Obama Kills Osama
Covert intelligence operations, like the one that killed Osama bin Laden, are part of the new counterterrorism strategy introduced by the Obama administration, which entails a growing offensive of extrajudicial executions with the tactic of decapitating terrorist leadership while at the same time seeking to limit large-scale military operations.
Given the dubious results of George W. Bush’s global war on terror, which focused on large military operations, Obama calls his counterterrorism actions Overseas Contingency Operations,(1) and has launched a new strategy in which the death of bin Laden marks a break with that of his successor. The strategy is based on the Israeli model of extrajudicial executions, also called targeted killings, applied by Mossad since 1972 (after the murder of nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics). However, it continues the Bush concept of fighting fire with fire. The new strategy correlates with U.S. foreign policy.
The counterterrorism technique of targeted killings was and is used occasionally by multiple countries such as France, Russia and Colombia. Now, however, the leading specialists in targeted killing, who apply it systematically and increasingly, are the U.S. and Israel, who are at the point of turning it into a daily practice (a practice also used in fighting drug trafficking).
As with terrorism itself, there is no single definition of targeted killing. One option is the intentional killing of a specific civilian or illegal combatant who cannot reasonably be captured and is participating in a conflict; the selection of a target is done under the direction of a government, whether in the context of an international armed conflict or not.(2) Those who consider it a legal tactic — not murder but homicide without criminal responsibility — claim the right to the legitimate national defense and treat it as an act of war.
In the U.S.–Israeli doctrine, the list of targets for assassinations covers a wide spectrum both inside and outside of insurgent organizations, including the top leaders and high-profile individuals, lower-ranking commanders, active and passive militants, ideologues, collaborators and technical staff. The killings are committed based on suspicions, not a trial, and are therefore considered extrajudicial.
Among the reasons for the targeted killing of individuals in another country is to eliminate those elements that are considered a permanent threat to the interests of both countries and their citizens in relation to an armed conflict. Another reason is to use killings to destroy, paralyze or reduce the level of operation of an organization. The severity and number of attacks cause an internal power vacuum, eliminating key operators and sowing distrust and disruption.
Targeted assassinations of leaders (i.e., the beheading of the leadership) has a special relevance in Obama’s strategy. Washington’s black list for targeted killings of al-Qaida leaders includes a dozen members. The next in line are bin Laden’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leader of al-Qaida in the Maghreb, Abu Zeid.
The leaders of insurgent organizations are treated as “terrorist leaders” within the system of reference of a state, but from the perspective of the other side they are considered “the highest authorities.” Ultimately, the decapitation of insurgent leadership is authorizing to some degree the assassination of “leaders.” Thus the insurgent forces, who do not follow the laws of the West, may respond with assassinations of Western leaders. In 2007, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney was the target of a violent assassination attempt by the Taliban in a surprise and secret visit to Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, the same base where commandos were trained for the execution of bin Laden. That the assassinations have not been more frequent is due in part to the fact that attacks against civilians are much easier than against protected and alert political leaders.
According to Obama, after the death of Osama bin Laden the world is a safer and better place.(3) In addition to congratulations from U.S. allies, it seems that most of the world should be thankful for this contribution to global peace, the murder of a murderer. Paradoxically, the Nobel Peace Prize recipient explains that the war continues, “There’s no doubt that al-Qaida will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must, and we will remain vigilant at home and abroad.”
Under what conditions does the decapitation of leadership diminish and eventually destroy the violent capability of a terrorist organization? In the case of the 2006 killing of al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, violence increased significantly. On the other hand, targeted killings by Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have resulted in a slight decrease in violence. Taking out the leadership alone does not mean the collapse of an insurgency or the decrease of their attacks, but it can generate the opposite effect.(4) After the killing of bin Laden, al-Qaida threatened vengeance and announced that it would continue the jihad. In fact, violence has continued in the days since his death, with the bombing in the city of Charsadda near Islamabad that killed 80, perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban that is linked to al-Qaida.
