Destabilize Iran: Unilateral Reasons and Implications (Part 1)
When Iran still had not openly shown the intention of following through with a nuclear development program, Pentagon studies signaled the Islamic Republic did not have a strategic need for developing nuclear warlike capacity (SSI- Sokolski and Clawson. 2004).
It was thought that Iran did not have a nearby enemy with aspirations of expansion, and the idea that the Transatlantic Alliance had in mind to militarily invade Iran was discarded. This period is prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attack of the twin towers in New York and the links between Iran and Al Qaeda were not an issue. After Sept. 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon’s point of view was definitively altered about Iran not having to aspire to assemble a nuclear war device. However, while the stabilization of Iraq advanced after the invasion, Iran transformed into an important collaborator for its normalization, manifesting itself as explicitly against terrorism.
Something happened along the way, and the precipitated invasion of Iraq, as well as the failure in Afghanistan contributed to the idea that Iran was going to take the nuclear path with more vigor. It was inevitable for a nation with the pedigree of Ancient Persia, after transforming into a stalwart space of political and cultural autonomy as an Islamic nation, to have a powerful warlike and atomic backup if possible.
In the era of the overthrown Reza Pahlavi, the nuclear ambition of Iran was a reality that the great nuclear powers could not confront with balanced judgment, much less with a weak non-proliferation treaty in the middle of the bipolar confrontation between the former USSR and the U.S. If India, Israel and Pakistan possess a nuclear war device, then why should the Iranian nation, that has historically been pivotal in negotiations for territorial disputes in the region, give up the same aspiration that the aforementioned nations completed with help from the great powers?
The war between Iran and Iraq exploded, stimulated by the U.S., becoming the point of vital inflection: Iran could not be devoid of a nuclear arsenal being surrounded by nations with atomic war power, including nations in the former USSR’s sphere of influence.
Nevertheless, while Iran was attempting to carry out its vital strategic design for protection, in strict rigor, what was being planned parallel to this was the case to invade Iran with support from a large international consensus, including some Islamic and Arab countries. The main idea consisted of constructing the central enemy and that was none other than Iran: the elusive occidental prey from remote times.
The actual Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty rests in the premise of fragile moral legitimacy: it is conceived from a virtual Nuclear Apartheid in which an exclusive club of possessors of atomic arms was maintained. The concept of non-proliferation is permanently violated, for example in the last nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. Increasingly, the nuclear war power is the story being told, and not in vain as today’s club consists of the most exclusive nations.
The rest of the force validations are adrift. Due to this, the occidental assault on Iran obliged Iran to adopt the nuclear option to defend itself. This gives rise to the crossroads of a forced invasion, because if the Iranian government had not manifested an antagonistic autonomy by the West, and above all if the government had not aligned its opponents with slogans against Israel, it is probable that the negotiations would have deduced that Iran could have nuclear development including the “adored atomic bomb.” From the point of view of the balances of power in the zone, it was very reasonable even from the perspective of the Western supremacy.
It is more efficient to have subsidiary powers that watch over the central interests that compete and yield than risking the (central) power in important but peripheral battles. This has been the essential doctrine dominant throughout the centuries.
Even considering the premises of the non-proliferation treaty — which Iran adheres to — from the point of view of the balances of war power, it is indisputable that Israel cannot be the only nuclear power in the region that is a historic powder keg. The trajectory of conflicts has contributed to forming the principle that the greater the inequality and imbalance of power, the greater the possibility of unilateral action. Israel, whether it likes it or not, is exposed to this situation, just as the U.S. is with respect to its omnipresent power, or as a default, the power of the Transatlantic Alliance.
After a process of tension that escalated with negotiation deficiencies by both parties, the United States and the Transatlantic Alliance are engaged in applying drastic measures to Iran in the case that the nation violates the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. The SCR 1929, as it is called, imposes economic sanctions for its obstinacy in continuing with its nuclear development. These measures could include military invasion that could not be implemented until now, but that have existed as a dossier on standby by consensus and the appropriate juncture.
The U.S. and the Transatlantic Alliance maintain voluminous troops in Iraq, countries in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan; Iran is the only thing standing in the way of complete military control of almost the entire region. The speech by President Jimmy Carter on Jan. 21, 1980, when he indicated to Congress “that any foreign interference in the Persian Gulf zone and the Arabia Sea would be considered as an aggression to the strategic interests of the U.S. and a threat to its national security,”* is the starting point of the master plan to obtain control of elusive Iran.
The sanctions are imposed on 41 companies affecting the commercial and financial flow of Iran that is centered on oil, the base of its economy. It is freezing Iranians’ capital in European banks and aiming for the collapse of the economy. In essence, the 1929 resolution aspires for the regime to collapse. It is unusual that the U.N. backs this strategy to bring down a political regime without measuring the implications in every sense.
The report from the U.S. Senate about the invasion in Iraq determined that they did not fully anticipate the political and economic implications of the invasion. However, between the lines it reads that “the world has not gone under” and that an anti-Occidental regime has been overthrown. Definitively, it was justifying the invasion. In the case of Iran, the implications of an invasion or military attack on Iran are immaterial. The objective is to knock down the regime. The sanctions in Iraq provoked an increase in poverty and a study prior to the invasion (UNICEF: A. Rao-Singh, 2000), signaled a significant increase in infant mortality.
