The Strategy Has Become Less Pretentious
The Pentagon no longer overestimates its capabilities.
The U.S. Department of Defense has unveiled a revised National Military Strategy, the first since 2004.
Pursuant to the law, a new strategy is released every two years. This time, either there were no significant amendments to suggest or more important business was on the agenda. But now, at last, the Defense Department has decided to adjust its guidelines to fit the new conditions and requirements of U.S. foreign policy. What a coincidence that the department has brought it in accordance with last year’s national security doctrine.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says the new strategy is built around the belief that “our military power is most effective when employed with other elements of state power,” meaning diplomacy, intelligence services, non-governmental organizations, etc.
The U.S. government and its Department of Defense have acknowledged that the main threat to the country’s security remains terrorism, which is now reaching out beyond Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.
The 2004 strategy was primarily based on the need for the U.S. to provide for its security and deter all threats, including terrorist attacks, while relying only on their own military capabilities. This self-confidence has vanished. In the first place, it will continue to cooperate with “responsible states” and regional organizations like the African Union and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations). One of the main alliances remains NATO.
“NATO members act as a stabilizing force on its perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East, Northern Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey can play a uniquely critical role in this regard. We will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe’s non-NATO nations,” the strategy states.
Particular attention is paid to Russia and China. The U.S. will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. The main objectives of cooperation are counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space-related and ballistic missile defense systems cooperation.
There are no mutual military-to-military agreements between China and the U.S., which is why the new strategy is designed to promote the relationship with China without excluding close monitoring of the country. We need “a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest, improve understanding and prevent miscalculation.” This is one side. On the other side, the U.S. intends to “monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea.”
The U.S. Department of Defense has unveiled a revised National Military Strategy, the first since 2004.
Pursuant to the law, a new strategy is released every two years. This time, either there were no significant amendments to suggest or more important business was on the agenda. But now, at last, the Defense Department has decided to adjust its guidelines to fit the new conditions and requirements of U.S. foreign policy. What a coincidence that the department has brought it in accordance with last year’s national security doctrine.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says the new strategy is built around the belief that “our military power is most effective when employed with other elements of state power,” meaning diplomacy, intelligence services, non-governmental organizations, etc.
The U.S. government and its Department of Defense have acknowledged that the main threat to the country’s security remains terrorism, which is now reaching out beyond Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.
The 2004 strategy was primarily based on the need for the U.S. to provide for its security and deter all threats, including terrorist attacks, while relying only on their own military capabilities. This self-confidence has vanished. In the first place, it will continue to cooperate with “responsible states” and regional organizations like the African Union and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations). One of the main alliances remains NATO.
“NATO members act as a stabilizing force on its perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East, Northern Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey can play a uniquely critical role in this regard. We will actively support closer military-to-military relations between the Alliance and Europe’s non-NATO nations,” the strategy states.
Particular attention is paid to Russia and China. The U.S. will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. The main objectives of cooperation are counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space-related and ballistic missile defense systems cooperation.
There are no mutual military-to-military agreements between China and the U.S., which is why the new strategy is designed to promote the relationship with China without excluding close monitoring of the country. We need “a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest, improve understanding and prevent miscalculation.” This is one side. On the other side, the U.S. intends to “monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea.”