U.S.-China-Taiwan Co-Development Framework for Building Peace in East Asia
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Chairman Ray Burghardt had a meeting with President Ma Ying-jiu yesterday regarding the recent meeting between President Obama and Hu Jintao. Burghardt is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and fully understands the cross-strait situation between China and Taiwan. He took over as Chairman of AIT in February of 2006 and has visited Taipei 10 times since.
The goal of Burghardt's trip is similar to his November 2009 trip to Taipei. At that time, President Obama had just finished visiting Beijing and Burghardt was ordered to Taipei in order to carry out a briefing and explanation to President Ma. As far as Taipei is concerned, Burghardt's coming to Taiwan after the Chinese and American meeting to explain the content of Obama and Hu's discussions is very rare. It reflects the unhindered development in Sino-U.S. relations. In other words, Burghardt’s two most recent visits to Taiwan both appear to affirm President Ma's consolidation of American and Taiwanese mutual trust during his term in office. In fact, U.S.-Taiwanese relations certainly have improved because of the improvement in cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Political interaction now, compared to the past, is even more frequent.
Another similarity with the situation more than a year ago is that, on one hand, President Obama confirmed his commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act during his joint press conference with Hu. Another similarity is that Obama supported Taiwan's desire to participate more in international organizations and affairs. On the other hand, President Ma still looks forward to new developments in U.S.-Taiwanese relations. Ma raised the question, although a cliche, of whether the development of U.S.-Taiwanese relations extends to the sale of F-16 fighters and diesel submarines, restoration of the investment and trade framework (TIFA), completion of a VISA waiver program and other American ministerial-level official ability to visit Taiwan.
The long-term asymmetric interaction between America, China and Taiwan has been closely followed by the Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese deeply fear turning into the sacrificial lamb in a power struggle between China and America. As a matter of fact, after the substantial improvement in cross-strait relations, Taiwan is no longer a stumbling block in Sino-American relations. During this meeting between Obama and Hu, the American side's "Communique" commended the recent signing of the ECFA agreement. They also welcomed the cross-strait's bulding of new communication channels. Therefore, whether Obama-Hu had a private meeting or publicly declared their positions does not matter. Both sides will persistently lobby for their own core interests. In theory, both should not damage Taiwan's core interests. Moreover, both sides do not want to see a renewal of the original tension in cross-strait relations.
A practical look at the joint Sino-U.S. statement stresses that the U.S. side observes the three Sino-U.S. communiques’ principles and doesn't say a word about the Taiwan Relations Act, but it doesn't actually indicate that the U.S. no longer attaches importance to U.S.-Taiwanese relations. President Ma put forward the pressing issue of buying F-16s and diesel submarines to Ray Burghardt. The weaponry is only for the defense of Taiwan, not for any aggressive usage. It is only to replace aging military equipment. Yesterday, President Ma attended the Ministry of Defense's Chinese New Year dinner party and commented that he was not willing to see the descendants of the Yellow Emperor resort to weapons in order to solve their problems. The Ma administration, up until now, has made a great effort to improve cross-strait relations. Their purpose is precisely to strive for permanent cross-strait peace and proceed to the next step of stability and safety in Northeast Asia.
Taiwan's outward procurement of weapons from the U.S. is not the "encouragement of Taiwanese independence" that Beijing opposes. If China's leaders could change positions with Taiwan and ponder this issue, they of course would realize that Taiwan hopes earnestly only to buy defensive weapons from America. Taiwan only wants enough capacity to fundamentally protect itself without provoking China. It would only be helpful to the cross-strait common safeguards and safety. Afterward, Taiwan and China would be able to proceed to the next step of future bilateral consultation. At the same time, it would reduce internal opposition in Taiwan to cross-strait political talks.
Beijing must recognize that if America wishes to maintain the first island chain in its strategy of superiority in the Asia Pacific region, it must not be partial to the August 17 Communique or the Taiwan Relations Act too much. America seeks to maintain the current military balance of power in the region. When America sells military equipment, it depends on America's own national interests.
Remember that when Burghardt came to Taiwan in November 2009 to have a meeting with President Ma, he also mentioned America selling F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan. According to participants in the meeting, Burghardt responded positively to the question of sales, but America announced in early 2010 that it would not sell the fighters and submarines. It was obvious that the White House was trying to avoid opposition from Beijing. Even though this occurred, Beijing still did not let up on their opposition to the military sales. Beijing suspended military exchanges and relations with the U.S. Recently, Sino-U.S. relations have normalized. One may also say that the Obama-Hu meeting set the tone for the next 10 years of Sino-U.S. relations. On the Taiwan issue, we not only look forward to the issue of military sales not turning into an obstruction in relations between China and the U.S., but also to Sino-U.S. cooperation and harmony spurring on cross-strait political negotiations. We also hope to design a mutual cross-strait and Northeast Asia framework for peaceful development.
Both trips that Burghardt has taken to Taiwan have affirmed that America does not have a fixed policy when it comes to Taiwan. At many times, America states that cross-strait politics should look to the requirements of the citizens’ opinions to move forward. The American side has no intention to intervene in cross-strait negotiations, merely stressing that the "American side supports cross-strait relations, looks forward to peaceful development of their economies, political and other fields of dialogue and interaction, and to developing a more positive and stable relationship" as contained in the Sino-American communique. This means that a stable and peaceful cross-strait relationship most conforms with American national interests.
