What Should the U.S. Do in Egypt?
Despite last week’s dramatic events in Cairo ending in the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, U.S. experts from both the left and the right sharply criticized the Obama administration for not showing more support to popular movements that challenge the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East.
Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, those who promote a more active role in the U.S. that are in favor of democracy in the Muslim world cite the strong (and ultimately successful) support from Washington to Poland’s Solidarity movement, as well as other anti-Soviet campaigns in the final stages of the Cold War. But with the high probability that the revolt in Egypt will encourage other democratic movements in the region — and, with the continued pressure placed on Obama’s government to openly support them — experts in Washington would benefit from taking into account the different perception that the U.S. had in Eastern Europe in 1989 versus the current one now in the Middle East.
In view of the huge appetite from the media resulting from a historic statement from the White House about events in the region, the best path that the Obama administration could take is to resist the temptation and pursue a policy of saying and doing less, rather than doing more.
For the majority of people residing in the former Soviet bloc, Kremlin was an imperialist oppressor. U.S. moral support was welcome because this country was seen as the main adversary of the USSR. Even if the United States had not been a beacon of freedom and democracy, they would have expressed positive feelings toward the enemy of the imperial regime.
The situation in the Middle East is considerably and sadly different. The people in that part of the world generally view the U.S. with great suspicion. In fact, many people of the Middle East consider Washington as the quintessential imperialist power, largely responsible for their misfortunes. A succession of U.S. administrations has reinforced this negative image by supporting corrupt and authoritarian regimes that plundered and brutalized their people.
The result is a profound hostility towards Washington. A June 2010 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed that 82 percent of those polled in Egypt had an unfavorable view of the U.S., as well as 79 percent of Jordanians. This negative assessment is not limited to the Arab sector of the Muslim world. In Pakistan, the unfavorable rating was 68 percent, and in Turkey it was 74 percent.
This widespread hostility makes it difficult, or impossible, for Washington to play an important and constructive role in the political transition that we are beginning to see in the Middle East. Put bluntly, although U.S. officials profess their support to objectives of democracy and freedom, these statements have little credibility to the inhabitants of that part of the world.
Even if Washington’s feelings in favor of freedom were genuine, the U.S. could not overcome the reputation it has acquired over decades of supporting autocratic regimes. It would be like if a reformist Soviet government had belatedly endorsed free elections and other features of democracy in Eastern Europe. Such a policy change would have generated much skepticism.
It is understandable that American politicians want secular and democratic forces to emerge victorious from the current crisis, as well as seeing the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups marginalized. However, supporting secular factions could easily backfire. It is almost certain that anti-American groups would cite that support as evidence that Washington continues to meddle in the internal affairs of their countries and would use such arguments to discredit secular opponents.
In addition, the efforts carried out by U.S. nongovernmental organizations that aim to promote democracy could prove counterproductive. Although these organizations are officially private sector enterprises, most people abroad do not make the distinction. And the frequent and friendly cooperation between NGOs and the U.S. government contributes to the perception that these are merely extensions of the White House, the State Department or the CIA.
Ostensibly supporting democratic secular groups in the revolutionary environment of the Middle East could be the kiss of death for these movements. Whether it likes it or not, the U.S. needs to adopt a low-profile during these turbulent days.
Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, those who promote a more active role in the U.S. that are in favor of democracy in the Muslim world cite the strong (and ultimately successful) support from Washington to Poland’s Solidarity movement, as well as other anti-Soviet campaigns in the final stages of the Cold War. But with the high probability that the revolt in Egypt will encourage other democratic movements in the region — and, with the continued pressure placed on Obama’s government to openly support them — experts in Washington would benefit from taking into account the different perception that the U.S. had in Eastern Europe in 1989 versus the current one now in the Middle East.
In view of the huge appetite from the media resulting from a historic statement from the White House about events in the region, the best path that the Obama administration could take is to resist the temptation and pursue a policy of saying and doing less, rather than doing more.
For the majority of people residing in the former Soviet bloc, Kremlin was an imperialist oppressor. U.S. moral support was welcome because this country was seen as the main adversary of the USSR. Even if the United States had not been a beacon of freedom and democracy, they would have expressed positive feelings toward the enemy of the imperial regime.
The situation in the Middle East is considerably and sadly different. The people in that part of the world generally view the U.S. with great suspicion. In fact, many people of the Middle East consider Washington as the quintessential imperialist power, largely responsible for their misfortunes. A succession of U.S. administrations has reinforced this negative image by supporting corrupt and authoritarian regimes that plundered and brutalized their people.
The result is a profound hostility towards Washington. A June 2010 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed that 82 percent of those polled in Egypt had an unfavorable view of the U.S., as well as 79 percent of Jordanians. This negative assessment is not limited to the Arab sector of the Muslim world. In Pakistan, the unfavorable rating was 68 percent, and in Turkey it was 74 percent.
This widespread hostility makes it difficult, or impossible, for Washington to play an important and constructive role in the political transition that we are beginning to see in the Middle East. Put bluntly, although U.S. officials profess their support to objectives of democracy and freedom, these statements have little credibility to the inhabitants of that part of the world.
Even if Washington’s feelings in favor of freedom were genuine, the U.S. could not overcome the reputation it has acquired over decades of supporting autocratic regimes. It would be like if a reformist Soviet government had belatedly endorsed free elections and other features of democracy in Eastern Europe. Such a policy change would have generated much skepticism.
It is understandable that American politicians want secular and democratic forces to emerge victorious from the current crisis, as well as seeing the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups marginalized. However, supporting secular factions could easily backfire. It is almost certain that anti-American groups would cite that support as evidence that Washington continues to meddle in the internal affairs of their countries and would use such arguments to discredit secular opponents.
In addition, the efforts carried out by U.S. nongovernmental organizations that aim to promote democracy could prove counterproductive. Although these organizations are officially private sector enterprises, most people abroad do not make the distinction. And the frequent and friendly cooperation between NGOs and the U.S. government contributes to the perception that these are merely extensions of the White House, the State Department or the CIA.
Ostensibly supporting democratic secular groups in the revolutionary environment of the Middle East could be the kiss of death for these movements. Whether it likes it or not, the U.S. needs to adopt a low-profile during these turbulent days.