In the case of organizations like al-Qaida, the statistics show that the probability of the killing of a top leader causing a collapse is 17 percent, whereas the likelihood of spontaneous dissolution is 33 percent. Paradoxically, then, killing bin Laden has increased the probability that al-Qaida will live on, from 67 percent to 83 percent.
But the elimination of the organization would be unexpected. What is hoped for is that it will be debilitated by the Arab Spring, and its lifespan depends on the popular support it can maintain. What’s more, there are benefits and opportunities in both domestic and foreign policy for Obama.
George Bush’s war on terror needed bin Laden like a fetish. Barack Obama’s Overseas Contingency Operations do not. The torture of prisoners in the Empire’s Cuban jail, Guantanamo, helped to locate Osama, who finally “disappeared” at the opportune moment, bringing to a close for Americans the cycle of 9/11. The people asked for justice, and Obama affirmed, “Our country has remained committed to seeing that justice is done.” The targeted killing of bin Laden ends the brutal imperial lesson embedded in the uncertainties since 9/11, which began with the bombing and invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama praised the unity and patriotism of a crowd that gathered in front of the White House, at the World Trade Center site and in other parts of the country, holding candles and flags and singing the national anthem. But the joy and celebration of the death (although no more than that of a murderer), speaks of revenge more than justice. Torture and death as a response to death shows the savage face of part of the superpower’s society. It is the decline of a civilization into the jungle of the Shuar tribes of Ecuador, for whom justice means revenge, with rules that allow a stricter level of retaliation than even ancient Babylonian law. This leads to an endless cycle of death, perhaps a less sophisticated version of targeted killings.
The ability of a terrorist organization to survive decapitation of its leadership is proportional to the popular support it maintains. For al-Qaida, popular support comes not from its religious fundamentalism but from its anti-Americanism, which is in turn popular because of the U.S. invasions and major military operations in the Islamic world and its support of authoritarian regimes. It is estimated that in Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia 20 percent of the population supports al-Qaida, and in Nigeria 49 percent do, although these numbers are declining. For this reason, the Obama administration seeks to intensify covert operations like targeted drone strikes,(5) to reduce the troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and to limit its policy of support for repressive regimes, at least in North Africa. This is all done with an eye toward reducing anti-Americanism. In 2010, Barack Obama increased funding for and expanded covert operations (black ops) to 75 countries, compared to the 60 authorized by George Bush.
The influence of al-Qaida and bin Laden over the Arabs in the Maghreb who spurred the Arab Spring is not significant, for they have a political rather than religious nature, and Washington’s support for authoritarian Arab regimes is not a primary consideration of the demonstrators. Although the U.S. is not looked upon favorably, the rebellion is against the local regimes themselves. Arabs are seeking democracy, not a caliphate. In fact, bin Laden was trying to bring down the pro-Western authoritarian Arab governments, but he could not achieve sufficient popular support with its doctrine and methods of violent fundamentalism.
In addition, bin Laden’s death gives Obama greater leverage in domestic politics and a conclusion to the Afghan war. He stated:
“I've already made a commitment that starting in July of this year, we are drawing down troops. And we are transitioning; we're training Afghan forces so that they can start securing their own country. And so, what has happened on Sunday, I think, reconfirms that we can focus on al-Qaida, focus on the threats to our homeland, train Afghans in a way that allows them to stabilize their country. But we don't need to have a perpetual footprint of the size that we have now.”(6)
It is unlikely that bin Laden’s presence during the last five years in a deteriorating and peculiar compound tenuously called a mansion, 800 meters from the Pakistan Military Academy, in a middle class neighborhood of Abbottabad (founded in 1853 by British Maj. James Abbott), had gone unnoticed by Pakistan’s nine intelligence agencies (and therefore at some point by the Pentagon and CIA) and by local civil authorities. Taking into account that Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies and ISI are divided between supporters of al-Qaida, the Taliban and the U.S., bin Laden could very well have been betrayed. Obama has announced an increase for the next five years of $2 billion in aid to the Pakistani Defense Ministry for counterterrorism.
