A Look at the Dismissalof the Commander of theAmerican War in Afghanistan
The dismissal of General Stanley McChrystal from the NATO command in Afghanistan by Obama can be analyzed as indicative of a disagreement between the White House and the Pentagon in the management of the war in Afghanistan. On another level, it demonstrates the complexity of this war and its difference from Iraq. This complexity is a result of the special social, political, cultural, and geographic conditions of Afghanistan.
The change in command happened at a time (June) when the Taliban force made it hell-on-earth for foreign forces in Afghanistan, leaving 64 dead — the highest mortality in months for the allies and NATO.
McChrystal believed that a reduction in air operations in the war in Afghanistan would reduce civilian Afghan casualties and that talking with tribal leaders could reduce the difficulties of war, helping bring America and its allies to success.
NATO forces and the allies, after nine years of war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, still have not been able to guarantee or achieve a victory. Obama justified the dismissal of McChrystal, announcing that this action was an official change but does not mean a change of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
While this has been said, it seems that a switch over of Afghanistan’s commander requires a change of strategy. The change of the war’s commander is not only a problem for America and its allies, but adds to the problems and conflicts in Afghanistan.
McChrystal’s view, direct from the battlefield of Afghanistan, has been quite different than that of the battlefield viewed remotely from the White House. The last word is that Afghanistan is still a great problem for U.S. and can be more costly, politically, for Washington than the dismissal of an American commander.
The change in command happened at a time (June) when the Taliban force made it hell-on-earth for foreign forces in Afghanistan, leaving 64 dead — the highest mortality in months for the allies and NATO.
McChrystal believed that a reduction in air operations in the war in Afghanistan would reduce civilian Afghan casualties and that talking with tribal leaders could reduce the difficulties of war, helping bring America and its allies to success.
NATO forces and the allies, after nine years of war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, still have not been able to guarantee or achieve a victory. Obama justified the dismissal of McChrystal, announcing that this action was an official change but does not mean a change of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
While this has been said, it seems that a switch over of Afghanistan’s commander requires a change of strategy. The change of the war’s commander is not only a problem for America and its allies, but adds to the problems and conflicts in Afghanistan.
McChrystal’s view, direct from the battlefield of Afghanistan, has been quite different than that of the battlefield viewed remotely from the White House. The last word is that Afghanistan is still a great problem for U.S. and can be more costly, politically, for Washington than the dismissal of an American commander.