How Does America Look from Ankara?
Published in Zaman
(Turkey) on 29 November 2010
by Ali H. Aslan (link to original)
(Turkey) on 29 November 2010
by Ali H. Aslan (link to original)
Translated from
by Tyler Evans.
Edited by Jessica Boesl.
Looking at how Turkey looks from the United States is no doubt important. But sometimes, it is useful to turn the tables and examine how the U.S. is regarded in Ankara. In the end, this is the only way to get the big picture.
It was with this in mind that I spent most of the week after the Lisbon Summit in Ankara and then went back to Washington to cover Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit. While in Ankara, I had the opportunity to speak with some important names in Turkish foreign policy, including President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Davutoglu. As far as I can see, Ankara’s political scene continues to place a great amount of importance on developments and relations with the U.S. And for starters, having an intellectual, constructive personality like Obama in the White House is looked on positively in Ankara.
During Obama’s first NATO summit, Ankara sent a positive signal to Obama by accepting certain compromises and removing its veto on Anders Fogh Rasmussen's election as general secretary. This saved Obama from falling into a weakened position due to an inability to get a general secretary elected to NATO. During the last summit, a helping hand was lent to Obama once again — a much-needed gesture given his midterm defeat and declining public support. I think that if we consider the 2012 Republican presidential candidates, it is not hard to see how Turkey’s interests lie in strengthening Obama both domestically and internationally.
By not throwing a wrench in NATO’s missile defense system concept, Turkey effectively increased Washington’s ability to maneuver. Thanks to these harmonious relations (both President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan are on very friendly terms with Obama), Ankara is very comfortable with the situation in the White House. But efforts still need to be made to improve the situation with the secretary of state, who has expressed concern about recent Turkish policies. In this sense, Davutoglu’s meeting with Secretary Clinton was an important opportunity, and the fact that Davutoglu brought Ambassador-Counselor Feridun Sinirlioglu with him on the visit is important in terms of reducing pressures on the highest levels of the foreign service bureaucracies. The meetings Davutoglu will hold with Congress also hold the potential to reduce tensions.
Beyond day-to-day events (WikiLeaks, for example), America wants to increase its emphasis on negotiation in approaching core issues like Afghanistan. In Washington, the perception that Turks do not like to listen is widespread. As criticism of Turkey’s Iran policy dies down with Turkey’s compliance with the embargo, the lack of resolution of the Mavi Marmara crisis continues to plague Washington. Whereas Ankara wants Washington to discretely pressure Israel to offer an apology to Turkey for the incident, with Turkey no longer having an embassy in Tel Aviv, coordination is becoming increasingly complex.
The fact that the Lisbon Summit concluded without any major malfunctions should strengthen the Obama administration’s hand in pushing their pick for ambassador to Turkey. On the other hand, I hear that the administration is considering a Plan B candidate, Francis Ricciardone. The major criticism against Ricciardone is that he compromises his objectivity by forging overly friendly ties with the locales where he is stationed. But having an extremely friendly personality take over as ambassador could go a long way in softening the suspicious attitudes of Turkey’s political parties.
Another concern I am hearing in Washington is that negative criticisms directed at Turkey at the bureaucratic level are not being clearly communicated to the government. And Turkish officials express a similar situation occurring on their end. It seems that communication between the two continues to be dysfunctional. If this is the case, how can communication between the two countries be improved? In my opinion, one solution would be to increase the depth and intensity of consultations on issues of high importance for both parties. Also, bringing a wider range of actors to consultations is important. For instance, it might be useful to give the Pentagon and the Turkish General Command at least observer status in consultations with a military dimension, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The two sides can set up a working group headed by top officials to deal with Middle East issues, an area of chronic disagreement. In this group, it would be important to include diplomats heading the European portfolio, which usually encompasses Europe, as well as officials in charge of affairs in the Near East. This way, the two players will be able to see the big picture better and answer each other’s questions and concerns easily.
Despite Ankara’s broadening foreign policy horizons and the extra time commitments that go along with this, Ankara continues to devote serious effort to its relations with the U.S. This shows that the relationship is valued highly in Ankara. And even if Turkey is not noticed much by the American public, in Washington, it is quickly attracting more and more attention (unfortunately, most of it has been negative). The fact is that many Turkish policy moves that were never intended to cause alarm in Washington have been misconstrued due to misleading rhetoric. I hope that in his interactions with the American public and foreign policy establishment, Ahmet Davutoglu is able to steer the growing interest in Turkey in a more positive direction.
