America Chooses …

In spite of a reduction in its economic power and political and social influence, the U.S. remains one of the most powerful countries in the world, substantially influencing the character and tendencies of global development.

Of course, the flip side of that influence is that in its domestic policy America should give significant consideration to the following: the situation in the world as a whole and in individual countries, the state of the global economy and security and many other factors that are located outside the territory of the U.S — and often generally outside the sphere of its direct control. How the world depends on the U.S. is also how the U.S., to the same degree, depends on the world. This is the other side of globalization. Today America's world influence revolves around its high degree of responsibility and dependence on others, which makes the U.S. one of the most vulnerable countries of the world to external forces.

Today, a new scenario is developing in the world. The more influence you want in the world, the more you should depend on that world — on its successes and failures, on its dangers and uncertainties. In other words, the growth of global influence, which of course gives you the possibility of significantly advancing your national interests and better assuring your own security and the quality of the national economy, will necessarily demand more and more erosion of your own national sovereignty. It is somewhat simplifying, but you could say that in the current situation, the most sovereign nations of the world are the ones that are almost completely excluded from the global cycle, such as North Korea or Cuba. And the most influential countries are rapidly losing their sovereignty literally before your very eyes, including in the global economic, technological and information chains, competing and collaborating amongst themselves on so many international stages that later they won't always be able to say exactly where their own interests end and where the interests of other players begin. The choice of a model of foreign policy conduct still stands before Russia. Therefore, we need to know the pros and cons of each one of them.

To a large degree, all of this is related to the problems of providing international security and global stability. Today the U.S. stands, on the one hand, before a tough need to reduce its military presence in the world, or it will lay too heavy a burden on the shoulders of common Americans and undermine the country's political stability. But, on the other hand, it stands before an almost complete inability to do this because, to a large degree, U.S. national security today depends not on the strength of its borders, as it always was in the history of all countries, but on what is occurring in various regions of the world. Therefore, Washington considers military presence to be of primary importance — for example, in Europe, in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf region — in spite of the fact that this very presence is cause for a whole array of threats and challenges to U.S. security.

In these circumstances, the ratification of the arms reduction treaty with Russia, which was signed by President Dmitry Medvedev and President Barack Obama in April of this year in Prague, is of primary importance for providing national security for the U.S., as well as for strengthening all international security. Naturally, in Washington there is a full understanding that this treaty is also important for Russia's security. Barack Obama promised Dmitry Medvedev that he would do everything in order to gain ratification of the treaty, although from the very beginning it was clear that there was somewhat of a paradox: it was easier to prepare and sign the treaty than to ratify it.

The results of the American midterm elections, in which the Democrats suffered a noticeable defeat while Republicans significantly strengthened their presence in Congress, led to it becoming much more difficult for Obama to fulfill his promise to his Russian colleague. It could be that the White House will have to submit the treaty to the new Congress for ratification. That means that the cost of ratification will be greater for Obama.

The fact that the party controlling the White House suffered a defeat in the midterm Congressional elections is not unusual. On the contrary, that is the traditional scenario of American political life: As a rule, the party of the current president gets fewer votes in such elections than their opponents. In part, this is connected with the fact that voters experience natural disappointment in their new leader: Some of their expectations are not realized, and a number of pre-election promises have to be retracted.

However, many believe that, willingly or unwillingly, Americans try to achieve a balance of their political machine in midterm elections and strengthen the legislative power of the representatives of the party that opposes the White House. In American political culture, there is a strong sense that a monopoly of power is the shortest path to inevitable mistakes. Any monopoly leads to a collapse, including in the United States. The results of the present midterm elections could also be regarded as the next restoration of the balance of power, which is the basis of America's political system. In other words, it is not worth making a tragedy out of the Democrats' defeat. It would probably be worse if this had not happened, including for them. There is another matter: the fact that the defeat turned out to be the most serious in the last half century places Barack Obama in a difficult situation.

Of course, there are principal opponents to this treaty in the Senate. They have their arguments against ratification, which they are not hiding. There are advocates of increasing America's nuclear potential. Naturally, there are constant critics of Russia. Nothing will convince them otherwise. But it is important to keep in mind that for many of Obama's political opponents, the issue of ratifying the treaty with Russia has nothing to do with Russia or with the treaty itself. For them, this is just an instrument of political struggle with Barack Obama's administration. They want to "sell" their agreement for support in a way that is the most politically advantageous for themselves. The administration must work individually with each senator.

Therefore, the issue lies in what some of them want to receive from the administration in exchange for their support and whether Obama will be able to give them what they want. For all intents and purposes, all of these issues will touch upon domestic policy in the country, the distribution of budgetary resources and federal benefits for one voting district or another and cabinet appointments to one Congressional committee or another and various levels of governmental agencies, etc. In other words, for many in the U.S. establishment, the issue of ratifying the treaty with Russia will be decided within the framework of searching for a compromise on many issues, often not having anything to do with the treaty or with Russia. Now Obama will have to take his political opponents' arguments into account to a much greater degree and make concessions to them, including regarding the treaty with Russia. This is not good for the ratification of the treaty, but it is good for the political machine of the U.S., restoring its balance. It is important for Moscow to understand that the difficulties President Obama is encountering have nothing to do with Moscow itself. Moscow does not need to dramatize or change its course in its collaboration with the current White House.

At least that is how it appears to me from Washington.