America’s Strategic “Pivotal Shift” in Asia-Pacific Geopolitics
The series of geopolitical developments in the Asia-Pacific region taking place all at once is certainly overwhelming: The West has responded swiftly to the changes in Myanmar’s internal politics. These changes include the unprecedented visits to the country by the U.S. secretary of state and the British prime minister, as well as the entrance of the first batch of Marine Corps personnel into the Marine Corps base in Darwin, which was described by the Australian defense minister as “a historical day.” Not to mention the beginning of a joint U.S.-Philippines naval military exercise -- while China is having a stand-off with Philippines for the Scarborough Shoal -- and India’s first successful test of its long-range continental guided missile (thus enhancing its military equipment). The Washington Post, on the other hand, revealed that when the lease expires in 2016, the Pentagon will be ready to forego its strategic point, the Biego Garcia base, at the true South of India, choosing to head east to the Cocos Islands in Australia.
Besides the acceleration in the economic and military cooperation of the U.S. with Vietnam, its rival half a century ago, Japan has convened a summit in Tokyo with the five nations of the Mekong River to propose the Cooperative Strategies 2012. Tokyo has promised Myanmar’s President Thein Sein, who visited Japan for the first time in 30 years, to write off $3.7 billion worth of debt, as well as renew its provision of developmental assistance. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Ngyuen Tan Dung, on the other hand, has openly invited the U.S. and Japan, among others, to “join in to resolve” the dispute over the sovereignty of the South China Sea.
The shadow of Uncle Sam, as well as the international climate that has resulted from China’s rise to the second largest economy in the world, is evident behind this series of developments. From a historical perspective, this is the classic strategy of breaking from the strong and joining with the weak that I had concluded more than a decade ago. The recent crux is the United States’ international strategic “pivotal shift” since the Obama administration took office, which was intended to weaken the political conflict it had with the Islamic world during the “War on Terror” and to turn the main object of the “civilized conflict” to the Chinese civilization, which has the greatest economic competitiveness.
The Obama administration has seen clearly that the real threat to the United States’ hegemonic status is economic power, not the new ‘spirit’ wandering the world that is the political Islam. In addition, it has also assessed the “good horses” and “poor horses” of Washington’s various international opponents, especially of the soft power of “universal value” won over in the Cold War against Russia as well as the huge advantage of the public support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Warsaw Pact. Ten years of “War on Terror” has shown that the two weapons the U.S. had in the Cold War are useless against political Islam, but has great potential in the “pivotal shift” toward the Asia-Pacific region today. Washington’s recent series of offensives from Australia to Southeast Asia -- and especially in China’s “backyard,” Myanmar -- displayed the trump cards of “universal value” and public opinion, which is truly where Beijing’s “poor horse” is.
I have stressed many times that a deficit of moral authority is Beijing’s major problem. It has not only induced the internal problems that are brewing behind closed doors, it even risks to become an external problem of handing someone else control of Beijing. The recent scandal involving Chongqing’s leader is a stark example. It revealed the highest level of corruption directly; it can also be compared to Mao Zedong’s personal superstition in which the Lin Biao incident served to ultimately destroy the grassroots society. Internationally, this incident has not only involved overseas personnel directly, but -- according to the South China Morning Post -- has caused the higher-ups in Europe and the U.S. to pay attention to similar high-level corruptions within the Chinese military.
International allies are another major soft aid for Beijing. Let’s take a look at the overall trend of growth and decline of power in the East Asian region.
A significant highlight is the decline of Japan. The New York Times and The Washington Post have specially reported on the decline of the trump card of Japan’s rise after World War II: the manufacturing sector and especially the consumer electronics industry that once dominated the world. Giants of the industry for many years like Sony, Sharp and Panasonic (Matsushita) have continually suffered losses and the retrenching of their staff. Sharp has been forced to sell off its shares and factories to the Taiwan-invested Hon Hai Precision Industry. All the above are cases in point.
In contrast is the rise of South Korea, which has begun to supersede Japan in the traditional manufacturing and electronics industries. On the international stage, not only has Korean culture created waves overseas, but the Korean UN secretary general and Korean head of the World Bank have also displayed disproportionate worldwide influences.
In the subcontinent, in contrast to the Indian economic achievements that is mirrored in its test firing of its missiles, Pakistan’s economy is at a standstill, while its politics continue to slow down and crumble. The U.S. Congress has even introduced a bill that supports Pakistan’s Baluchistan province’s “self-declared” independence. The terrorist violence that occurred in Xinjiang this year has also been used by Beijing to accuse Islamic organizations in Pakistan of having direct involvement in the incident.
We can remind ourselves of a lesson in history here. The economic power of the second Deutsche Empire whose unification was driven by the Franco-Prussian war was rising rapidly at that time and had a chance of leading Europe and becoming a global superpower at one time. Such a trend was reversed during World War I, and one of the key reasons was Germany’s choice of international allies. During the early period of the war, after Erich Ludendoff, a powerful general in the German army, made an investigative visit to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, he reported to the German Emperor, saying, “We have made an alliance with a dead body.”
