A Purposeless War
New armed conflict, with U.S. and NATO involvement (several countries of the alliance are involved), has broken out suddenly and chaotically. Unlike military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were preceded by political, military and propaganda preparation, the Libyan “Odyssey” scarcely could have been imagined only three weeks ago. Never before has there been such a surprising military campaign.
Leading military world powers have slipped into a third world war in the Middle East, without having agreed upon a final purpose of the intervention, plans for deployment, an exact number of participants, or leadership.
Instead, an urgently-formed coalition secured a sanction from the United Nations Security Council. The BRIC countries, as if on cue, abstained from voting, which was yet another surprise. If Russia and China had imposed a veto on military actions in Libya, Washington would have washed its hands and declared it was not going to make the Iraq mistake again (the war without approval of a supreme international body), and would have held Moscow and Beijing responsible for the massacre in Benghazi. However, Russia and China “let the resolution to be pushed through”, according to words of Dmitry Medvedev.*
The document, itself, is a masterpiece of craftiness. It permits the taking of “all necessary measures” to protect the civilian population, thereby providing for the widest range of interpretation. Ten countries have voted for the no-fly zone over Libya, now shamefully pretending they didn’t understand what the term meant. Everybody preferred to not hear the public statement of Robert Gates, the pentagon chief (who was against a new intervention campaign until the last minute), about a no-fly zone, allowing the bombing of enemy military infrastructure and the respective consequences. The latter allowed Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League, to offer a retraction two days later, saying it was not what they had in mind.
If Washington, London, Paris and others intended to establish a puppet government in Tripoli to take control of Libyan oil and create an outpost in North Africa in order to influence particular territories or to advance democracy in Libya, it would appear unattractive or (in the latter case) naive, but explicable.
Obviously, the paradox of the situation is that all of the above may not be true and it was merely a concatenation of circumstance that led to war.
It all began with the West, which, after being shocked by the speed and scope of “the Arab spring” decided the Jamahiriya regime would be destroyed as fast as it had been in neighboring countries. Along with the fall of the usual Middle Eastern political framework, the consequences of which no one yet knows, the prospect of the disappearance of one of the most repulsive autocrats could be a source of some consolation.
But “the Berber Lion” has calmed down and pursued his enemies and that was another shock. The leading countries are just getting used to the idea that the Middle East is undergoing fundamental change; therefore, they need to adapt to new realities. Unfortunately, the nastiest realities may remain the same. Gadhafi’s military successes, multiplied by panicky T.V. reports from opposing countries (rather difficult to understand) have revived some memories in the minds of American and European representatives. The memories are of the Rwanda genocide, the most infamous page of international politics of the 1990s, thus raising the subject of humanitarian intervention. A possible massacre would prove the West impotent and undermine the authority of the leading powers, to an even greater degree.
To all appearances, this very line of argument has succeeded inside the White House. Hillary Clinton, U.S. secretary of state, Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and Samantha Power, a special assistant to President Barack Obama, are followers of the Clinton foreign policy school of the 1990s. Together, the three have persuaded Barack Obama to ignore the categorical objections of realists, Robert M. Gates and Michael G. Mullen. The U.S. president conceded but has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that America is not going solo and, instead, would prefer to play a supporting role, leaving leadership to Europe.
After all this time, there Europe is!
Nicolas Sarkozy has long been brokenhearted over seeing a united Europe, created as a tool to ensure French grandeur, being transformed into a world outlier. As a result, he has, in fact, become an instigator of the war. His has received extensive support from the U.K.'s David Cameron, who previously showed no interest in international politics; defense spending cuts depress the British military. With the forthcoming reduction in military potential, a little victorious war has come in handy to strengthen a strategic reputation.
The preparations were quick and poorly organized, and the ultimatum issued to Tripoli was vague. Military operations began with uncoordinated French bombing raids, coinciding with Sarkozy’s announcement of the commencement of a historic humanitarian mission. To be fair, it must be mentioned that any delay in action was probably countered by the possible fall of Benghazi.
