If War Breaks Out in the Korean Peninsula
At the moment, the world’s hottest hotspot has to be the Korean Peninsula. The aftereffect of the Tian An incident and the Yin Ping Island shelling is progressing in a terrifying direction. The latest South Korean military exercises, the congregation of three U.S. aircraft carriers in East Asia, a North Korean warning that cannot be underestimated, and the failure of China’s and Russia’s mediation all point toward an impending war in the peninsula. Of course, war is preventable, as long as large nations, especially the U.S. and China, actively cooperate, limiting dangerous actions from both the North and the South, and thus leading to an easing of the situation. However, under such tense conditions, any randomly occurring event could ignite a war, and once that happens, the fire would be difficult to put out. If war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, what would happen?
Once a war breaks out, U.S.-Republic of Korea forces must first resolve two issues: first, to thoroughly destroy the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear capabilities, including existing nuclear bombs and facilities used in the production of nuclear bombs; and second, to paralyze much of the DPRK’s artilleries so that its destructive power is reduced to an acceptable level. The first problem is hard to resolve — it is easy to destroy the facilities, but difficult to utterly destroy existing nuclear bombs. No one knows for sure if the U.S. has this ability. If the U.S. is the one to start the war, it shows that they have confidence in resolving the nuclear issue.
The second problem is comparatively simpler. Even though the DPRK has thousands of cannons that can hit Seoul, the U.S.-ROK forces have effective integration of air, sea and land power. The U.S.-ROK forces would be able to take a preemptive strike against the North, and the North’s remaining artillery power would be within the acceptable range for the South.
If the two problems are resolved, there are still two options for U.S.-ROK forces after the war begins:
First, the war would be limited. After destroying the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and artillery powers, the U.S.-ROK forces could continue weakening its national defense using primarily air forces and cruise missiles to accurately attack. The attack would be targeted at the highest DPRK authorities, its military, military equipment and military facilities etc., such that the DPRK becomes a non-threatening nation toward the ROK and the world. The residual mess would be left for the DPRK to clean up or perhaps China would be allowed to help in the clean up. The advantage of this move is to gain China’s and Russia’s reluctant acceptance (the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities are also cause for concern for them), hence securing their non-participation, drawing the limits of the war and preventing a larger catastrophe. Of course, such a decision would not be popular with the ROK, but as long as the U.S., China and Russia — especially the U.S. and China — reach an agreement or understanding, the choice is not the ROK’s.
The second option is for a full-scale war, allowing the ROK to unify the peninsula through warfare. Given the strength of the coalition forces, to destroy the DPRK’s military strength and to use land troops to take over the DPRK should not be difficult, and the U.S. could control the level of casualties within an acceptable range. However, this solution would not be accepted by China and Russia, especially not by the former. If these two powers interfere — even just China — the situation would be tougher for the U.S.-ROK coalition. Following the lessons learned from the last Korean War, the two nations would be careful. They will attempt to communicate through various channels, look for a compromise — seeking a degree of cooperation amidst the conflict — and to the greatest extent avoid touching each other’s most sensitive points.
Once a War Breaks Out in the Korean Peninsula, How Would China Choose?
Public opinion within the country is an important factor. A significant [portion of the] population feels that the last Korean War ended victoriously and that victory is imminent in the upcoming war as well. Public support for a second war against the U.S. and for the DPRK is great, and this has influence on decision-making at the higher level.
If the coalition forces choose to embark on limited warfare, with the aims of destroying the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and the military threat toward the ROK, the U.S. may choose to announce its intentions to the world or to privately inform China and Russia. Under such a circumstance, China will naturally express condemnation, prepare its military forces for war, carry out military exercises to showcase its strength and provide some military aid to the DPRK. At the same time, China has to prepare for the fall of the North Korean Kim regime and use its own influence in maintaining post-war political stability in North Korea. In this case, China does not have to interfere through military support. The situation would not harm China’s national interests, and would even aid them.
If the U.S. and the ROK decide to take over the DPRK, China has three possible options. The first is to use China’s full power in aid of the DPRK, providing troops to fight against the U.S.-ROK forces. Even with Russian military assistance, it is unlikely that the large-scale war will end victoriously for China and may even interrupt China’s nation-building. I think China’s highest authorities will withstand the pressures of public opinion and not choose this option.
The second option is to not take any practical actions. This would be in the best interest of the U.S.-ROK coalition, but considering China’s own military strategic space, would be a sign of weakness. In lowering its own worth, the Chinese government would be met with great disapproval from its own people; thus, this is not a likely action for China.
The third option is limited participation, which requires that China find the best timing — for example, when the U.S.-ROK forces cross the Military Demarcation Line. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil, Chinese forces could quickly establish leadership, take control of Pyongyang, and then as best as possible push the line of defense southward. At the same time, China would announce to the world a suggestion to establish a joint military security area along with the U.S.-ROK coalition to stabilize the situation and end the war. This situation may not be desired by South Korea, but does not greatly harm U.S. interests. The threat posed by the DPRK would be eradicated, the Kim government would fall, and the price of a full-fledged war against China would have been too high. This solution requires of China superb armies, command, military strategies, sophisticated diplomacy, and even more so, requires courageous and wise leadership. Even though this would be the first time China executes such a plan, it may still succeed.
