Experts Fear That in Obama and Hu’s Private Talks, There May Be Secrets That Can’t Be Told
Published in China Times
(Taiwan) on 31 January 2011
by Chen Yixin (link to original)
(Taiwan) on 31 January 2011
by Chen Yixin (link to original)
Translated from
by Lisa Ferguson.
Edited by Amy Wong.
Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, made a special visit to Taiwan from Jan. 23 to 26 to present the contents and results of negotiations between Obama and Hu’s Jan. 18 to 21 meetings. At a press conference, he indicated that American President Obama not only refused to sign a fourth communiqué with Chinese President Hu Jintao, but he was also unwilling to let the wording “core interests” appear in the Jan. 19 China–U.S. Joint Statement. Even if it appears from his words that he is not letting our country down, there are still several points of doubt that our country’s government officials continue to seek to understand.
Fourth Communiqué a Strategic Threat
Burghardt said that because the U.S. “kept Taiwan in mind,” the result of these “Joint Statement” negotiations at Obama and Hu’s meetings was that the U.S. neither hurt Taiwan’s interests nor broke any ground on issues of concern to Taiwan. Although the Chinese originally wished to present a “fourth communiqué,” after the United States’ refusal, the Chinese again sought to enter “core interests” wording into the Joint Statement, but the U.S. still did not agree, as it did not want differing opinions on the wording to lead to misunderstandings.
“Keeping Taiwan in mind,” had to be the reaction of Obama and his national security team; otherwise, he would not have issued the Joint Statement with Hu Jintao on Nov. 17, 2009, either. In that Joint Statement, the U.S. talked evasively in expressing respect for China’s territorial and sovereignty “core interests” in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan. Fortunately, in the recent second Joint Statement, each can interpret the “core interests” wording however he wants. Afterward, the U.S. claimed that it never agreed on China’s “core interests” in Taiwan.
The most worrisome thing for Taiwan is the main consideration that Burghardt mentioned for why the U.S. refused to sign a “fourth communiqué” — surprisingly, that the time has not yet come. Obviously, this doesn’t just mean that the opportunity and the atmosphere for signing a “fourth communiqué” has yet to ripen but also shows that both sides have yet to discuss the conditions that each has raised.
Therefore, for Taipei, although Burghardt technically “exposed” the “fourth communiqué,” it could still pose a strategic “threat.” Some say that Burghardt’s exposure of this was an elaborate act to draw attention away from the “American beef” issue. However, the issue of American beef and clenbuterol is only a little technicality in U.S.–Taiwan relations, not something that would merit fanfare from Obama’s government and make Washington refuse to sign the “fourth communiqué” in order to use the whole issue to force Taipei to give in. Only on important strategic issues does the U.S. need to use a heavy hand. As this is a strategic threat, Taipei needs to respond properly. It must consult with the U.S. before making any major policy decisions on its policy with the mainland, on cross-strait relations, U.S.–China–Taiwan relations or on international issues, in order to put the U.S. at ease.
Playing “Leadership Chess” Without Wanting to Bear Responsibility
Burghardt reiterated that the U.S. does not want to take on the responsibility of cross-strait mediator; in talks on cross-strait relations on items including time frame and subjects, the U.S. lacks a specific opinion, respecting the decisions of the Taiwanese people. The U.S. feels satisfied with the current state of cross-strait relations and so takes the position of not promoting further talks. But if both sides of the strait were to discuss how Taiwan could expand its international space, then the U.S. position would be that it is a “political matter.”
However, both Burghardt’s and Obama’s talks in the Joint Statement are quite inconsistent. Both of the two Joint Statements between Obama and Hu stress that the U.S. looks forward to the strengthening of cross-strait economic, political and other dialogues and interactions, as well as the establishment of more positive, stable relations. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg echoed this call in his speech on Sept. 24, 2009, encouraging both sides of the strait to start negotiations on the establishment of military confidence-building measures. Since the U.S. wants neither to take on the responsibility of being a cross-strait mediator nor to encourage negotiations, yet still frequently plays “leadership chess” with our country, can it be that the U.S. wants to interfere in cross-strait affairs without wanting to bear responsibility?