None of the questions asked by skeptics were answered before or after the bombings. Who or what was offered for the support by the military and political superpower and its principal allies remains a mystery. As time goes by, the structure, strength, military capacity and intentions of the rebels are still uncertain and are not becoming clearer, for reasons unknown. The leadership of the intervention is inconsistent. The U.S. is ceding to Paris the responsibility of assuming leadership. Notwithstanding, everyone understands that, eventually, the U.S. will have to put things right. The Europeans may have started the war, but they may never put an end to it. The purpose of the intervention is “floating.” All possible motivations are publicly voiced, varying from the protection of civilians and regime change to the assassination of Gadhafi.
Most important, the alternative of a stalemate is becoming more possible. A weakened Tripoli won’t be capable of finishing the war and Colonel Gadhafi won’t be removed. Intervention in a civil war has taken place. If Gadhafi remains in power, even in a truncated Libya, any negotiations for political compromise will lead to the defeat of the West and its loyal regimes in the Middle East.
The Libyan campaign has negative consequences already. NATO hasn’t divided, as it did in the case with Iraq, but has found itself in a state of confusion. Its role is unclear, and the allies are annoyed with each other.
The E.U. has suffered the most. It can be said that it does not exist, in the context of the crisis. Its “engine,” a French-German tandem, has fallen apart. Paris and Berlin are on different sides, divided by the resolution.
However, if everything goes wrong in North Africa, the influence on Euro-Atlantic structures may become fatal. A long-lasting tendency to ignore NATO may become a final verdict, if Washington becomes fully involved in yet another war in the region, due to the failure of its allies. America will venture into looking for new partners, leaving the alliance a function of the interest club.
Since the end of the 1990s, the whole generation of leaders, who still remembered World War II and experienced the threat of nuclear destruction, is gone. Now, the world elite talks about the use of force with extraordinary ease, in circumstances in which it would never have been used before. Previously, force was used to consolidate strategic positions, but now the opposite is obvious. At least the Iraq and Iran cases are good examples of that.
It’s hard to grasp the rationale for assuming that if the first two wars in the Middle East went wrong, the third would be a success.
*Editor's note: This quotation cannot be verified.
Leading military world powers have slipped into a third world war in the Middle East, without having agreed upon a final purpose of the intervention, plans for deployment, an exact number of participants, or leadership.
Instead, an urgently-formed coalition secured a sanction from the United Nations Security Council. The BRIC countries, as if on cue, abstained from voting, which was yet another surprise. If Russia and China had imposed a veto on military actions in Libya, Washington would have washed its hands and declared it was not going to make the Iraq mistake again (the war without approval of a supreme international body), and would have held Moscow and Beijing responsible for the massacre in Benghazi. However, Russia and China “let the resolution to be pushed through”, according to words of Dmitry Medvedev.*
The document, itself, is a masterpiece of craftiness. It permits the taking of “all necessary measures” to protect the civilian population, thereby providing for the widest range of interpretation. Ten countries have voted for the no-fly zone over Libya, now shamefully pretending they didn’t understand what the term meant. Everybody preferred to not hear the public statement of Robert Gates, the pentagon chief (who was against a new intervention campaign until the last minute), about a no-fly zone, allowing the bombing of enemy military infrastructure and the respective consequences. The latter allowed Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League, to offer a retraction two days later, saying it was not what they had in mind.
If Washington, London, Paris and others intended to establish a puppet government in Tripoli to take control of Libyan oil and create an outpost in North Africa in order to influence particular territories or to advance democracy in Libya, it would appear unattractive or (in the latter case) naive, but explicable.
Obviously, the paradox of the situation is that all of the above may not be true and it was merely a concatenation of circumstance that led to war.
It all began with the West, which, after being shocked by the speed and scope of “the Arab spring” decided the Jamahiriya regime would be destroyed as fast as it had been in neighboring countries. Along with the fall of the usual Middle Eastern political framework, the consequences of which no one yet knows, the prospect of the disappearance of one of the most repulsive autocrats could be a source of some consolation.
