Sino–U.S. Relations Will Never Return to the Past

Published in Zaobao
(Singapore) on 6 January 2011
by Guo Bingyun (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Peixin Lin. Edited by Amy Wong.
The Sino–U.S. relationship, which has seen unceasing troubles since early last year, seems to be warming up at the start of 2011. The U.S. secretary of defense will visit China, and China’s diplomacy is also preparing for President Hu Jintao’s later visit to the U.S. The warming up of the relationship can surely be attributed to President Hu’s planned visit to the U.S.

Not long ago, the “Sino–U.S. grand strategy agreement” newly proposed by U.S. scholars was hotly debated in a panel discussion led by He Liangliang on Phoenix Cable TV. The “Sino–U.S. grand strategy agreement” refers to a potential agreement that would be signed during President Hu’s upcoming visit, similar to the 1972 “Shanghai Communiqué”. It is further claimed that if such an agreement were signed, it would be as important as any other document signed in the history of Sino–U.S. relations.

The two peaks in Sino–U.S. relations

This writer thinks that, in the foreseeable future, Sino–U.S. relations will never return to the past. The so-called “past” here refers to the honeymoon period in Sino–U.S. relations, otherwise known as the stable peak period.

The two honeymoon peaks in Sino–U.S. relations are the 17 years between 1972 and 1989 and the seven years between 2002 (Post-9/11, Bush Jr. participated in the 2001 APEC meeting in Shanghai, and in 2002 he visited China.) and 2009. In November 2009, Obama visited China and announced the “U.S.–China Joint Statement”. According to Chinese scholar Tao Wen, the word “common” appeared as many as 20 times in the statement. In comparison, it appeared only three times in the 1972 bulletin.

While there were obstacles of various magnitudes in the 17 years between 1972 and 1989, the “informal Sino–U.S. alliance” was generally unaffected (Kissinger, in his masterpiece “Diplomacy”, claims that after a visit to China, President Nixon confirmed the unofficial alliance between the two countries.). The reason why an alliance could be formed was that there was a common enemy — the threat of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved, when this common enemy no longer existed, the basis of the alliance dissolved as well.

Between 2002 and 2009, though they were not as close as during 1972–1989, Sino–U.S. relations were basically stable. Bush Jr. visited China in October 2001, a first move towards the subsequent four visits he would make to China. 9/11 utterly changed the China policy of the Bush Jr. administration. While terrorism was unable to push the Sino–U.S. relationship to its peak, as the Soviet Union threat did in pushing the two nations to come together as military allies, it at least maintained the stability of the relationship.

Sino–U.S. conflicts on the international stage

Though Sino–U.S. relations reached a new peak under the Obama administration, the goodwill did not last long. Not long after Obama left China, friction and conflicts ensued. These ranged from the arms sale to Taiwan to meeting the Dalai Lama and then the RMB issue and the later military conflicts in the South China Sea and Yellow Sea.

The driving forces and mutual interests behind Sino–U.S. cooperation still exist: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, trade relations, climate and the environment, maintaining global political and economic stability. Even so, following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the rise of the Chinese economy and Obama’s global strategic adjustments have caused Sino–U.S. relations to deteriorate rapidly. Obama’s one sentence “I do not accept second place for the United States of America” shattered the popular belief that the era of U.S. supremacy is at its end.

The first honeymoon period was driven by the common threat of the Soviet Union. The second honeymoon period was driven by the need to combat terrorism to safeguard national interests and global supremacy. From the viewpoints of the Obama administration and some Americans, the two countries that used to work together to safeguard global supremacy are now working against each other to claim unilateral supremacy. As described above, the Obama administration sees China as a challenger to U.S. hegemony. This move by Obama introduces Sino–U.S. relations to the greater global stage. Only from a macro worldview can we comprehensively understand the friction and conflicts between China and the U.S.

Cooperation between China and the U.S. brings about micro level benefits for the U.S. such as lowering the cost of living for Americans and increasing employment opportunities. There are also more macro-level benefits such as maintaining the stability of the global economy. Even so, from the current viewpoint of the Obama administration, the Sino–U.S. relationship, while mutually beneficial, benefits China more than the U.S. In the long run, the U.S. will not only lose its comparative advantage but would be replaced by China.

Obama is looking to use Hu’s upcoming visit as an opportunity to lower China’s absolute gain and increase the relative gain of the U.S. in their relationship. Even though a joint statement may be issued, or even a joint communiqué, the outcome will certainly be the further limitation of China’s progress. In international diplomacy, national leaders are always smiling when cursing and always laughing when killing others!

In the international arena of what international relations scholars call “power politics”, especially among the great powers, one country’s increase in relative strength signifies the relative reduction in strength of another. The U.S., the only dominant power since the end of the Cold War, definitely does not wish for other nations to weaken its own absolute and relative strength. In history, those who could have threatened or did threaten U.S. hegemony, such as the Soviet Union and Japan, have been brought down by the U.S. or have been led to economic stagnation by the U.S. As China grows unceasingly into a real threat to U.S. hegemony, the U.S. is bound to expend great effort toward limiting China's progress, until it feels that the threat has been resolved.