The goal of Burghardt's trip is similar to his November 2009 trip to Taipei. At that time, President Obama had just finished visiting Beijing and Burghardt was ordered to Taipei in order to carry out a briefing and explanation to President Ma. As far as Taipei is concerned, Burghardt's coming to Taiwan after the Chinese and American meeting to explain the content of Obama and Hu's discussions is very rare. It reflects the unhindered development in Sino-U.S. relations. In other words, Burghardt’s two most recent visits to Taiwan both appear to affirm President Ma's consolidation of American and Taiwanese mutual trust during his term in office. In fact, U.S.-Taiwanese relations certainly have improved because of the improvement in cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Political interaction now, compared to the past, is even more frequent.
Another similarity with the situation more than a year ago is that, on one hand, President Obama confirmed his commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act during his joint press conference with Hu. Another similarity is that Obama supported Taiwan's desire to participate more in international organizations and affairs. On the other hand, President Ma still looks forward to new developments in U.S.-Taiwanese relations. Ma raised the question, although a cliche, of whether the development of U.S.-Taiwanese relations extends to the sale of F-16 fighters and diesel submarines, restoration of the investment and trade framework (TIFA), completion of a VISA waiver program and other American ministerial-level official ability to visit Taiwan.
The long-term asymmetric interaction between America, China and Taiwan has been closely followed by the Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese deeply fear turning into the sacrificial lamb in a power struggle between China and America. As a matter of fact, after the substantial improvement in cross-strait relations, Taiwan is no longer a stumbling block in Sino-American relations. During this meeting between Obama and Hu, the American side's "Communique" commended the recent signing of the ECFA agreement. They also welcomed the cross-strait's bulding of new communication channels. Therefore, whether Obama-Hu had a private meeting or publicly declared their positions does not matter. Both sides will persistently lobby for their own core interests. In theory, both should not damage Taiwan's core interests. Moreover, both sides do not want to see a renewal of the original tension in cross-strait relations.
A practical look at the joint Sino-U.S. statement stresses that the U.S. side observes the three Sino-U.S. communiques’ principles and doesn't say a word about the Taiwan Relations Act, but it doesn't actually indicate that the U.S. no longer attaches importance to U.S.-Taiwanese relations. President Ma put forward the pressing issue of buying F-16s and diesel submarines to Ray Burghardt. The weaponry is only for the defense of Taiwan, not for any aggressive usage. It is only to replace aging military equipment. Yesterday, President Ma attended the Ministry of Defense's Chinese New Year dinner party and commented that he was not willing to see the descendants of the Yellow Emperor resort to weapons in order to solve their problems. The Ma administration, up until now, has made a great effort to improve cross-strait relations. Their purpose is precisely to strive for permanent cross-strait peace and proceed to the next step of stability and safety in Northeast Asia.
Taiwan's outward procurement of weapons from the U.S. is not the "encouragement of Taiwanese independence" that Beijing opposes. If China's leaders could change positions with Taiwan and ponder this issue, they of course would realize that Taiwan hopes earnestly only to buy defensive weapons from America. Taiwan only wants enough capacity to fundamentally protect itself without provoking China. It would only be helpful to the cross-strait common safeguards and safety. Afterward, Taiwan and China would be able to proceed to the next step of future bilateral consultation. At the same time, it would reduce internal opposition in Taiwan to cross-strait political talks.
Beijing must recognize that if America wishes to maintain the first island chain in its strategy of superiority in the Asia Pacific region, it must not be partial to the August 17 Communique or the Taiwan Relations Act too much. America seeks to maintain the current military balance of power in the region. When America sells military equipment, it depends on America's own national interests.
Remember that when Burghardt came to Taiwan in November 2009 to have a meeting with President Ma, he also mentioned America selling F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan. According to participants in the meeting, Burghardt responded positively to the question of sales, but America announced in early 2010 that it would not sell the fighters and submarines. It was obvious that the White House was trying to avoid opposition from Beijing. Even though this occurred, Beijing still did not let up on their opposition to the military sales. Beijing suspended military exchanges and relations with the U.S. Recently, Sino-U.S. relations have normalized. One may also say that the Obama-Hu meeting set the tone for the next 10 years of Sino-U.S. relations. On the Taiwan issue, we not only look forward to the issue of military sales not turning into an obstruction in relations between China and the U.S., but also to Sino-U.S. cooperation and harmony spurring on cross-strait political negotiations. We also hope to design a mutual cross-strait and Northeast Asia framework for peaceful development.
Both trips that Burghardt has taken to Taiwan have affirmed that America does not have a fixed policy when it comes to Taiwan. At many times, America states that cross-strait politics should look to the requirements of the citizens’ opinions to move forward. The American side has no intention to intervene in cross-strait negotiations, merely stressing that the "American side supports cross-strait relations, looks forward to peaceful development of their economies, political and other fields of dialogue and interaction, and to developing a more positive and stable relationship" as contained in the Sino-American communique. This means that a stable and peaceful cross-strait relationship most conforms with American national interests.
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