The sanctions drawn in social and economic tragedies and a conflagration will determine in many nations — even in South America — the doctrines of security, and in some serious cases, economic losses.
*Editor's Note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
It was thought that Iran did not have a nearby enemy with aspirations of expansion, and the idea that the Transatlantic Alliance had in mind to militarily invade Iran was discarded. This period is prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attack of the twin towers in New York and the links between Iran and Al Qaeda were not an issue. After Sept. 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon’s point of view was definitively altered about Iran not having to aspire to assemble a nuclear war device. However, while the stabilization of Iraq advanced after the invasion, Iran transformed into an important collaborator for its normalization, manifesting itself as explicitly against terrorism.
Something happened along the way, and the precipitated invasion of Iraq, as well as the failure in Afghanistan contributed to the idea that Iran was going to take the nuclear path with more vigor. It was inevitable for a nation with the pedigree of Ancient Persia, after transforming into a stalwart space of political and cultural autonomy as an Islamic nation, to have a powerful warlike and atomic backup if possible.
In the era of the overthrown Reza Pahlavi, the nuclear ambition of Iran was a reality that the great nuclear powers could not confront with balanced judgment, much less with a weak non-proliferation treaty in the middle of the bipolar confrontation between the former USSR and the U.S. If India, Israel and Pakistan possess a nuclear war device, then why should the Iranian nation, that has historically been pivotal in negotiations for territorial disputes in the region, give up the same aspiration that the aforementioned nations completed with help from the great powers?
The war between Iran and Iraq exploded, stimulated by the U.S., becoming the point of vital inflection: Iran could not be devoid of a nuclear arsenal being surrounded by nations with atomic war power, including nations in the former USSR’s sphere of influence.
Nevertheless, while Iran was attempting to carry out its vital strategic design for protection, in strict rigor, what was being planned parallel to this was the case to invade Iran with support from a large international consensus, including some Islamic and Arab countries. The main idea consisted of constructing the central enemy and that was none other than Iran: the elusive occidental prey from remote times.
The actual Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty rests in the premise of fragile moral legitimacy: it is conceived from a virtual Nuclear Apartheid in which an exclusive club of possessors of atomic arms was maintained. The concept of non-proliferation is permanently violated, for example in the last nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. Increasingly, the nuclear war power is the story being told, and not in vain as today’s club consists of the most exclusive nations.
The rest of the force validations are adrift. Due to this, the occidental assault on Iran obliged Iran to adopt the nuclear option to defend itself. This gives rise to the crossroads of a forced invasion, because if the Iranian government had not manifested an antagonistic autonomy by the West, and above all if the government had not aligned its opponents with slogans against Israel, it is probable that the negotiations would have deduced that Iran could have nuclear development including the “adored atomic bomb.” From the point of view of the balances of power in the zone, it was very reasonable even from the perspective of the Western supremacy.
It is more efficient to have subsidiary powers that watch over the central interests that compete and yield than risking the (central) power in important but peripheral battles. This has been the essential doctrine dominant throughout the centuries.
Even considering the premises of the non-proliferation treaty — which Iran adheres to — from the point of view of the balances of war power, it is indisputable that Israel cannot be the only nuclear power in the region that is a historic powder keg. The trajectory of conflicts has contributed to forming the principle that the greater the inequality and imbalance of power, the greater the possibility of unilateral action. Israel, whether it likes it or not, is exposed to this situation, just as the U.S. is with respect to its omnipresent power, or as a default, the power of the Transatlantic Alliance.
After a process of tension that escalated with negotiation deficiencies by both parties, the United States and the Transatlantic Alliance are engaged in applying drastic measures to Iran in the case that the nation violates the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. The SCR 1929, as it is called, imposes economic sanctions for its obstinacy in continuing with its nuclear development. These measures could include military invasion that could not be implemented until now, but that have existed as a dossier on standby by consensus and the appropriate juncture.
The U.S. and the Transatlantic Alliance maintain voluminous troops in Iraq, countries in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan; Iran is the only thing standing in the way of complete military control of almost the entire region. The speech by President Jimmy Carter on Jan. 21, 1980, when he indicated to Congress “that any foreign interference in the Persian Gulf zone and the Arabia Sea would be considered as an aggression to the strategic interests of the U.S. and a threat to its national security,”* is the starting point of the master plan to obtain control of elusive Iran.
The sanctions are imposed on 41 companies affecting the commercial and financial flow of Iran that is centered on oil, the base of its economy. It is freezing Iranians’ capital in European banks and aiming for the collapse of the economy. In essence, the 1929 resolution aspires for the regime to collapse. It is unusual that the U.N. backs this strategy to bring down a political regime without measuring the implications in every sense.
The report from the U.S. Senate about the invasion in Iraq determined that they did not fully anticipate the political and economic implications of the invasion. However, between the lines it reads that “the world has not gone under” and that an anti-Occidental regime has been overthrown. Definitively, it was justifying the invasion. In the case of Iran, the implications of an invasion or military attack on Iran are immaterial. The objective is to knock down the regime. The sanctions in Iraq provoked an increase in poverty and a study prior to the invasion (UNICEF: A. Rao-Singh, 2000), signaled a significant increase in infant mortality.
The sanctions drawn in social and economic tragedies and a conflagration will determine in many nations — even in South America — the doctrines of security, and in some serious cases, economic losses.
*Editor's Note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
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