Victory, Now What? Libya Is a Lucky Break, Not a Test Case; NATO Was at Its Limit

“Pure or impure?” This question is going to torment the West for some time, although they were, however late, victorious against Gadhafi. (In 1999 it took only half as long against the stronger Serbia.) The record since 2001? Afghanistan: negative; the Taliban are coming back. Iraq: a “red zero,” as they say in finance jargon; the tyrant is gone, there is democracy, but the country remains an at-risk asset that can only be entered in as a positive if order can survive there without America’s support. Libya: a “black zero,” but with return potential.

Without NATO the rebellion would not be in Tripoli by a long shot, and the alliance had more good fortune than ammunition, leadership and solidarity. Two of the largest members — Berlin and Warsaw — didn’t fly with the rest; America was only halfheartedly involved. A part of this good fortune is the deftness of the rebels, who have learned from the mistakes of the U.S. in Baghdad. Instead of dismantling military and power structures, they have hardly touched the police and security apparatuses and have taken in deserters with open arms. If chaos doesn’t break out in Tripoli as it did in Baghdad, then they will have also won half the political battle.

Winning the first half isn’t winning everything. A collective leadership, who have quarreled even before the victory, is fundamentally unstable. The forces in western Libya, which have accomplished the breakthrough to Tripoli, will demand more authority than the militarily unsuccessful Benghazi wing wants to give: After all, we have contrived the revolution and have bled the longest. Like those faithful to Saddam in the Iraq War, the Gadhafi-faithful could disappear.

There is a point where the similarities between the situations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya end: It was not foreign invaders that eked out regime change, it was a broad coalition, borne by the people. The new regime enjoys a legitimacy that Karzai never had in Kabul and that Mallawi and Maliki only partly had in Baghdad. Legitimacy means approval, which promises the ability to govern.

Of course, the uprising against the dictator in Damascus is broader still, and the citizens, who die daily in the hail of bullets, would have deserved the military help of the West even more than the Libyans. But aid is not coming, because the reality is stronger than ideals: a difficult terrain, the power interests of the neighbors, particularly Iran, with a highly trained army. And then the fourth war against an Islamic country, one that would require the complete commitment of the U.S.? Further, Europe need not fear a mass influx of Syrian refugees.

Furthermore, Libya has shown that NATO would be neither politically nor militarily capable. It would be good for aircraft to remain at the ready, in order to keep the counter-revolution at bay. And, if asked, to help with the structure of the armed forces, because without security everything is for nothing. Instead of weaving bay leaves, the coalition should strike a hard balance. NATO would have disrupted a long, bloody stalemate. The wealthiest group of states in the world would have almost run out of ammunition. The future looks even bleaker; since the economic crisis military spending is melting away everywhere. “Pure or impure?” Libya is a lucky break, not a test case.