But “the Berber Lion” has calmed down and pursued his enemies and that was another shock. The leading countries are just getting used to the idea that the Middle East is undergoing fundamental change; therefore, they need to adapt to new realities. Unfortunately, the nastiest realities may remain the same. Gadhafi’s military successes, multiplied by panicky T.V. reports from opposing countries (rather difficult to understand) have revived some memories in the minds of American and European representatives. The memories are of the Rwanda genocide, the most infamous page of international politics of the 1990s, thus raising the subject of humanitarian intervention. A possible massacre would prove the West impotent and undermine the authority of the leading powers, to an even greater degree.
To all appearances, this very line of argument has succeeded inside the White House. Hillary Clinton, U.S. secretary of state, Susan Rice, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and Samantha Power, a special assistant to President Barack Obama, are followers of the Clinton foreign policy school of the 1990s. Together, the three have persuaded Barack Obama to ignore the categorical objections of realists, Robert M. Gates and Michael G. Mullen. The U.S. president conceded but has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that America is not going solo and, instead, would prefer to play a supporting role, leaving leadership to Europe.
After all this time, there Europe is!
Nicolas Sarkozy has long been brokenhearted over seeing a united Europe, created as a tool to ensure French grandeur, being transformed into a world outlier. As a result, he has, in fact, become an instigator of the war. His has received extensive support from the U.K.'s David Cameron, who previously showed no interest in international politics; defense spending cuts depress the British military. With the forthcoming reduction in military potential, a little victorious war has come in handy to strengthen a strategic reputation.
The preparations were quick and poorly organized, and the ultimatum issued to Tripoli was vague. Military operations began with uncoordinated French bombing raids, coinciding with Sarkozy’s announcement of the commencement of a historic humanitarian mission. To be fair, it must be mentioned that any delay in action was probably countered by the possible fall of Benghazi.
None of the questions asked by skeptics were answered before or after the bombings. Who or what was offered for the support by the military and political superpower and its principal allies remains a mystery. As time goes by, the structure, strength, military capacity and intentions of the rebels are still uncertain and are not becoming clearer, for reasons unknown. The leadership of the intervention is inconsistent. The U.S. is ceding to Paris the responsibility of assuming leadership. Notwithstanding, everyone understands that, eventually, the U.S. will have to put things right. The Europeans may have started the war, but they may never put an end to it. The purpose of the intervention is “floating.” All possible motivations are publicly voiced, varying from the protection of civilians and regime change to the assassination of Gadhafi.
Most important, the alternative of a stalemate is becoming more possible. A weakened Tripoli won’t be capable of finishing the war and Colonel Gadhafi won’t be removed. Intervention in a civil war has taken place. If Gadhafi remains in power, even in a truncated Libya, any negotiations for political compromise will lead to the defeat of the West and its loyal regimes in the Middle East.
The Libyan campaign has negative consequences already. NATO hasn’t divided, as it did in the case with Iraq, but has found itself in a state of confusion. Its role is unclear, and the allies are annoyed with each other.
The E.U. has suffered the most. It can be said that it does not exist, in the context of the crisis. Its “engine,” a French-German tandem, has fallen apart. Paris and Berlin are on different sides, divided by the resolution.
However, if everything goes wrong in North Africa, the influence on Euro-Atlantic structures may become fatal. A long-lasting tendency to ignore NATO may become a final verdict, if Washington becomes fully involved in yet another war in the region, due to the failure of its allies. America will venture into looking for new partners, leaving the alliance a function of the interest club.
Since the end of the 1990s, the whole generation of leaders, who still remembered World War II and experienced the threat of nuclear destruction, is gone. Now, the world elite talks about the use of force with extraordinary ease, in circumstances in which it would never have been used before. Previously, force was used to consolidate strategic positions, but now the opposite is obvious. At least the Iraq and Iran cases are good examples of that.
It’s hard to grasp the rationale for assuming that if the first two wars in the Middle East went wrong, the third would be a success.
*Editor's note: This quotation cannot be verified.