It was with this in mind that I spent most of the week after the Lisbon Summit in Ankara and then went back to Washington to cover Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit. While in Ankara, I had the opportunity to speak with some important names in Turkish foreign policy, including President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Davutoglu. As far as I can see, Ankara’s political scene continues to place a great amount of importance on developments and relations with the U.S. And for starters, having an intellectual, constructive personality like Obama in the White House is looked on positively in Ankara.
During Obama’s first NATO summit, Ankara sent a positive signal to Obama by accepting certain compromises and removing its veto on Anders Fogh Rasmussen's election as general secretary. This saved Obama from falling into a weakened position due to an inability to get a general secretary elected to NATO. During the last summit, a helping hand was lent to Obama once again — a much-needed gesture given his midterm defeat and declining public support. I think that if we consider the 2012 Republican presidential candidates, it is not hard to see how Turkey’s interests lie in strengthening Obama both domestically and internationally.
By not throwing a wrench in NATO’s missile defense system concept, Turkey effectively increased Washington’s ability to maneuver. Thanks to these harmonious relations (both President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan are on very friendly terms with Obama), Ankara is very comfortable with the situation in the White House. But efforts still need to be made to improve the situation with the secretary of state, who has expressed concern about recent Turkish policies. In this sense, Davutoglu’s meeting with Secretary Clinton was an important opportunity, and the fact that Davutoglu brought Ambassador-Counselor Feridun Sinirlioglu with him on the visit is important in terms of reducing pressures on the highest levels of the foreign service bureaucracies. The meetings Davutoglu will hold with Congress also hold the potential to reduce tensions.
Beyond day-to-day events (WikiLeaks, for example), America wants to increase its emphasis on negotiation in approaching core issues like Afghanistan. In Washington, the perception that Turks do not like to listen is widespread. As criticism of Turkey’s Iran policy dies down with Turkey’s compliance with the embargo, the lack of resolution of the Mavi Marmara crisis continues to plague Washington. Whereas Ankara wants Washington to discretely pressure Israel to offer an apology to Turkey for the incident, with Turkey no longer having an embassy in Tel Aviv, coordination is becoming increasingly complex.
The fact that the Lisbon Summit concluded without any major malfunctions should strengthen the Obama administration’s hand in pushing their pick for ambassador to Turkey. On the other hand, I hear that the administration is considering a Plan B candidate, Francis Ricciardone. The major criticism against Ricciardone is that he compromises his objectivity by forging overly friendly ties with the locales where he is stationed. But having an extremely friendly personality take over as ambassador could go a long way in softening the suspicious attitudes of Turkey’s political parties.
Another concern I am hearing in Washington is that negative criticisms directed at Turkey at the bureaucratic level are not being clearly communicated to the government. And Turkish officials express a similar situation occurring on their end. It seems that communication between the two continues to be dysfunctional. If this is the case, how can communication between the two countries be improved? In my opinion, one solution would be to increase the depth and intensity of consultations on issues of high importance for both parties. Also, bringing a wider range of actors to consultations is important. For instance, it might be useful to give the Pentagon and the Turkish General Command at least observer status in consultations with a military dimension, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The two sides can set up a working group headed by top officials to deal with Middle East issues, an area of chronic disagreement. In this group, it would be important to include diplomats heading the European portfolio, which usually encompasses Europe, as well as officials in charge of affairs in the Near East. This way, the two players will be able to see the big picture better and answer each other’s questions and concerns easily.
Despite Ankara’s broadening foreign policy horizons and the extra time commitments that go along with this, Ankara continues to devote serious effort to its relations with the U.S. This shows that the relationship is valued highly in Ankara. And even if Turkey is not noticed much by the American public, in Washington, it is quickly attracting more and more attention (unfortunately, most of it has been negative). The fact is that many Turkish policy moves that were never intended to cause alarm in Washington have been misconstrued due to misleading rhetoric. I hope that in his interactions with the American public and foreign policy establishment, Ahmet Davutoglu is able to steer the growing interest in Turkey in a more positive direction.