Afghanistan Strategy: There Is No Military Solution
Published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(Germany) on 25 June 2010
by Günther Nonnenmacher (link to
original)
The withdrawal of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who wanted to avoid civilian casualties in Afghanistan at all costs, marks a tough blow to the mission in the Hindu Kush. President Barack Obama needs to keep the military deployment under political control, but nerves are frayed.
The dismissal of Gen. McChrystal came as no surprise after it became known what the top commander in Afghanistan and his military entourage think of the politicians and diplomats who deal with the “Afpak” (Afghanistan/Pakistan) complex. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Obama couldn't leave any doubt that the military deployment remains under political control. Far more surprising is that the general and his co-workers, in the presence of a journalist, expressed themselves critically, even condescendingly, about their political superiors and their civilian counterparts — the American ambassador in Afghanistan and the Afpak Special Representative Richard Holbrooke. It is a lack of discipline; above all, it shows how great the frustration is and that nerves are frayed.
The withdrawal of that general, who had been sought specifically by Gen. David Petraeus, the father of the new American “counterinsurgency” strategy — which was supposed to now be applied in Afghanistan after its trial in Iraq — deals a tough blow to the entire mission. Despite the assurance that it will not lead to a further change in strategy, and despite the statement of McChrystal himself that he still stands by the strategy that he helped to develop, the doubts will multiply about whether a military-political outcome, which could be portrayed as a success at some point, can be attained by this method in Afghanistan.
In fact, the retaking of the city of Marjah and the suppression of the Taliban from the district of the same name have proven, at best, to be only halfway successful. This offensive was supposed to be a test run for a far larger offensive, in which insurgents were to be expelled from the province of Kandahar and parts of the Afghan south — an ambitious goal, which since then has been repeatedly scaled back.
Problematic Strategy: Increasing Casualties
The tactic that McChrystal tried with all his strength to put into effect after taking command turned out to be problematic: So that the foreign troops would appear as little like foreign occupiers as possible and thereby win the support of the Afghan population, civilian casualties were to be avoided at almost any price.
In practice this meant that airstrikes and air support for the ground forces were limited. But it also meant that the troop commanders couldn't even carry out some military activities in difficult territory without placing their soldiers in jeopardy. The number of fallen soldiers — foreign and Afghan — has since climbed substantially.
“Pairing” — the attempt to have foreign and Afghan units carry out joint operations — is assessed as equally risky (and often as inefficient). Many Afghan troop units do not yet have enough combat strength, not to mention their lack of discipline. That doesn't bode well for the next component of the Afghanistan strategy: The development of domestic security forces — police and military — limps behind the plan objectives. Specialists call the expectation that, beginning in 2011, foreign troops will place control over the security of the largest portions of the country in Afghan hands an illusion. Here, the local situation and the political requirements collide head-on.
The strategy developed by Petraeus and McChrystal was controversial from the beginning. Vice President Joe Biden and the American ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eickenberry — a former NATO general — had declared themselves against a massive buildup of foreign combat forces in Afghanistan. Their primary argument was that this war, which officially according to the U.N. serves as “support of the government,” could only be won if the external military intervention is accompanied by the development of a credible political regime.
Afghanistan is still lacking one after nine years, and the arguments after the accusations of fraud accompanying the presidential election show the dilemma in its entire scale. The Americans don't have confidence in President Hamid Karzai to lead a clean and effective administration, but they have no one else with a chance of (electoral) success who could take his place. They are forced in many areas, therefore, to cooperate with dubious regional princes and warlords who float along with the wave of success and can become enemies tomorrow.
There is no military solution in Afghanistan. The insurgents and the Taliban groups who battle on both sides of the border with Pakistan have to be included in a political process. But the magic formula for how this can happen hasn't been found yet. As long as there is a type of mobile war of attrition in Afghanistan, McChrystal's successor, Petraeus, will be able to change little of it.
The dismissal of Gen. McChrystal came as no surprise after it became known what the top commander in Afghanistan and his military entourage think of the politicians and diplomats who deal with the “Afpak” (Afghanistan/Pakistan) complex. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Obama couldn't leave any doubt that the military deployment remains under political control. Far more surprising is that the general and his co-workers, in the presence of a journalist, expressed themselves critically, even condescendingly, about their political superiors and their civilian counterparts — the American ambassador in Afghanistan and the Afpak Special Representative Richard Holbrooke. It is a lack of discipline; above all, it shows how great the frustration is and that nerves are frayed.
The withdrawal of that general, who had been sought specifically by Gen. David Petraeus, the father of the new American “counterinsurgency” strategy — which was supposed to now be applied in Afghanistan after its trial in Iraq — deals a tough blow to the entire mission. Despite the assurance that it will not lead to a further change in strategy, and despite the statement of McChrystal himself that he still stands by the strategy that he helped to develop, the doubts will multiply about whether a military-political outcome, which could be portrayed as a success at some point, can be attained by this method in Afghanistan.
In fact, the retaking of the city of Marjah and the suppression of the Taliban from the district of the same name have proven, at best, to be only halfway successful. This offensive was supposed to be a test run for a far larger offensive, in which insurgents were to be expelled from the province of Kandahar and parts of the Afghan south — an ambitious goal, which since then has been repeatedly scaled back.
Problematic Strategy: Increasing Casualties
The tactic that McChrystal tried with all his strength to put into effect after taking command turned out to be problematic: So that the foreign troops would appear as little like foreign occupiers as possible and thereby win the support of the Afghan population, civilian casualties were to be avoided at almost any price.
In practice this meant that airstrikes and air support for the ground forces were limited. But it also meant that the troop commanders couldn't even carry out some military activities in difficult territory without placing their soldiers in jeopardy. The number of fallen soldiers — foreign and Afghan — has since climbed substantially.
“Pairing” — the attempt to have foreign and Afghan units carry out joint operations — is assessed as equally risky (and often as inefficient). Many Afghan troop units do not yet have enough combat strength, not to mention their lack of discipline. That doesn't bode well for the next component of the Afghanistan strategy: The development of domestic security forces — police and military — limps behind the plan objectives. Specialists call the expectation that, beginning in 2011, foreign troops will place control over the security of the largest portions of the country in Afghan hands an illusion. Here, the local situation and the political requirements collide head-on.
The strategy developed by Petraeus and McChrystal was controversial from the beginning. Vice President Joe Biden and the American ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eickenberry — a former NATO general — had declared themselves against a massive buildup of foreign combat forces in Afghanistan. Their primary argument was that this war, which officially according to the U.N. serves as “support of the government,” could only be won if the external military intervention is accompanied by the development of a credible political regime.
Afghanistan is still lacking one after nine years, and the arguments after the accusations of fraud accompanying the presidential election show the dilemma in its entire scale. The Americans don't have confidence in President Hamid Karzai to lead a clean and effective administration, but they have no one else with a chance of (electoral) success who could take his place. They are forced in many areas, therefore, to cooperate with dubious regional princes and warlords who float along with the wave of success and can become enemies tomorrow.
There is no military solution in Afghanistan. The insurgents and the Taliban groups who battle on both sides of the border with Pakistan have to be included in a political process. But the magic formula for how this can happen hasn't been found yet. As long as there is a type of mobile war of attrition in Afghanistan, McChrystal's successor, Petraeus, will be able to change little of it.