The Deluded Western World Thinks It Counts for Something
Will Barack Obama be remembered as a new Jimmy Carter, the president who “lost” Iran and was subjected to the Khomeini revolution in 1979? Perhaps, but the irony is that his destiny will decide this; it won’t be up to him to perfect it. It will depend on how the unrest in Egypt and other Middle Eastern ebullient countries turns out. Despite many comments to the contrary, there is really very little that America, not to mention Europe, can do in this situation. Egypt’s destiny is largely at the mercy of the choices they will make, in response to popular movements and the most important Egyptian figures. Other than “hoping” and “making suggestions” (and crossing their fingers), Westerners cannot do anything. To understand the true capacity of America’s influence, you only have to look at Pakistan: Under both Bush and Obama, America has showered it with dollars without managing to stop the Pakistani army and secret services from supporting the Taliban.
The discussion about the lack of predictions on what was happening is also an aspect of the overestimation of Westerners’ ability to control events: “Sooner or later” dictatorships — even those that seem to be stronger than others — will fall; it’s inevitable. However, no one can predict what will come sooner and what will come later. Often dictatorships last a very long time; it is not unusual for them to outlive even the crisis of a succession.
The one thing that, in very general terms, can be foreseen — and which has been heavily predicted — is that the worldwide economic crisis will in the long run destabilize, here and there, various dictatorial regimes. The reason is simple: Dictatorship guarantees stability by offering acquiescence freely, distributing cascading resources in strategic sectors of the population (it’s also the reason that in these regimes the state has a huge presence within the economy). The economic crisis, reducing the flow of resources, had a high probability of blowing up in various areas where discontent and opposition were present, subsequently causing the weight of corruption to emerge. However, nobody — not even the specialists, not the scholars of a single country — was in a position to say where and when the protests that were strong enough to bring down a regime would explode. The landslide, which started in little Tunisia, took over Egypt, while other countries like Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen were also drawn in. Since Egypt is the most important state in the region, its internal revolution will influence the entire Near and Middle East.
The Western world is watching these events while feeling a profound sense of uncertainty. The Middle East is always a raw nerve, the West’s Achilles’ heel: Because Israel is there, oil is there, its most uncompromising enemies are there. If the Iranians’ omens are realized, if the forces of radical Islamism prevail in the largest states of the region (what would happen if these forces succeeded in conquering Saudi Arabia?), it would be a disaster of unimaginable proportions for all of us.
If anything can be done to influence events, it’s not making glaring errors. Obama has already done this when, in protest to the policies of his predecessor, he demoralized those opposed to Mubarak’s regime and other Middle Eastern dictators, taking away the moral and financial support from pro-democracy groups. It’s evident that the democratization of Egypt and other countries of that area is desirable — not only because the quality of life for people living in a democracy is higher than those living under a dictatorship, but also because in a stable democracy (if and when it succeeds in becoming stable), people at least do not have to fight for survival; it does not, in general, encourage too much violence. Democratization, however, is a very difficult process that can end in chaos. On the other side of democratization, illiberal forces can gain power (Hamas regularly wins elections in Gaza). In an explosive environment such as the Middle East, the rise of illiberal democracy does not mean peace, but war and catastrophes. The Western world’s uncertainty is therefore justified.
Among the mistakes that need to be avoided is the danger of falling into propaganda traps set up by those wanting to further confuse an already confused Western world. A publicity operation aimed at “selling” Muslim brethren as an acceptable intermediary has already begun within the mass media. Fundamentally, it says, unlike al-Qaida, they don’t plant bombs (anymore). But the fact that they no longer plant bombs — that they are sometimes opposed to violence — does not make them an intermediary. Ideologically they are no different than al-Qaida, and one of their final victories in Egypt (possibly – army permitting – being the brotherhood, the only political force branched from and organized by Egyptian society) would precisely configure an illiberal outcome capable of anti-Westernizing the entire Middle East.
If by some misfortune they gain power, or even a strong influence over things, we will have to come to terms with it. But let’s not insult our own intelligence by accepting to consider them a “democratic force,” or anything similar.
