North Korean “Satellite”: Is Missile Defense the Correct Response?
The government has issued an order to shoot down the North Korean “satellite,” which carries the same capabilities as a long-range ballistic missile. However, is the Japanese Self-Defense Force's missile defense system effective?
This is the second time that a shoot-down order has been issued since North Korea’s April 2009 long-range ballistic missile launch. The missile, slated to be launched between the 12th and 16th of this month, will fly over Okinawa’s Sakishima Islands. The Ministry of Defense has shipped surface-to-air interceptor missiles (PAC-3) to the main Okinawan island, Miyako island, and Ishigaki island from the Japanese mainland. The Ministry has also deployed three Aegis escort vessels equipped with sea-to-air interceptor missiles (SM-3) to the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.
The Bankrupt Theory of Deterrence
A segment of the population on Ishigaki island, where no Self-Defense Force forces are currently based, expressed concern that “this is intended to slowly accustom the residents to a regular military presence on the island.” The government likely feels that there is a possibility that the missile will hit Japan. They reason that as long as Japan possesses a missile defense system, they ought to issue a shoot-down order.
By launching their “satellite,” North Korea intends to perfect their long-range missile capabilities in order to gain a better position in dealing with America and to cause disorder in Japan. In 2009, there was chaos after the Japanese government incorrectly reported the North Korean missile launch a day in advance. The government and local authorities thrust onto each other the all-important duty of notifying the citizens in the event that the missile landed on Japanese territory. In the end, this role was neglected.
A missile defense system is meant to render ballistic missiles useless. It is the trump card of strategic deterrence. Yet it cannot deter North Korea from launching a “satellite.” It seems that North Korea will not cancel the launch, even as Japan positions itself for a shoot-down. It is because the approach is all wrong.
Support for America Is the Cause
Missile defense was developed by the United States. In 2001, President Bush announced the development of anti-ballistic missile capabilities to “protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.” However, fearing the potential of an American invasion, North Korea and Iran have accelerated their nuclear and missile research.
Former Vice-Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya was the standard-bearer for the introduction of missile defense to Japan. In 2002, as the Director of the Defense Agency at the time, he said that “America will provide $10 trillion towards missile defense. As an allied nation, it is a matter of course to support them.”
The Self-Defense Force opposed this because of the pressure that such an expensive project will cause on the defense budget. Regardless, former Vice-Minister Moriya and Liberal Democratic Party Vice-President Taku Yamasaki pushed the military leadership aside. Moriya personally called the Prime Minister’s residence to make his case. In December 2003, the Koizumi cabinet decided to develop a missile defense system. The cabinet also revised the National Defense Program Outline, the nation’s security guideline, as it previously made no mention of missile defense. The military bureaucracy incited the politicians to stray away from civilian control of the armed forces. This, together with the policy to support America, is what caused the introduction of missile defense to Japan.
The cost of missile defense will surpass one trillion yen this year. Meanwhile, the United States, which paid for the majority of Japan’s system, is equipped with an interceptor missile of questionable accuracy and without clear contingency plans for facing multiple warheads, decoy warheads or a succession of missile launches. Consequently, Japan is alone in acquiring SM3 and PAC3 missiles in tandem.
There will be a double-layer of SM3s on the Aegis escort vessels with PAC3s intended to intercept missiles that may have slipped through. However, with only 28 PAC3 launchers placed in the Tokyo metropolitan area, the Central region and Northern Kyushu, there is very little that can be done if the 54 nuclear power plants that dot the Japanese islands are targeted.
Japan is most afraid of mid-range ballistic missiles, such as the “Scud-C missiles” that have a range of approximately 500 km or the Nodong missiles that have a range of 1,300 km. The most worrisome are not “satellites” or long-range missiles. The recent shoot-down order does not seem to take this into account.
Let us assume that the recent positioning of missile defense capabilities is to prepare against a “satellite” falling on Japan. The use of PAC3s in populated areas is something that even the United States does not have experience with. Would the fragments of the destroyed missile present a danger? Would the interceptor missiles even hit its target?
When asked if the PAC3 can really intercept a missile, Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Haruhiko Kataoka only answered that “it depends on the missile’s flight path and the circumstances of impact.” The authorities must present the effectiveness of missile defense, if it is really intended to protect against the calamity of a missile striking Japan.
They Are Expecting an Overreaction
Will a shoot-down order be issued every time North Korea launches a “satellite”? It can be said with certainty that North Korea’s intention is to elicit an overreaction.
