Inter-American Defense Under Debate
The commemoration of the Malvinas War,* which ended 30 years ago, should have at least two purposes: on the one hand, starting a broad national dialogue aiming to forge a better understanding (of reasons, motivations and effects) about what happened and a series of definite basic agreements (going forward) about the issue of the islands; on the other hand, rethinking key aspects of the country’s foreign policy and advancing the design of a long-term international strategy.
At the intersection of both objectives lies an interesting issue scarcely mentioned in debates about the Malvinas: What is to be done with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) from 1947? This instrument — the United States’ first military and multilateral agreement of the Cold War — was invoked in 1982 by Argentina, but was not put into effect. At the time, its discredit was evident: its effective use as a means to address threats from outside the continent had centered on Cuba in 1962; first, in the island’s exclusion from the inter-American system, and later during the Missile Crisis.
More than joint commitments and collective defense, anti-communism was IATRA’s reason for being. The uselessness of the treaty was made evident in the case of the Malvinas. Its deterioration and malleability were rendered more obvious in the ‘80s. Washington did not use it when it invaded Granada in 1983, nor when it sponsored a low intensity war in Central America, nor when it launched the military counter-narcotic Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia in 1986, nor when it invaded Panama in 1989. In the ‘90s, with the apex of humanitarian intervention (in Haiti in 1994, for example), it didn’t even feign recourse to IATRA, despite the laxity implicit in Article 6, which calls for the adoption of collective measures before “an aggression which is not an armed attack.”
Nevertheless, in 2001, the treaty saw a brief symbolic revival with Brazil’s initiative which appealed to Article 3 of the treaty (“an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States”); the continent closed ranks with the United States after the September 11 attacks. The attack on Iraq, however, by the United States and a “coalition of the willing” (in which some members of IATRA took part) showed yet again that free-rider behavior would remain in effect in the region when the use of force is concerned.
In the last decade, IATRA and the group of agencies linked to defense and security in the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) and the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS), have remained intact. As a result, a low-profile status quo has prevailed. Periodically, there are announcements geared toward suggesting the need for certain modifications, but the fact remains that nothing is being restructured. Incentives to change established, conventional and ideological bureaucracies are low. Likewise, Washington does not negotiate its strategic decisions with respect to the region through this framework. For example, it did not use collective institutional nor bilateral governmental channels to inform Latin America that it was reestablishing the Fourth Fleet.
In this context, there remain two alternatives for effecting some kind of change. One option is the revision of IATRA. This reformist option is desirable, but neither the precedents nor the political situation are very auspicious. In 1975 a Protocol of Amendment was signed, but it never entered into force; only eight of 21 signatories ratified it. The present diverse realities of defense issues on the continent are such that arriving at a common direction for adapting IATRA proves complex. Surely, Central American and Caribbean countries, anguished by the drug phenomenon and well inclined to favor the United States, would not join a reformist effort. Some of the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) would prefer to abandon IATRA instead of reforming it. The countries of the Southern Cone may possibly propose very moderate, gradual changes, which would not be met with much enthusiasm in the region.
Another option would be to withdraw from IATRA. Peru attempted to in 1990, but returned a year later. Mexico already did so (under the presidency of Vicente Fox) on September 6, 2002, and it did not pay a high price with regards to Washington. At the most recent meeting of the Organization of American States in Cochabamba, four ALBA countries (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) announced that they will do the same. Washington considered the decision “unfortunate” and will have to see what actions would result. Herein lays a problem of collective action: The eventual displeasure or retaliation from Washington will be lessened only if two or more large- or medium-sized countries decide to leave IATRA.
Argentina could employ a more active policy towards IATRA. Its position favoring a pragmatic reform — reasonable, but thorough and effective — should remain clear. It could also, however, consider withdrawal, together with countries like Brazil, Chile and Peru, if it were possible to arrive at a strong consensus among at least those countries.
In any case, avoiding the discussion about IATRA is of little use; what is imperative is to make the United States understand that the inter-American defense system every day grows more dysfunctional and obsolete, for us as well as for them. It was already inadequate during the Malvinas War; today it is even more anachronistic. In this respect, 30 years after a war that shouldn’t have happened but did, putting IATRA under debate is valid, timely, and necessary.