The outcomes of this transformation will disrupt the world’s equilibrium, starting with relations between the United States and Europe. If these outcomes are positive — if, for example, Mubarak’s post is resolved in a controlled transition toward a stable structure, and the regime in crisis today becomes less imposing — so far so good. But if he’s victorious in Egypt, and radical Islamic forces win over elsewhere, it’s an easy bet that misunderstandings and rifts between America and Europe will increase. Despite the oscillating Obama, America must choose the contrasting path, to be balanced in defense of Israel and to defend its strategic interests. Europe, which doesn’t much like Israel, is powerless and, [being] frightened, will fall over itself to follow them.
The discussion about the lack of predictions on what was happening is also an aspect of the overestimation of Westerners’ ability to control events: “Sooner or later” dictatorships — even those that seem to be stronger than others — will fall; it’s inevitable. However, no one can predict what will come sooner and what will come later. Often dictatorships last a very long time; it is not unusual for them to outlive even the crisis of a succession.
The one thing that, in very general terms, can be foreseen — and which has been heavily predicted — is that the worldwide economic crisis will in the long run destabilize, here and there, various dictatorial regimes. The reason is simple: Dictatorship guarantees stability by offering acquiescence freely, distributing cascading resources in strategic sectors of the population (it’s also the reason that in these regimes the state has a huge presence within the economy). The economic crisis, reducing the flow of resources, had a high probability of blowing up in various areas where discontent and opposition were present, subsequently causing the weight of corruption to emerge. However, nobody — not even the specialists, not the scholars of a single country — was in a position to say where and when the protests that were strong enough to bring down a regime would explode. The landslide, which started in little Tunisia, took over Egypt, while other countries like Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen were also drawn in. Since Egypt is the most important state in the region, its internal revolution will influence the entire Near and Middle East.
The Western world is watching these events while feeling a profound sense of uncertainty. The Middle East is always a raw nerve, the West’s Achilles’ heel: Because Israel is there, oil is there, its most uncompromising enemies are there. If the Iranians’ omens are realized, if the forces of radical Islamism prevail in the largest states of the region (what would happen if these forces succeeded in conquering Saudi Arabia?), it would be a disaster of unimaginable proportions for all of us.
If anything can be done to influence events, it’s not making glaring errors. Obama has already done this when, in protest to the policies of his predecessor, he demoralized those opposed to Mubarak’s regime and other Middle Eastern dictators, taking away the moral and financial support from pro-democracy groups. It’s evident that the democratization of Egypt and other countries of that area is desirable — not only because the quality of life for people living in a democracy is higher than those living under a dictatorship, but also because in a stable democracy (if and when it succeeds in becoming stable), people at least do not have to fight for survival; it does not, in general, encourage too much violence. Democratization, however, is a very difficult process that can end in chaos. On the other side of democratization, illiberal forces can gain power (Hamas regularly wins elections in Gaza). In an explosive environment such as the Middle East, the rise of illiberal democracy does not mean peace, but war and catastrophes. The Western world’s uncertainty is therefore justified.
Among the mistakes that need to be avoided is the danger of falling into propaganda traps set up by those wanting to further confuse an already confused Western world. A publicity operation aimed at “selling” Muslim brethren as an acceptable intermediary has already begun within the mass media. Fundamentally, it says, unlike al-Qaida, they don’t plant bombs (anymore). But the fact that they no longer plant bombs — that they are sometimes opposed to violence — does not make them an intermediary. Ideologically they are no different than al-Qaida, and one of their final victories in Egypt (possibly – army permitting – being the brotherhood, the only political force branched from and organized by Egyptian society) would precisely configure an illiberal outcome capable of anti-Westernizing the entire Middle East.
If by some misfortune they gain power, or even a strong influence over things, we will have to come to terms with it. But let’s not insult our own intelligence by accepting to consider them a “democratic force,” or anything similar.
The outcomes of this transformation will disrupt the world’s equilibrium, starting with relations between the United States and Europe. If these outcomes are positive — if, for example, Mubarak’s post is resolved in a controlled transition toward a stable structure, and the regime in crisis today becomes less imposing — so far so good. But if he’s victorious in Egypt, and radical Islamic forces win over elsewhere, it’s an easy bet that misunderstandings and rifts between America and Europe will increase. Despite the oscillating Obama, America must choose the contrasting path, to be balanced in defense of Israel and to defend its strategic interests. Europe, which doesn’t much like Israel, is powerless and, [being] frightened, will fall over itself to follow them.
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