Conditions do not exist for a warming up of Sino–U.S. relations

Looking at the current balance of powers, the existing configuration of one superpower trumping many indicates that Sino–U.S. relations are unlikely to warm up in the short term. Since the end of the Cold War, especially into the 21st century, under market economy conditions fueled by economic globalization, the U.S. has become one of the most important trading partners of other countries. At the same time, military alliances formed during the Cold War did not dissolve with the end of the Cold War. Rather, the U.S. makes full use of these alliances and existing conflicts on the international arena to further strengthen its military presence all over the world. In short, to many countries, the U.S. is the most important trading partner and military ally.

The current status of the U.S. means that, in the foreseeable future, the phenomenon of the second and third most powerful countries forming an alliance against the most powerful will not come to pass, unlike at other points in history. China, India, Brazil, Russia, as well as the traditionally developed countries of Germany, France, England, Italy, Japan and Spain, all have close economic ties with the U.S. Except for China and Russia, the rest of the countries have closer military ties to the U.S. than to each other. To world powers outside of China and Russia, coming together to combat the U.S. will be too costly and the price too high for them to take the risk.

In the short run, it is impossible for any entity to become a significant threat to the U.S., as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War period. The Obama administration has already lowered the strategic status of counterterrorism. Conversely, the threat of China has risen dramatically in importance in the overall grand strategy of the U.S. The forces that drove Sino–U.S. relations into the previous honeymoon periods not only no longer exist, but the U.S. now views China as the most significant threat to guard against.

Based on the above analysis, I believe that even if any so-called “achievements” come of Hu’s upcoming visit to the U.S. or if Sino–U.S. relations are to reach new heights, all would be temporary. Obama’s visit to China last year proved this to us. The current global pattern determines that for a long period (at least two decades), the Sino–U.S. relationship is bound to be continuously characterized by friction and conflicts. Last year’s conflict between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands led to a rapid deterioration of their bilateral relations. In actuality, that was only a micro-level adjustment and focus point in Asia. When China and the U.S. make a similar adjustment, a significant turbulence will be felt at the global scale.

In the face of the restricting force that is the U.S. and its layers of containment, the Chinese government is not totally helpless. Conversely, with enough confidence, strategy and the appropriate policy, China is bound to be the leader of the world in the coming years!


再也回不到从前的中美关系

 去年年初开始麻烦不断的中美关系在2011年年初似乎让人开始感受到了暖意。美国国防部长即将访华,中国外交也将为胡锦涛的访美作准备而作先遣访问。把中美关系推向新暖意的当属即将到来的中国国家主席胡锦涛访问美国。

  前不久,凤凰卫视以何亮亮为代表的时事评论员热议由美国学者提出的所谓中美大战略协议。这里所谓之中美大战略协议,是指即将访问美国的中国国家主席胡锦涛与美国总统奥巴马可能签订的一个类似于1972年《中美联合公报》即《上海公报》的公报。他们并且声称,若此大战略协议真能签订,其重要性不亚于中美关系史上的任何一个公报。

  中美关系的两个高峰

  笔者愚以为,在可以预见的将来,中美关系不可能回到过去。这里所谓之过去,是指中美关系史上的蜜月期,或者称之为稳定期的历史高峰。

  中美关系史的两个蜜月高峰,一是1972年至1989年的十七年;二是指2002年(九·一一后小布什总统参加当年在上海举行的亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议并于第二年访问中国)至2009年的七年。2009年11月奥巴马访问中国并发表《中美联合声明》,据中国学者陶文钊统计,声明中 “共同”两字出现多达20次,而1972年的公报中则仅有可怜的3次。

  1972至1989年这十七年期间,虽然也曾出现过大小不一的波折,但总体来说,中美两国之间“非正式的同盟关系”并未改变(基辛格在其力作《大外交》一书中声称尼克松总统访华后确定了中美两国之间的非正式同盟关系)。中美两国之所以能形成同盟关系,主要原因是当时两国面临着当时共同的敌人——苏联的威胁。当苏联解体后,这一对象不复存在后,中美同盟关系的基础也随之烟消云散。

  2002年至2009年这七年期间,虽然中美关系之密切程度无法比肩于1972至1989年的的同盟关系,但中美关系的基本面是稳定的。小布什总统于2001年10 月访华,拉开了其任内四次访华的大幕。九·一一事件彻底改变了小布什政府的对华政策,恐怖分子虽然未能如当年苏联般把中美关系再次推向军事盟国的高潮,但至少维护了中美关系的稳定。