*Translator’s Note: The author, here and throughout, uses Malvinas in reference to the Falkland Islands, the preferred usage in Argentina.
At the intersection of both objectives lies an interesting issue scarcely mentioned in debates about the Malvinas: What is to be done with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) from 1947? This instrument — the United States’ first military and multilateral agreement of the Cold War — was invoked in 1982 by Argentina, but was not put into effect. At the time, its discredit was evident: its effective use as a means to address threats from outside the continent had centered on Cuba in 1962; first, in the island’s exclusion from the inter-American system, and later during the Missile Crisis.
More than joint commitments and collective defense, anti-communism was IATRA’s reason for being. The uselessness of the treaty was made evident in the case of the Malvinas. Its deterioration and malleability were rendered more obvious in the ‘80s. Washington did not use it when it invaded Granada in 1983, nor when it sponsored a low intensity war in Central America, nor when it launched the military counter-narcotic Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia in 1986, nor when it invaded Panama in 1989. In the ‘90s, with the apex of humanitarian intervention (in Haiti in 1994, for example), it didn’t even feign recourse to IATRA, despite the laxity implicit in Article 6, which calls for the adoption of collective measures before “an aggression which is not an armed attack.”
Nevertheless, in 2001, the treaty saw a brief symbolic revival with Brazil’s initiative which appealed to Article 3 of the treaty (“an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States”); the continent closed ranks with the United States after the September 11 attacks. The attack on Iraq, however, by the United States and a “coalition of the willing” (in which some members of IATRA took part) showed yet again that free-rider behavior would remain in effect in the region when the use of force is concerned.
In the last decade, IATRA and the group of agencies linked to defense and security in the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) and the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS), have remained intact. As a result, a low-profile status quo has prevailed. Periodically, there are announcements geared toward suggesting the need for certain modifications, but the fact remains that nothing is being restructured. Incentives to change established, conventional and ideological bureaucracies are low. Likewise, Washington does not negotiate its strategic decisions with respect to the region through this framework. For example, it did not use collective institutional nor bilateral governmental channels to inform Latin America that it was reestablishing the Fourth Fleet.
In this context, there remain two alternatives for effecting some kind of change. One option is the revision of IATRA. This reformist option is desirable, but neither the precedents nor the political situation are very auspicious. In 1975 a Protocol of Amendment was signed, but it never entered into force; only eight of 21 signatories ratified it. The present diverse realities of defense issues on the continent are such that arriving at a common direction for adapting IATRA proves complex. Surely, Central American and Caribbean countries, anguished by the drug phenomenon and well inclined to favor the United States, would not join a reformist effort. Some of the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) would prefer to abandon IATRA instead of reforming it. The countries of the Southern Cone may possibly propose very moderate, gradual changes, which would not be met with much enthusiasm in the region.
Another option would be to withdraw from IATRA. Peru attempted to in 1990, but returned a year later. Mexico already did so (under the presidency of Vicente Fox) on September 6, 2002, and it did not pay a high price with regards to Washington. At the most recent meeting of the Organization of American States in Cochabamba, four ALBA countries (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) announced that they will do the same. Washington considered the decision “unfortunate” and will have to see what actions would result. Herein lays a problem of collective action: The eventual displeasure or retaliation from Washington will be lessened only if two or more large- or medium-sized countries decide to leave IATRA.
Argentina could employ a more active policy towards IATRA. Its position favoring a pragmatic reform — reasonable, but thorough and effective — should remain clear. It could also, however, consider withdrawal, together with countries like Brazil, Chile and Peru, if it were possible to arrive at a strong consensus among at least those countries.
In any case, avoiding the discussion about IATRA is of little use; what is imperative is to make the United States understand that the inter-American defense system every day grows more dysfunctional and obsolete, for us as well as for them. It was already inadequate during the Malvinas War; today it is even more anachronistic. In this respect, 30 years after a war that shouldn’t have happened but did, putting IATRA under debate is valid, timely, and necessary.
*Translator’s Note: The author, here and throughout, uses Malvinas in reference to the Falkland Islands, the preferred usage in Argentina.