Now that the euphoria of Obama taking office has passed, it's in our best interest to analyze what Barack Obama's real role has been in regional politics. Above all, why aren't Latinos immune to his powerful charisma? The historic defeat of Republicans (71 to 21 percent of the Latin vote) is only understandable based on two variables: the indignant radicalization of Republican speech against immigrants — an indefensible and offensive act of extremism — and the subtle attraction of democratic volunteerism, idealist speech that is expressed in the creation of a network of social welfare programs that fit perfectly with the old Latin political fiscal culture of the philanthropic ogre.
Latin America hasn't been a priority for Washington for several presidencies now. Not even Chavism in its entire splendor could achieve the waking up of the proactive interest of the White House. The new liberal democratic Leviathan hegemony has opted for appeasement and damage control. However, Obamism, just as time passes, will strengthen his position of "continental cause." In fact, the probable legalization of the eleven million undocumented immigrants (unless radical blindness triumphs) will be sufficient for Barack Obama to revalidate the high popularity ratings he maintains in all of Latin America. In spite of this, it is improbable that his administration will revive the ideological fight with Cuba or that it will decisively confront the Bolivian Caesarisms that trample Latin democracy. With respect to the region, its foreign politics will continue being what it always has been — the words of the president: beautiful characters written in bronze that are of limited efficiency in the real world.
Under the Obamic vision of the world, the speech of the U.S. essentially continues being different from that in Latin America. On one side, we find with the formidable mobilizing myth of manifest destiny (a City upon a Hill) that is based on a theoretic map, the supremacy of the U.S. throughout the globe; on the other side, the recurring desire, the great Latin promise, a type of indicative utopia that influences the Pan-American position from before Bolivar and San Martin. This unfinished dream has little to do with the real hegemony of our brothers to the north. Because of this, in spite of Obama, in spite of his rhetorical promises and the exceptionalism at the base of the political mission of his country ("We will support democracy from the Americas to the Middle East"), we Latin Americans have to be conscious that the continental democratization process that Obama has as a sympathizer, an affectionate spectator, maybe to an inspired orator that promotes commercial agreement. And yes, this is a lot. But Obama isn't a leader capable of beginning the great political offensive that Latin America demands to weaken the autocratic pact that causes so much damage in the region.
Ahora que ha pasado la euforia obamista de la toma de posesión, conviene analizar con cuidado cuál ha sido el papel real de Barack Obama en la política regional. Sobre todo porque los latinos no son inmunes a su poderoso carisma. La derrota histórica de los republicanos (71 a 27% en el voto latino) solo es comprensible en función a dos variables: la indignante radicalización del discurso republicano contra los inmigrantes, un extremismo indefendible y ofensivo, y la sutil atracción del voluntarismo demócrata, un discurso idealista que se plasma en la construcción de una red de ayudas sociales que calza perfectamente con la vieja cultura política latina tributaria del ogro filantrópico.
Desde hace varias presidencias, Latinoamérica no es una prioridad para Washington. Ni siquiera el chavismo en todo su esplendor logró despertar el interés proactivo de la Casa Blanca. La nueva hegemonía del Leviatán liberal demócrata ha optado por el appeasement y el control de daños. Sin embargo, el obamismo, conforme pasa el tiempo, consolida su carácter de "causa continental". De hecho, la probable legalización de los once millones de inmigrantes indocumentados (a no ser que triunfe la obcecación radical) será suficiente para que Barack Obama revalide los altos índices de popularidad que mantiene en toda Latinoamérica. Pese a ello, es improbable que su administración reactive la lucha ideológica con Cuba o que se enfrente decisivamente a los cesarismos bolivarianos que pisotean la democracia latina. Con respecto a la región, su política exterior continuará siendo lo que siempre han sido las palabras del Presidente: bellos caracteres escritos para el bronce, de limitada eficacia en el mundo real.
Porque incluso bajo la visión obámica del mundo, el discurso de EEUU continúa siendo, esencialmente, distinto al latinoamericano. Por un lado nos encontramos con el formidable mito movilizador del destino manifiesto (A City Upon a Hill) que fundamenta en el plano teórico la primacía de Estados Unidos en todo el orbe. Por otro, el anhelo recurrente, la gran promesa latina, a manera de utopía indicativa, que influye en el carácter panamericano desde antes de Bolívar y San Martín. Ese sueño inconcluso poco tiene que ver con la hegemonía real de nuestros hermanos del norte. Por eso, a pesar del triunfo de Obama, a pesar de sus promesas retóricas y del excepcionalismo sobre el que funda la misión política de su país ("We will support democracy from the America's to the Middle East") los latinoamericanos tenemos que ser conscientes que el proceso de la democratización continental tiene en Obama a un simpatizante, a un espectador afectuoso, tal vez a un orador inspirado que promueve el acuerdo comercial. Y eso es mucho, claro que sí. Pero Obama no es un líder capaz de iniciar la gran ofensiva política que Latinoamérica exige para debilitar a ese pacto autócrata que tanto daño causa en la región.
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It wouldn’t have cost Trump anything to show a clear intent to deter in a strategically crucial moment; it wouldn’t even have undermined his efforts in Ukraine.
The madness lies in asserting something ... contrary to all evidence and intelligence. The method is doing it again and again, relentlessly, at full volume ... This is how Trump became president twice.
It wouldn’t have cost Trump anything to show a clear intent to deter in a strategically crucial moment; it wouldn’t even have undermined his efforts in Ukraine.