In any event, Washington accused its ally Pakistan of failing to provide information on bin Laden, while Pakistan has criticized the covert operation carried out on their territory. Relations tensed when, five days after the execution, four U.S. drones returned to Pakistani territory in a targeted killing of 15 suspected militants in North Waziristan, pressuring the Pakistani government to strengthen its own fight against extremists. In response to the crisis, on May 11 President Zardari made an official visit to Russia seeking to diversify Pakistan’s foreign relations.
The methods used to conduct targeted killings are limitless. In bin Laden’s case, the Pentagon considered various possible courses of action. Dropping 2000-pound bombs on the compound from stealth B-2 bombers was discarded as too difficult to physically identify the target and too dangerous for civilians in the area. Using Reaper drones fitted with Hellfire missiles was dismissed because such aircraft would be spotted by Islamabad’s air defense system.
The ultimate choice, a commando operation code-named Operation Neptune’s Spear, was an action with similar dynamics, save a few differences, to former Colombian President Uribe’s Operation Phoenix, which violated the sovereignty of Ecuador to execute FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes.
A team of U.S. Navy SEALs (at least 20) trained at Bagram Airfield and took off from the base at Jalalabad (both in Afghanistan) in two helicopters (with others as support) flying close to the ground to evade radar for about 160 kilometers in Pakistani airspace.The novelty is that the helicopters had stealth features to reduce their detection by radar, produce less noise and reduce their heat signature (the U.S. stealth helicopter program that was believed to have been canceled in 2004). While the SEALs breached the compound using explosives, one of the helicopters flew into the ground and had to be destroyed. During the mission, radio signals were jammed, and support aircraft for communication were deployed. The helicopters returned to Jalalabad, Afghanistan with bin Laden’s body, which was said to be transferred to the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and buried at sea.
Obama announced hours later, “After a firefight, [the SEALs] killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.” White House Press Secretary Jay Carney later said, “Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed.” His death carried the characteristics of an execution with a shot to the chest and a shot to the head. According to Shaul Mofaz, the president of the Israeli parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, “This was an operation to kill.”
In this case, the members of the elite SEAL team, later decorated by Obama behind closed doors at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were the official assassins of the empire.
Had bin Laden been taken prisoner and subjected to the judicial process, he could have seriously compromised more than a few Western and Saudi leaders and capitalists, since he was a former collaborator of Washington and the CIA. The information obtained from his compound will also shed further light on al-Qaida, which appears to be a dispersed network of independent cells that act autonomously with ideological cohesion, causing disproportionately violent terrorist attacks. Al-Qaida has no central command that issues orders but a symbolic leader, now gone, who, dead or alive, is a spiritual martyr.
Editorial Notes:
1) OCO, Overseas Contingency Operations.
2) Gary D. Solis, "The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War," Cambridge University Press, 2010. Law professor, specializing in the laws of war at Georgetown University Law Center.
3) Remarks by the President Awarding the Medal of Honor to Private First Class Anthony Kaho'ohanohano and Private First Class Henry Svehla, White House, May 2, 2011.
4) Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation Against Terrorist Organizations," University of Chicago, Security Studies, 18:719–755, 2009.
Patrick B. Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, September 24, 2010.
5) Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles controlled remotely and armed. They replicate the terrorist conception of vigilance and punishment and constitute the highest military expression of the panopticon, which consists in the civil setting of surveillance cameras in public spaces to prevent crime, but also to control and correct the social order. The wars of the near future that are being planned today in the technology and strategy centers involve enormous “swarms” of lethal commando units of all sizes. These drones are intelligent, automatic and coordinated without a central command, and with continuous satellite access to real-time information.
