The War of the Future
Published in Süddeutsche Zeitung
(Germany) on 1 October 2010
by Stefan Kornelius (link to original)
(Germany) on 1 October 2010
by Stefan Kornelius (link to original)
Translated from
by Ron Argentati.
Edited by Jessica Boesl.
NATO recognizes the threat scenarios of the future. But it’s dangerous to make far-reaching strategic decisions without thinking through the consequences to the last detail.
Wars will no longer be fought on the battlefield; they envision no parade of armored battalions, and there will be no more artillery barrages. For those who haven’t noticed since 9/11, Afghanistan or Stuxnet: The ancient song of friends and foes is no longer accompanied by drums and bugles, but by new instruments.
This is the age of asymmetry, terrorists, saboteurs, pipeline potentates and virus mongers. Future wars won’t be any less dangerous, but they will definitely be less visible.
When the world’s largest defense alliance reconsiders its security and formulates its new strategy, it will have to consider this new reality. Since the Berlin Wall was torn down, NATO has wasted far too much time accepting the new truths of their core missions. Like every other bureaucracy, it’s far too lethargic.
Now the redesigned strategy is becoming apparent, and whoever still puzzles over terms like cyber war or raw materials security is still stuck in the last century. The white papers and national doctrines of the member states have long since accepted these concepts and incorporated them into their new threat catalog.
NATO’s main mission is still to prevent uncertainty and avoid war. NATO is an alliance of deterrence. It scares potential invaders away from its territory and provides for continued access to raw materials — and it has recognized that the most dangerous threats can come from manipulation of the information highway that runs through this highly connected world. Highly developed nations can’t be defeated by attacks with bombs and missiles, but with assaults on its infrastructure, its energy supply and its industrial installations.
So it’s correct to incorporate these threat scenarios into the new strategy. But it’s even more important to determine in concrete terms how the alliance intends to react to such a threat. The conclusions drawn in the strategy are more important than its basic elements. What does it wish to accomplish militarily and technologically? What is the threshold for taking action? What escalation and de-escalation methods are to be used?
During the Cold War, the world experienced an arms race because new technologies demanded ever more sophisticated responses. NATO should learn from that experience. It is dangerous to make far-reaching strategic decisions without thinking through the consequences to the last detail.
Deterrence mainly depends on credibility. The details in the strategy must therefore be brought into the political discussion as soon as possible. Then we’ll see what it is that truly unites the 28 NATO member states.
Wars will no longer be fought on the battlefield; they envision no parade of armored battalions, and there will be no more artillery barrages. For those who haven’t noticed since 9/11, Afghanistan or Stuxnet: The ancient song of friends and foes is no longer accompanied by drums and bugles, but by new instruments.
This is the age of asymmetry, terrorists, saboteurs, pipeline potentates and virus mongers. Future wars won’t be any less dangerous, but they will definitely be less visible.
When the world’s largest defense alliance reconsiders its security and formulates its new strategy, it will have to consider this new reality. Since the Berlin Wall was torn down, NATO has wasted far too much time accepting the new truths of their core missions. Like every other bureaucracy, it’s far too lethargic.
Now the redesigned strategy is becoming apparent, and whoever still puzzles over terms like cyber war or raw materials security is still stuck in the last century. The white papers and national doctrines of the member states have long since accepted these concepts and incorporated them into their new threat catalog.
NATO’s main mission is still to prevent uncertainty and avoid war. NATO is an alliance of deterrence. It scares potential invaders away from its territory and provides for continued access to raw materials — and it has recognized that the most dangerous threats can come from manipulation of the information highway that runs through this highly connected world. Highly developed nations can’t be defeated by attacks with bombs and missiles, but with assaults on its infrastructure, its energy supply and its industrial installations.
So it’s correct to incorporate these threat scenarios into the new strategy. But it’s even more important to determine in concrete terms how the alliance intends to react to such a threat. The conclusions drawn in the strategy are more important than its basic elements. What does it wish to accomplish militarily and technologically? What is the threshold for taking action? What escalation and de-escalation methods are to be used?
During the Cold War, the world experienced an arms race because new technologies demanded ever more sophisticated responses. NATO should learn from that experience. It is dangerous to make far-reaching strategic decisions without thinking through the consequences to the last detail.
Deterrence mainly depends on credibility. The details in the strategy must therefore be brought into the political discussion as soon as possible. Then we’ll see what it is that truly unites the 28 NATO member states.