Once the cost-benefit of missile defense is analyzed, doubts that it’s useless are bound to arise.
This is the second time that a shoot-down order has been issued since North Korea’s April 2009 long-range ballistic missile launch. The missile, slated to be launched between the 12th and 16th of this month, will fly over Okinawa’s Sakishima Islands. The Ministry of Defense has shipped surface-to-air interceptor missiles (PAC-3) to the main Okinawan island, Miyako island, and Ishigaki island from the Japanese mainland. The Ministry has also deployed three Aegis escort vessels equipped with sea-to-air interceptor missiles (SM-3) to the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.
The Bankrupt Theory of Deterrence
A segment of the population on Ishigaki island, where no Self-Defense Force forces are currently based, expressed concern that “this is intended to slowly accustom the residents to a regular military presence on the island.” The government likely feels that there is a possibility that the missile will hit Japan. They reason that as long as Japan possesses a missile defense system, they ought to issue a shoot-down order.
By launching their “satellite,” North Korea intends to perfect their long-range missile capabilities in order to gain a better position in dealing with America and to cause disorder in Japan. In 2009, there was chaos after the Japanese government incorrectly reported the North Korean missile launch a day in advance. The government and local authorities thrust onto each other the all-important duty of notifying the citizens in the event that the missile landed on Japanese territory. In the end, this role was neglected.
A missile defense system is meant to render ballistic missiles useless. It is the trump card of strategic deterrence. Yet it cannot deter North Korea from launching a “satellite.” It seems that North Korea will not cancel the launch, even as Japan positions itself for a shoot-down. It is because the approach is all wrong.
Support for America Is the Cause
Missile defense was developed by the United States. In 2001, President Bush announced the development of anti-ballistic missile capabilities to “protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.” However, fearing the potential of an American invasion, North Korea and Iran have accelerated their nuclear and missile research.
Former Vice-Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya was the standard-bearer for the introduction of missile defense to Japan. In 2002, as the Director of the Defense Agency at the time, he said that “America will provide $10 trillion towards missile defense. As an allied nation, it is a matter of course to support them.”
The Self-Defense Force opposed this because of the pressure that such an expensive project will cause on the defense budget. Regardless, former Vice-Minister Moriya and Liberal Democratic Party Vice-President Taku Yamasaki pushed the military leadership aside. Moriya personally called the Prime Minister’s residence to make his case. In December 2003, the Koizumi cabinet decided to develop a missile defense system. The cabinet also revised the National Defense Program Outline, the nation’s security guideline, as it previously made no mention of missile defense. The military bureaucracy incited the politicians to stray away from civilian control of the armed forces. This, together with the policy to support America, is what caused the introduction of missile defense to Japan.
The cost of missile defense will surpass one trillion yen this year. Meanwhile, the United States, which paid for the majority of Japan’s system, is equipped with an interceptor missile of questionable accuracy and without clear contingency plans for facing multiple warheads, decoy warheads or a succession of missile launches. Consequently, Japan is alone in acquiring SM3 and PAC3 missiles in tandem.
There will be a double-layer of SM3s on the Aegis escort vessels with PAC3s intended to intercept missiles that may have slipped through. However, with only 28 PAC3 launchers placed in the Tokyo metropolitan area, the Central region and Northern Kyushu, there is very little that can be done if the 54 nuclear power plants that dot the Japanese islands are targeted.
Japan is most afraid of mid-range ballistic missiles, such as the “Scud-C missiles” that have a range of approximately 500 km or the Nodong missiles that have a range of 1,300 km. The most worrisome are not “satellites” or long-range missiles. The recent shoot-down order does not seem to take this into account.
Let us assume that the recent positioning of missile defense capabilities is to prepare against a “satellite” falling on Japan. The use of PAC3s in populated areas is something that even the United States does not have experience with. Would the fragments of the destroyed missile present a danger? Would the interceptor missiles even hit its target?
When asked if the PAC3 can really intercept a missile, Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Haruhiko Kataoka only answered that “it depends on the missile’s flight path and the circumstances of impact.” The authorities must present the effectiveness of missile defense, if it is really intended to protect against the calamity of a missile striking Japan.
They Are Expecting an Overreaction
Will a shoot-down order be issued every time North Korea launches a “satellite”? It can be said with certainty that North Korea’s intention is to elicit an overreaction.
Once the cost-benefit of missile defense is analyzed, doubts that it’s useless are bound to arise.