  国际格局中的中美冲突

  中美关系在奥巴马执政伊始达到了2001年至2009年这七年中的新高度;然而好景不长,奥巴马离开中国后不久,两国之间的摩擦和冲突开始接踵而至。从对台军售到会见达赖,再到人民币汇率问题以及再后来的南海、黄海军事冲突。

  中美两国曾经合作的动力,即两国间的共同利益仍然还在:反恐、防扩散、经贸往来、气候和环境领域内的合作、维护全球政治、经济的稳定。然而,全球金融危机爆发后中国经济的强势及奥巴马全球战略调整导致中美关系急转直下。奥巴马的一句“美国不想做世界第二”惊醒了无数梦中人。

  中美关系的第一个蜜月期以联合中国对付苏联以维护其霸主地位为动力;第二个蜜月期以联合中国对付恐怖主义以维护其国家安全和世界霸主为动力。曾经那个两次与其共同维护其世界霸主的国家,如今在奥巴马政府及某些美国人看来,大有拉其下马自己称霸的势头。正是基于上述认识,奥巴马把中国当作美国霸主地位和潜在挑战者。奥巴马此举把中美关系这对双边关系带进了世界格局的大视野之中。只有从世界格局的宏观视角出发,才能较为全面的认识到中美两国之间的摩擦和冲突。

  中美两国之间的合作,对于美国来说既有具体的、微观层面的利益,如降低美国普通民众的生活成本、增加就业岗位;也有宏观层面的利益,如维持国际经济秩序的稳定。然而,在现在的奥巴马政府看来,中美之间的合作中国是相对受益者,而美只是绝对受益者(所谓绝对受益者,是对中美之间的合作双方都受益,而相对受益者是指在合作中受益更大更多的那一方);长此以往,美国对中国的优势不但不复存在,还将被中国取代。

  奥巴马总统想借此次胡锦涛主席访美缩小中国在中美合作中的绝对受益,与此同时增加美国的相对受益。即使胡锦涛此次访美,两国可能会发表联合声明,甚至发表联合公报,但其结果绝对是美国尽力进一步限制中国的发展。在国际社会的交往中,国家领导人向来都是笑着骂人、笑着杀人的!

  在被国际关系学者称为权力政治的国际社会中,国家之间,尤其是大国之间,一国相对实力的增加意味着本国相对实力的减少。冷战结束以来一直是国际社会中唯一霸主的美国,绝不希望有其他国家来削弱其相对和绝对实力。历史上,那些本可能或者曾经威胁过美国霸主地位的国家,如苏联和日本,或被美国搞垮,或被美国弄得经济长期停滞不前。当中国的实力在不断地朝着美国认为威胁其霸主地位的方向发展时,美国定将不留余力地遏制该国的发展,直到他认为安全为止。

  中美关系不存在升温的条件

  就目前各国实力对比来看,一超多强的国际格局决定了中美关系短期内不可能升温。冷战结束后,特别是进入二十一世纪以来,市场经济作用下的经济全球化导致美国成为其他国家最重要的贸易伙伴之一。与此同时,美国在冷战过程中形成的很多军事同盟关系并未随着冷战的结束而寿终正寝,相反,美国充分运用其盟国存在的各种外部敌对关系进一步巩固了其遍布世界各地的军事力量。一言以蔽之,美国成为当今世界很多国家最重要的经贸伙伴和军事同盟。

  美国此现状决定了,在可以预见的将来,国际社会中不可能发生世界历史上不断出现的实力第二、第三的国家联合对付实力最强的国家的现象。中国、印度、巴西、俄罗斯,以及传统的发达国家:德、法、英、意、日用西班牙,所有这种些国家,没有谁与美国的经济关系不密切,除了中、俄,其他国家与美国的军事关系更为密切。对于任何中国、俄罗斯以外的大国而言,联合其他国家对付美国的成本太高,代价太沉重,因而不敢冒此风险。

  短期内,国际社会中不可能出现如冷战期间般足以威胁美国的苏联;奥巴马政府已经降低了反恐在美国的战略地位;相反,对中国的防范在美国的大战略中却急剧上升。曾经促使中美走向蜜月关系的动力不但不复存在;而且美国把中国当作其最重要的战略防范对象。

  基于上述分析,笔者认为,不论这次胡锦涛访美暂时取得任何所谓成就、中美关系达到什么新的高度,那一切的一切都只是暂时的,去年奥巴马访问中国的历史经验已经告诉了我们这一点。当今世界格局决定了在相当长一段时期内(至少二十年),中美关系必将摩擦和冲突不断。中日两国去年因钓鱼岛问题而出现的两国关系严重倒退,其实质是亚洲格局调整的一个缩影和集中点。当中美两国的实力出现如此调整时,世界格局必将出现相应的动荡。

  面对美国的重重包围和层层遏制,中国政府并非无可作为;相反,只要足够自信,战略科学,策略得当,来日之域中,必将中华之天下!

  湖北随州 郭兵云
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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