Finally, as for the contents of Obama and Hu’s secret negotiations, Burghardt expressed that in addition to both sides focusing on the North Korea nuclear weapons issue, Hu Jintao certainly mentioned the topic of Taiwan, asking the U.S. to reduce and ultimately end its arms sales to Taiwan. But the U.S. has made a promise to Taiwan and cannot change its Taiwan policy. However, since American government officials have spoken of a “fourth communiqué” and “core interests,” there could still very well be other secrets that can’t be told.
The author is a professor at the Graduate Institute of the Americas of Tamkang University.
Fourth Communiqué a Strategic Threat
Burghardt said that because the U.S. “kept Taiwan in mind,” the result of these “Joint Statement” negotiations at Obama and Hu’s meetings was that the U.S. neither hurt Taiwan’s interests nor broke any ground on issues of concern to Taiwan. Although the Chinese originally wished to present a “fourth communiqué,” after the United States’ refusal, the Chinese again sought to enter “core interests” wording into the Joint Statement, but the U.S. still did not agree, as it did not want differing opinions on the wording to lead to misunderstandings.
“Keeping Taiwan in mind,” had to be the reaction of Obama and his national security team; otherwise, he would not have issued the Joint Statement with Hu Jintao on Nov. 17, 2009, either. In that Joint Statement, the U.S. talked evasively in expressing respect for China’s territorial and sovereignty “core interests” in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan. Fortunately, in the recent second Joint Statement, each can interpret the “core interests” wording however he wants. Afterward, the U.S. claimed that it never agreed on China’s “core interests” in Taiwan.
The most worrisome thing for Taiwan is the main consideration that Burghardt mentioned for why the U.S. refused to sign a “fourth communiqué” — surprisingly, that the time has not yet come. Obviously, this doesn’t just mean that the opportunity and the atmosphere for signing a “fourth communiqué” has yet to ripen but also shows that both sides have yet to discuss the conditions that each has raised.
Therefore, for Taipei, although Burghardt technically “exposed” the “fourth communiqué,” it could still pose a strategic “threat.” Some say that Burghardt’s exposure of this was an elaborate act to draw attention away from the “American beef” issue. However, the issue of American beef and clenbuterol is only a little technicality in U.S.–Taiwan relations, not something that would merit fanfare from Obama’s government and make Washington refuse to sign the “fourth communiqué” in order to use the whole issue to force Taipei to give in. Only on important strategic issues does the U.S. need to use a heavy hand. As this is a strategic threat, Taipei needs to respond properly. It must consult with the U.S. before making any major policy decisions on its policy with the mainland, on cross-strait relations, U.S.–China–Taiwan relations or on international issues, in order to put the U.S. at ease.
Playing “Leadership Chess” Without Wanting to Bear Responsibility
Burghardt reiterated that the U.S. does not want to take on the responsibility of cross-strait mediator; in talks on cross-strait relations on items including time frame and subjects, the U.S. lacks a specific opinion, respecting the decisions of the Taiwanese people. The U.S. feels satisfied with the current state of cross-strait relations and so takes the position of not promoting further talks. But if both sides of the strait were to discuss how Taiwan could expand its international space, then the U.S. position would be that it is a “political matter.”
However, both Burghardt’s and Obama’s talks in the Joint Statement are quite inconsistent. Both of the two Joint Statements between Obama and Hu stress that the U.S. looks forward to the strengthening of cross-strait economic, political and other dialogues and interactions, as well as the establishment of more positive, stable relations. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg echoed this call in his speech on Sept. 24, 2009, encouraging both sides of the strait to start negotiations on the establishment of military confidence-building measures. Since the U.S. wants neither to take on the responsibility of being a cross-strait mediator nor to encourage negotiations, yet still frequently plays “leadership chess” with our country, can it be that the U.S. wants to interfere in cross-strait affairs without wanting to bear responsibility?
Finally, as for the contents of Obama and Hu’s secret negotiations, Burghardt expressed that in addition to both sides focusing on the North Korea nuclear weapons issue, Hu Jintao certainly mentioned the topic of Taiwan, asking the U.S. to reduce and ultimately end its arms sales to Taiwan. But the U.S. has made a promise to Taiwan and cannot change its Taiwan policy. However, since American government officials have spoken of a “fourth communiqué” and “core interests,” there could still very well be other secrets that can’t be told.
The author is a professor at the Graduate Institute of the Americas of Tamkang University.