6) Interview with President Barack Obama by correspondent Steve Kroft, "60 Minutes," CBS News, May 6, 2011.
Given the dubious results of George W. Bush’s global war on terror, which focused on large military operations, Obama calls his counterterrorism actions Overseas Contingency Operations,(1) and has launched a new strategy in which the death of bin Laden marks a break with that of his successor. The strategy is based on the Israeli model of extrajudicial executions, also called targeted killings, applied by Mossad since 1972 (after the murder of nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics). However, it continues the Bush concept of fighting fire with fire. The new strategy correlates with U.S. foreign policy.
The counterterrorism technique of targeted killings was and is used occasionally by multiple countries such as France, Russia and Colombia. Now, however, the leading specialists in targeted killing, who apply it systematically and increasingly, are the U.S. and Israel, who are at the point of turning it into a daily practice (a practice also used in fighting drug trafficking).
As with terrorism itself, there is no single definition of targeted killing. One option is the intentional killing of a specific civilian or illegal combatant who cannot reasonably be captured and is participating in a conflict; the selection of a target is done under the direction of a government, whether in the context of an international armed conflict or not.(2) Those who consider it a legal tactic — not murder but homicide without criminal responsibility — claim the right to the legitimate national defense and treat it as an act of war.
In the U.S.–Israeli doctrine, the list of targets for assassinations covers a wide spectrum both inside and outside of insurgent organizations, including the top leaders and high-profile individuals, lower-ranking commanders, active and passive militants, ideologues, collaborators and technical staff. The killings are committed based on suspicions, not a trial, and are therefore considered extrajudicial.
Among the reasons for the targeted killing of individuals in another country is to eliminate those elements that are considered a permanent threat to the interests of both countries and their citizens in relation to an armed conflict. Another reason is to use killings to destroy, paralyze or reduce the level of operation of an organization. The severity and number of attacks cause an internal power vacuum, eliminating key operators and sowing distrust and disruption.
Targeted assassinations of leaders (i.e., the beheading of the leadership) has a special relevance in Obama’s strategy. Washington’s black list for targeted killings of al-Qaida leaders includes a dozen members. The next in line are bin Laden’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leader of al-Qaida in the Maghreb, Abu Zeid.
The leaders of insurgent organizations are treated as “terrorist leaders” within the system of reference of a state, but from the perspective of the other side they are considered “the highest authorities.” Ultimately, the decapitation of insurgent leadership is authorizing to some degree the assassination of “leaders.” Thus the insurgent forces, who do not follow the laws of the West, may respond with assassinations of Western leaders. In 2007, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney was the target of a violent assassination attempt by the Taliban in a surprise and secret visit to Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, the same base where commandos were trained for the execution of bin Laden. That the assassinations have not been more frequent is due in part to the fact that attacks against civilians are much easier than against protected and alert political leaders.
According to Obama, after the death of Osama bin Laden the world is a safer and better place.(3) In addition to congratulations from U.S. allies, it seems that most of the world should be thankful for this contribution to global peace, the murder of a murderer. Paradoxically, the Nobel Peace Prize recipient explains that the war continues, “There’s no doubt that al-Qaida will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must, and we will remain vigilant at home and abroad.”
Under what conditions does the decapitation of leadership diminish and eventually destroy the violent capability of a terrorist organization? In the case of the 2006 killing of al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, violence increased significantly. On the other hand, targeted killings by Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have resulted in a slight decrease in violence. Taking out the leadership alone does not mean the collapse of an insurgency or the decrease of their attacks, but it can generate the opposite effect.(4) After the killing of bin Laden, al-Qaida threatened vengeance and announced that it would continue the jihad. In fact, violence has continued in the days since his death, with the bombing in the city of Charsadda near Islamabad that killed 80, perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban that is linked to al-Qaida.
