Diplomacy and the US-Japan Security Treaty: Are We to Become a Major Military Power?

Published in Ryukyushimpo
(Japan) on 11 December 2012
by (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Ethan Ferraro. Edited by Heather Martin.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs often says, “It is the duty of the government to preserve the safety and prosperity of our country and the safety of our citizens and their property,” when explaining their security policies. However, I cannot possibly see how they are fulfilling this duty towards Okinawa.

This fact is all too clear when you look at how the will of the Okinawan people is being ignored with regard to the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and the deployment of the Osprey. When you clear away the distortions to see the entire picture, it is obvious that there is a need for the various parties to show they can get things done.

When looking at the election pledges made by the various parties with regard to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty arrangements, the Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Komeito, the Japan Restoration Party, the Your Party, the New Party Daichi, the People’s New Party and the New Renaissance Party all use different expressions, such as “maintaining,” “strengthening,” “deepening” or “a key to Japanese security,” but the overall emphasis on the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance is clear.

The Tomorrow Party of Japan states that “We must construct a relationship with the U.S. grounded in the responsibility of an independent nation,” and “We must concentrate on East Asia diplomacy.” The Japanese Communist Party states that “We must cancel the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” while the Social Democratic Party asserts that “We must take a UN-focused stance on diplomacy.” The New Party Nippon has made no reference to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The fact that Japanese diplomacy after the end of World War II deserted the people of Japan to follow the U.S. is needless to say. The various parties must seriously face their inconsistencies toward the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

There are few political parties that make public commitments with regard to the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. The Japanese Communist Party calls for drastic revisions, the Your Party calls for Japan to consider revisions, the Social Democratic Party calls for a revision of the entire agreement and the People’s New Party calls for less drastic revisions. The other parties do not even mention the Status of Forces Agreement within their main policies. There is a large gap between the parties and the citizens, who view with a sense of foreboding this Status of Forces Agreement, which assures special privileges to the U.S. military, and who believe it to be the “root of the U.S. military’s crimes.”

With regard to the Senkaku Islands problem, the Liberal Democratic Party takes an unbending stance, seeking legislation to give it stronger practical control over the islands. The Japan Restoration Party states that it wants to fortify coastal defenses to strengthen Japan’s control of these islands.

The Democratic Party of Japan wants to expand the defense system of the Japanese Coast Guard; the New Komeito states their desire for firm strategic diplomacy, while the Japanese Communist Party, the Your Party, the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party stress the importance of a diplomatic solution.

I want to stress the following to each party. Territorial disputes must be solved with diplomacy, not military force. The “defeat of diplomacy” that would be signaled by military conflict must not occur in East Asia. We must learn from the many of examples of sorrow and misfortune that war has brought us.

Japanese diplomacy and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that came after the war was focused on the following three diplomatic principles: Diplomacy focused on the UN, cooperation with other free countries and maintaining our position as a member of Asia. It was also focused on our nonaggressive defense policy, our commitment to not becoming a country affiliated with major military affairs, the maintenance of our three antinuclear principles against producing, possessing or allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into our territory and the guarantee of civilian control of national defense.

Will we protect or destroy these national policies? Will we promote disarmament and peaceful diplomacy? Each party must explicitly state what they intend to do.


 外務省は安全保障政策の説明でよく「我(わ)が国の安全と繁栄を維持し、国民の生命と財産の安全を守ることは政府の責務」だという。だが、沖縄に対し、その責務が果たされているとは到底思えない。
 米軍普天間飛行場の県内移設やオスプレイ配備に反対する民意が無視されている現状を見れば明らかだ。こうしたひずみをなくす大局観、実行力を各党に求めたい。
 選挙公約を見ると、日米安保体制について、民主、自民、公明、日本維新、みんな、新党大地、国民新党、新党改革の8党は、「堅持」「強化」「深化」「基軸」など表現こそ異なるが、「日米同盟」重視の姿勢が鮮明だ。
 日本未来は「独立国家としての責任に基づいた日米関係を構築」「東アジア外交を重視」を掲げる。共産は「日米安保解消」、社民は「国連中心の外交」を追求。新党日本は日米安保に言及していない。
 戦後日本外交が国民を置き去りにし、対米追従を繰り返してきたことは論をまたない。各党は、安保の矛盾と真剣に向き合うべきだ。
 日米地位協定を公約前面に掲げた政党は少ない。共産「抜本改定」、みんな「改定提起」、社民「全面改正」、国民新「改定」ぐらいだ。他の党は、党中央の重点政策としては「地位協定」を取り上げていない。米軍、米兵に特権的地位を保障する「地位協定が諸悪の根源」と捉える県民の危機感と、各党の認識に隔たりがある。
 尖閣諸島問題では、自民は法整備による実効支配強化など強硬姿勢をにじませる。維新も実効支配強化のため「海防力強化」を掲げる。
 民主は海上保安庁などの警備体制拡充を、公明は「毅然(きぜん)たる戦略的外交」、共産、みんな、社民、国民新も外交的解決を重視する。
 各党に強調したい。領有権問題は軍事力ではなく、あくまで外交で解決すべきだ。東アジアで「外交の敗北」を意味する武力衝突を引き起こしてはならない。不幸な戦争の教訓にしっかり学ぶべきだ。
 戦後日本の外交・安保政策は、国連中心、自由主義諸国との協調、アジアの一員としての立場堅持の「外交三原則」と、専守防衛、軍事大国にならない、非核三原則、文民統制確保の「国防の基本方針」を両輪に展開してきた。
 国是を守るのか破棄するのか、軍縮・平和外交を強化するのか。各党は選択肢を明示すべきだ。
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