nation has created its own strategy. If we attempt to create an overarching European one, of course, nothing is going to work.
(1) Le Temps des Chimères [The Time of Dreams], 2003-2009 (Fayard)