In the case of organizations like al-Qaida, the statistics show that the probability of the killing of a top leader causing a collapse is 17 percent, whereas the likelihood of spontaneous dissolution is 33 percent. Paradoxically, then, killing bin Laden has increased the probability that al-Qaida will live on, from 67 percent to 83 percent.
But the elimination of the organization would be unexpected. What is hoped for is that it will be debilitated by the Arab Spring, and its lifespan depends on the popular support it can maintain. What’s more, there are benefits and opportunities in both domestic and foreign policy for Obama.
George Bush’s war on terror needed bin Laden like a fetish. Barack Obama’s Overseas Contingency Operations do not. The torture of prisoners in the Empire’s Cuban jail, Guantanamo, helped to locate Osama, who finally “disappeared” at the opportune moment, bringing to a close for Americans the cycle of 9/11. The people asked for justice, and Obama affirmed, “Our country has remained committed to seeing that justice is done.” The targeted killing of bin Laden ends the brutal imperial lesson embedded in the uncertainties since 9/11, which began with the bombing and invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama praised the unity and patriotism of a crowd that gathered in front of the White House, at the World Trade Center site and in other parts of the country, holding candles and flags and singing the national anthem. But the joy and celebration of the death (although no more than that of a murderer), speaks of revenge more than justice. Torture and death as a response to death shows the savage face of part of the superpower’s society. It is the decline of a civilization into the jungle of the Shuar tribes of Ecuador, for whom justice means revenge, with rules that allow a stricter level of retaliation than even ancient Babylonian law. This leads to an endless cycle of death, perhaps a less sophisticated version of targeted killings.
The ability of a terrorist organization to survive decapitation of its leadership is proportional to the popular support it maintains. For al-Qaida, popular support comes not from its religious fundamentalism but from its anti-Americanism, which is in turn popular because of the U.S. invasions and major military operations in the Islamic world and its support of authoritarian regimes. It is estimated that in Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia 20 percent of the population supports al-Qaida, and in Nigeria 49 percent do, although these numbers are declining. For this reason, the Obama administration seeks to intensify covert operations like targeted drone strikes,(5) to reduce the troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and to limit its policy of support for repressive regimes, at least in North Africa. This is all done with an eye toward reducing anti-Americanism. In 2010, Barack Obama increased funding for and expanded covert operations (black ops) to 75 countries, compared to the 60 authorized by George Bush.
The influence of al-Qaida and bin Laden over the Arabs in the Maghreb who spurred the Arab Spring is not significant, for they have a political rather than religious nature, and Washington’s support for authoritarian Arab regimes is not a primary consideration of the demonstrators. Although the U.S. is not looked upon favorably, the rebellion is against the local regimes themselves. Arabs are seeking democracy, not a caliphate. In fact, bin Laden was trying to bring down the pro-Western authoritarian Arab governments, but he could not achieve sufficient popular support with its doctrine and methods of violent fundamentalism.
In addition, bin Laden’s death gives Obama greater leverage in domestic politics and a conclusion to the Afghan war. He stated:
“I've already made a commitment that starting in July of this year, we are drawing down troops. And we are transitioning; we're training Afghan forces so that they can start securing their own country. And so, what has happened on Sunday, I think, reconfirms that we can focus on al-Qaida, focus on the threats to our homeland, train Afghans in a way that allows them to stabilize their country. But we don't need to have a perpetual footprint of the size that we have now.”(6)
It is unlikely that bin Laden’s presence during the last five years in a deteriorating and peculiar compound tenuously called a mansion, 800 meters from the Pakistan Military Academy, in a middle class neighborhood of Abbottabad (founded in 1853 by British Maj. James Abbott), had gone unnoticed by Pakistan’s nine intelligence agencies (and therefore at some point by the Pentagon and CIA) and by local civil authorities. Taking into account that Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies and ISI are divided between supporters of al-Qaida, the Taliban and the U.S., bin Laden could very well have been betrayed. Obama has announced an increase for the next five years of $2 billion in aid to the Pakistani Defense Ministry for counterterrorism.