In conclusion, if war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, it may be a limited or a full-scale war. It is more likely to be a limited war. In the case of a limited war, China is unlikely to substantially intervene. In a full-scale war, China will likely intervene in a limited manner to safeguard national interests. Regardless, once a war starts, it would be far from simple, and its complexities would neither be easily understood nor elucidated.
Once a war breaks out, U.S.-Republic of Korea forces must first resolve two issues: first, to thoroughly destroy the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear capabilities, including existing nuclear bombs and facilities used in the production of nuclear bombs; and second, to paralyze much of the DPRK’s artilleries so that its destructive power is reduced to an acceptable level. The first problem is hard to resolve — it is easy to destroy the facilities, but difficult to utterly destroy existing nuclear bombs. No one knows for sure if the U.S. has this ability. If the U.S. is the one to start the war, it shows that they have confidence in resolving the nuclear issue.
The second problem is comparatively simpler. Even though the DPRK has thousands of cannons that can hit Seoul, the U.S.-ROK forces have effective integration of air, sea and land power. The U.S.-ROK forces would be able to take a preemptive strike against the North, and the North’s remaining artillery power would be within the acceptable range for the South.
If the two problems are resolved, there are still two options for U.S.-ROK forces after the war begins:
First, the war would be limited. After destroying the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and artillery powers, the U.S.-ROK forces could continue weakening its national defense using primarily air forces and cruise missiles to accurately attack. The attack would be targeted at the highest DPRK authorities, its military, military equipment and military facilities etc., such that the DPRK becomes a non-threatening nation toward the ROK and the world. The residual mess would be left for the DPRK to clean up or perhaps China would be allowed to help in the clean up. The advantage of this move is to gain China’s and Russia’s reluctant acceptance (the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities are also cause for concern for them), hence securing their non-participation, drawing the limits of the war and preventing a larger catastrophe. Of course, such a decision would not be popular with the ROK, but as long as the U.S., China and Russia — especially the U.S. and China — reach an agreement or understanding, the choice is not the ROK’s.
The second option is for a full-scale war, allowing the ROK to unify the peninsula through warfare. Given the strength of the coalition forces, to destroy the DPRK’s military strength and to use land troops to take over the DPRK should not be difficult, and the U.S. could control the level of casualties within an acceptable range. However, this solution would not be accepted by China and Russia, especially not by the former. If these two powers interfere — even just China — the situation would be tougher for the U.S.-ROK coalition. Following the lessons learned from the last Korean War, the two nations would be careful. They will attempt to communicate through various channels, look for a compromise — seeking a degree of cooperation amidst the conflict — and to the greatest extent avoid touching each other’s most sensitive points.
Once a War Breaks Out in the Korean Peninsula, How Would China Choose?
Public opinion within the country is an important factor. A significant [portion of the] population feels that the last Korean War ended victoriously and that victory is imminent in the upcoming war as well. Public support for a second war against the U.S. and for the DPRK is great, and this has influence on decision-making at the higher level.
If the coalition forces choose to embark on limited warfare, with the aims of destroying the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and the military threat toward the ROK, the U.S. may choose to announce its intentions to the world or to privately inform China and Russia. Under such a circumstance, China will naturally express condemnation, prepare its military forces for war, carry out military exercises to showcase its strength and provide some military aid to the DPRK. At the same time, China has to prepare for the fall of the North Korean Kim regime and use its own influence in maintaining post-war political stability in North Korea. In this case, China does not have to interfere through military support. The situation would not harm China’s national interests, and would even aid them.
If the U.S. and the ROK decide to take over the DPRK, China has three possible options. The first is to use China’s full power in aid of the DPRK, providing troops to fight against the U.S.-ROK forces. Even with Russian military assistance, it is unlikely that the large-scale war will end victoriously for China and may even interrupt China’s nation-building. I think China’s highest authorities will withstand the pressures of public opinion and not choose this option.
The second option is to not take any practical actions. This would be in the best interest of the U.S.-ROK coalition, but considering China’s own military strategic space, would be a sign of weakness. In lowering its own worth, the Chinese government would be met with great disapproval from its own people; thus, this is not a likely action for China.
The third option is limited participation, which requires that China find the best timing — for example, when the U.S.-ROK forces cross the Military Demarcation Line. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil, Chinese forces could quickly establish leadership, take control of Pyongyang, and then as best as possible push the line of defense southward. At the same time, China would announce to the world a suggestion to establish a joint military security area along with the U.S.-ROK coalition to stabilize the situation and end the war. This situation may not be desired by South Korea, but does not greatly harm U.S. interests. The threat posed by the DPRK would be eradicated, the Kim government would fall, and the price of a full-fledged war against China would have been too high. This solution requires of China superb armies, command, military strategies, sophisticated diplomacy, and even more so, requires courageous and wise leadership. Even though this would be the first time China executes such a plan, it may still succeed.
In conclusion, if war breaks out in the Korean Peninsula, it may be a limited or a full-scale war. It is more likely to be a limited war. In the case of a limited war, China is unlikely to substantially intervene. In a full-scale war, China will likely intervene in a limited manner to safeguard national interests. Regardless, once a war starts, it would be far from simple, and its complexities would neither be easily understood nor elucidated.