Obama and the Regional Solution Desired

All U.S. presidential administrations since that of Bush the Father have shown interest in the Palestinian track of the peace process, although the efforts that have been expended during the Obama administration are especially notable because of three factors.

The first is the timing of these efforts, in that the Obama administration is pursuing a process in a unique way compared to its predecessors: He is committing to the peace process at the beginning of his presidency.

The second is the urgency. No patience is being allotted to Special Envoy George Mitchell, who holds the world record for visits to the Middle East. In addition, Secretary Clinton has been directly involved, expending valuable hours in back-and-forth communication with both sides, mediating and applying pressure.

The third is the expansion of the circle to include Syria, meaning that the U.S. is closer to accepting the idea of a regional solution. The only question is whether a single comprehensive agreement is possible or whether there will be a series of separate agreements.

We have to distill a lesson that ought to be self-evident when it comes to the policy-making of the world’s most powerful country — namely, that the Obama administration must learn a lesson from the failures that have afflicted the peace process throughout its existence. The first lesson is Syria’s deliberate disregard, despite the vision of successive administrations. If the U.S. had better exploited areas of engagement with Syria, better results could have been obtained than have been the case thus far. Meanwhile, conducting the peace process as a series of isolated, single tracks has become an encumbrance upon peace and the chances of its realization.

We would not deny that, at times, treating negotiations between Israel and each of its adversaries as wholly separate tracks has led to some progress toward an agreement on each track, according to its individual characteristics. This is because progress on one track does not depend on negotiations [regarding] a comprehensive settlement moving forward. In the time between the Madrid Conference and Oslo, such grandiose success seemed at any rate incredible. But now, what little progress has been achieved by focusing on each negotiating track separately reveals how naïve and simplistic this idea really is. It has been deleterious for peacemaking and has been a sizable obstacle standing in the way of its success.

There is no shame in abandoning an approach that repeatedly produces mistakes. The isolated-track approach betrays a poor appraisal of the overall situation and gives the impression that it is founded upon the intention to divide the Arab world and subjugate the Palestinians, rather working with them to reach solutions by way of agreement and negotiations. The years since Oslo, even going back to Madrid, have revealed that not a single goal of the isolated-track approach has been achieved. Its advocates did not apply the proper pressure to get the parties to compromise. The progress that would have otherwise marked a lasting and enduring peace could not come to pass and will not come to pass even in the middle or long term as long as the isolated-track approach is applied.

American overtures to Syria must be within the context of a framework whose goal is opening negotiations between Israel and Syria. They must not merely keep the ball rolling, according to the logic of needing “to reassure the Syrians that we are keeping them in mind. …”

The measure of the seriousness of the American move to peace and the guaranty of its usefulness will be determined in light of American preparations for making a comprehensive regional peace that does not exclude any party. It is will also be determined by the employment of time in an effective manner, in addition to the fundamental and inevitable fact that America will have to be more assertive in pressuring Israel. Without U.S. pressure Israel will not cooperate in the implementation of a regional solution, which, if not accomplished in Obama’s term, may never be accomplished.

The degree of pessimism surrounding the seriousness of the U.S. effort to pursue a regional solution appears high in the official ranks, while it is wide and deep on the popular level. Despite that, the Obama administration has not shied away from taking heavy burdens on its shoulders, regardless of whether they involve U.S. domestic politics or U.S. relations with other countries. The U.S. ought not to pull back from the obstacles standing in the way of peace in the Middle East. This is just what Clinton did when he organized the Camp David Summit in the final days of his presidency. Having not dedicated himself to a comprehensive regional solution, Clinton pursued the same tired logic of isolated bilateral talks and ended up leaving the White House dispirited with the lack of progress.

George Bush the Son did much the same when he dove forcefully into the peace process, saying at the time that God ordered him to do so. When the obstacles were revealed, he quickly abandoned the issue and did not remember it until the last moments of his presidency when he called the Annapolis Conference, which ended up being more of a blame session than a forum for negotiations. As for Obama, he began positively but now wavers between the opportunities of the situation on the one hand and the urge to backslide in the same manner as his predecessors on the other. It appears as though he is ready to continue, but now it is up to him to realize that he needs Israel to ready itself for peace in the same manner as the Palestinians and the Arabs, who have offered their anguished support for the peace process.


- Nabil Amr is a member of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the current ambassador of the Palestinian National Authority to Egypt.