In any event, Washington accused its ally Pakistan of failing to provide information on bin Laden, while Pakistan has criticized the covert operation carried out on their territory. Relations tensed when, five days after the execution, four U.S. drones returned to Pakistani territory in a targeted killing of 15 suspected militants in North Waziristan, pressuring the Pakistani government to strengthen its own fight against extremists. In response to the crisis, on May 11 President Zardari made an official visit to Russia seeking to diversify Pakistan’s foreign relations.
The methods used to conduct targeted killings are limitless. In bin Laden’s case, the Pentagon considered various possible courses of action. Dropping 2000-pound bombs on the compound from stealth B-2 bombers was discarded as too difficult to physically identify the target and too dangerous for civilians in the area. Using Reaper drones fitted with Hellfire missiles was dismissed because such aircraft would be spotted by Islamabad’s air defense system.
The ultimate choice, a commando operation code-named Operation Neptune’s Spear, was an action with similar dynamics, save a few differences, to former Colombian President Uribe’s Operation Phoenix, which violated the sovereignty of Ecuador to execute FARC’s second-in-command, Raul Reyes.
A team of U.S. Navy SEALs (at least 20) trained at Bagram Airfield and took off from the base at Jalalabad (both in Afghanistan) in two helicopters (with others as support) flying close to the ground to evade radar for about 160 kilometers in Pakistani airspace.The novelty is that the helicopters had stealth features to reduce their detection by radar, produce less noise and reduce their heat signature (the U.S. stealth helicopter program that was believed to have been canceled in 2004). While the SEALs breached the compound using explosives, one of the helicopters flew into the ground and had to be destroyed. During the mission, radio signals were jammed, and support aircraft for communication were deployed. The helicopters returned to Jalalabad, Afghanistan with bin Laden’s body, which was said to be transferred to the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and buried at sea.
Obama announced hours later, “After a firefight, [the SEALs] killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.” White House Press Secretary Jay Carney later said, “Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed.” His death carried the characteristics of an execution with a shot to the chest and a shot to the head. According to Shaul Mofaz, the president of the Israeli parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, “This was an operation to kill.”
In this case, the members of the elite SEAL team, later decorated by Obama behind closed doors at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were the official assassins of the empire.
Had bin Laden been taken prisoner and subjected to the judicial process, he could have seriously compromised more than a few Western and Saudi leaders and capitalists, since he was a former collaborator of Washington and the CIA. The information obtained from his compound will also shed further light on al-Qaida, which appears to be a dispersed network of independent cells that act autonomously with ideological cohesion, causing disproportionately violent terrorist attacks. Al-Qaida has no central command that issues orders but a symbolic leader, now gone, who, dead or alive, is a spiritual martyr.
Editorial Notes:
1) OCO, Overseas Contingency Operations.
2) Gary D. Solis, "The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War," Cambridge University Press, 2010. Law professor, specializing in the laws of war at Georgetown University Law Center.
3) Remarks by the President Awarding the Medal of Honor to Private First Class Anthony Kaho'ohanohano and Private First Class Henry Svehla, White House, May 2, 2011.
4) Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation Against Terrorist Organizations," University of Chicago, Security Studies, 18:719–755, 2009.
Patrick B. Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, September 24, 2010.
5) Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles controlled remotely and armed. They replicate the terrorist conception of vigilance and punishment and constitute the highest military expression of the panopticon, which consists in the civil setting of surveillance cameras in public spaces to prevent crime, but also to control and correct the social order. The wars of the near future that are being planned today in the technology and strategy centers involve enormous “swarms” of lethal commando units of all sizes. These drones are intelligent, automatic and coordinated without a central command, and with continuous satellite access to real-time information.
6) Interview with President Barack Obama by correspondent Steve Kroft, "60 Minutes," CBS News, May 6, 2011.