What was more unfortunate was that Germany had made alliances with two dead bodies. The other was the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline just like the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
In the present state of the world, we can take a look at Beijing’s main allies in Asia: Pakistan, North Korea and the Myanmar military government. Perhaps it is a little too much to describe them as “dead bodies,” but these allies are definitely not reliable ones bubbling with life. They are not even sustainable entities in the long run. This calls for deeper contemplation.
Besides the acceleration in the economic and military cooperation of the U.S. with Vietnam, its rival half a century ago, Japan has convened a summit in Tokyo with the five nations of the Mekong River to propose the Cooperative Strategies 2012. Tokyo has promised Myanmar’s President Thein Sein, who visited Japan for the first time in 30 years, to write off $3.7 billion worth of debt, as well as renew its provision of developmental assistance. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Ngyuen Tan Dung, on the other hand, has openly invited the U.S. and Japan, among others, to “join in to resolve” the dispute over the sovereignty of the South China Sea.
The shadow of Uncle Sam, as well as the international climate that has resulted from China’s rise to the second largest economy in the world, is evident behind this series of developments. From a historical perspective, this is the classic strategy of breaking from the strong and joining with the weak that I had concluded more than a decade ago. The recent crux is the United States’ international strategic “pivotal shift” since the Obama administration took office, which was intended to weaken the political conflict it had with the Islamic world during the “War on Terror” and to turn the main object of the “civilized conflict” to the Chinese civilization, which has the greatest economic competitiveness.
The Obama administration has seen clearly that the real threat to the United States’ hegemonic status is economic power, not the new ‘spirit’ wandering the world that is the political Islam. In addition, it has also assessed the “good horses” and “poor horses” of Washington’s various international opponents, especially of the soft power of “universal value” won over in the Cold War against Russia as well as the huge advantage of the public support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Warsaw Pact. Ten years of “War on Terror” has shown that the two weapons the U.S. had in the Cold War are useless against political Islam, but has great potential in the “pivotal shift” toward the Asia-Pacific region today. Washington’s recent series of offensives from Australia to Southeast Asia -- and especially in China’s “backyard,” Myanmar -- displayed the trump cards of “universal value” and public opinion, which is truly where Beijing’s “poor horse” is.
I have stressed many times that a deficit of moral authority is Beijing’s major problem. It has not only induced the internal problems that are brewing behind closed doors, it even risks to become an external problem of handing someone else control of Beijing. The recent scandal involving Chongqing’s leader is a stark example. It revealed the highest level of corruption directly; it can also be compared to Mao Zedong’s personal superstition in which the Lin Biao incident served to ultimately destroy the grassroots society. Internationally, this incident has not only involved overseas personnel directly, but -- according to the South China Morning Post -- has caused the higher-ups in Europe and the U.S. to pay attention to similar high-level corruptions within the Chinese military.
International allies are another major soft aid for Beijing. Let’s take a look at the overall trend of growth and decline of power in the East Asian region.
A significant highlight is the decline of Japan. The New York Times and The Washington Post have specially reported on the decline of the trump card of Japan’s rise after World War II: the manufacturing sector and especially the consumer electronics industry that once dominated the world. Giants of the industry for many years like Sony, Sharp and Panasonic (Matsushita) have continually suffered losses and the retrenching of their staff. Sharp has been forced to sell off its shares and factories to the Taiwan-invested Hon Hai Precision Industry. All the above are cases in point.
In contrast is the rise of South Korea, which has begun to supersede Japan in the traditional manufacturing and electronics industries. On the international stage, not only has Korean culture created waves overseas, but the Korean UN secretary general and Korean head of the World Bank have also displayed disproportionate worldwide influences.
In the subcontinent, in contrast to the Indian economic achievements that is mirrored in its test firing of its missiles, Pakistan’s economy is at a standstill, while its politics continue to slow down and crumble. The U.S. Congress has even introduced a bill that supports Pakistan’s Baluchistan province’s “self-declared” independence. The terrorist violence that occurred in Xinjiang this year has also been used by Beijing to accuse Islamic organizations in Pakistan of having direct involvement in the incident.
We can remind ourselves of a lesson in history here. The economic power of the second Deutsche Empire whose unification was driven by the Franco-Prussian war was rising rapidly at that time and had a chance of leading Europe and becoming a global superpower at one time. Such a trend was reversed during World War I, and one of the key reasons was Germany’s choice of international allies. During the early period of the war, after Erich Ludendoff, a powerful general in the German army, made an investigative visit to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, he reported to the German Emperor, saying, “We have made an alliance with a dead body.”
What was more unfortunate was that Germany had made alliances with two dead bodies. The other was the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline just like the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
In the present state of the world, we can take a look at Beijing’s main allies in Asia: Pakistan, North Korea and the Myanmar military government. Perhaps it is a little too much to describe them as “dead bodies,” but these allies are definitely not reliable ones bubbling with life. They are not even sustainable entities in the long run. This calls for deeper contemplation.