Negotiating with the Devil: Bush to Obama!
Published in Asharq Al Awsat
(Saudi Arabia) on 12 October 2013
by Abdul Malik Ibn Ahmad Alsheikh (link to original)
(Saudi Arabia) on 12 October 2013
by Abdul Malik Ibn Ahmad Alsheikh (link to original)
Translated from
by Hannah Ridge.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
The latest political developments in the Middle East, after the use of chemical weapons against unarmed civilians by the Syrian regime and the reluctance of the American administration to fulfill powerfully and decisively what it promised against the Syrian regime (if it crossed the “red line” that President Obama set, including the use of internationally forbidden chemical weapons), have led to big and legitimate questions among the political elites in the regime about future American policies in their regions and the extent of the United States’ allies’ reliance on it, especially after Russia’s powerful return to the political forefront as a primary player in the politics of the region.
However, the observer of the American political arena and its literature (through its political discussions, dialogues and dispatches, some thinkers, such as in some of its universities and think tanks, about the expected future American role in the Middle East after its experience invading Iraq) sees the widening circles of American elites demanding day after day the reduction of a direct military role (except for military tasks limited to the fight against terrorism) and relying on a policy of fighting fires, rather than igniting them, through expanding the circle of political solutions. Those elites have had a clear impact on the policies of President Barack Obama.
Unlike Obama’s speech last Sept. 24 before the United Nations, the American administration has clearly adopted this role, whether in the Syrian case or in the Iranian nuclear case.
This development in American policy was surprising to some in our region. When compared to the American policy in the era of President Bush Jr., however, this surprise quickly fades, even if we know that President Obama is not Bush.
Robert Mnookin, law professor at Harvard University and chairman of the negotiating program at the Law College, focuses in his book “Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight,” published in 2010, on “the character of both President Bush Jr. and President Barack Obama, their leadership styles and their positions on negotiating with rogue states,” as he expressed it.* In his book, Mnookin clarifies that President Bush depended on leadership instincts when he made his political decisions; he did not rely on gain-loss calculations, as if he were not in favor of sitting for long periods of time with his advisers to discuss political topics in order to arrive at any decision. Indeed, President Bush based his decisions on that of which he was convinced. (Rarely did the team working with him oppose his decision when they discussed the gains and losses of those decisions; rather, they acquiesced to his opinion.) The best proof of this is his invasion of Iraq.
The American administration in the era of President Bush did not show any signs of a desire to negotiate with rogue states. Indeed, a speech from the Bush administration shows the complete opposite of that. That is what Vice President Dick Cheney confirmed shortly after the events of Sept. 11: “I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies of the world are negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” [Mnookin, "Bargaining with the Devil," 267] The book shows that President Bush refused to negotiate with regimes. Particularly, it made him rely on the emotional intuition he had, not on the pragmatic options that were in the interests of the American people. Thus, Bush’s speeches were more moralizing than was necessary and often used sharp phrases like “devils” and “rogue states.”
The book goes on in to describe President Bush’s leadership character and its impact on his decision making. For instance, he did not negotiate with Saddam Hussein; rather, he invaded Iraq, just as he refused to negotiate directly with Iran and North Korea about their nuclear programs.
The book confirms that President Bush’s decisions might have relied often on his sentiments more than careful and pragmatic evaluation of the choices available to him.
It also shows that the speeches and strategies of President Obama correspond with his positions (according to the writer) in choosing to negotiate with states. President Obama states in his eloquent speeches that he does not hold in contempt any of the regimes with whom he differs. In other words, President Obama wants to negotiate with the devil. Indeed, his political speeches and strategy show his preference for that choice.
Thus, will we see in the coming days the entrance of the United States into a series of negotiations with the countries crossing every “red line,” confirming the opinion of the writer that negotiating with the devil will become an American strategic choice?!
*Editor’s Note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
However, the observer of the American political arena and its literature (through its political discussions, dialogues and dispatches, some thinkers, such as in some of its universities and think tanks, about the expected future American role in the Middle East after its experience invading Iraq) sees the widening circles of American elites demanding day after day the reduction of a direct military role (except for military tasks limited to the fight against terrorism) and relying on a policy of fighting fires, rather than igniting them, through expanding the circle of political solutions. Those elites have had a clear impact on the policies of President Barack Obama.
Unlike Obama’s speech last Sept. 24 before the United Nations, the American administration has clearly adopted this role, whether in the Syrian case or in the Iranian nuclear case.
This development in American policy was surprising to some in our region. When compared to the American policy in the era of President Bush Jr., however, this surprise quickly fades, even if we know that President Obama is not Bush.
Robert Mnookin, law professor at Harvard University and chairman of the negotiating program at the Law College, focuses in his book “Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight,” published in 2010, on “the character of both President Bush Jr. and President Barack Obama, their leadership styles and their positions on negotiating with rogue states,” as he expressed it.* In his book, Mnookin clarifies that President Bush depended on leadership instincts when he made his political decisions; he did not rely on gain-loss calculations, as if he were not in favor of sitting for long periods of time with his advisers to discuss political topics in order to arrive at any decision. Indeed, President Bush based his decisions on that of which he was convinced. (Rarely did the team working with him oppose his decision when they discussed the gains and losses of those decisions; rather, they acquiesced to his opinion.) The best proof of this is his invasion of Iraq.
The American administration in the era of President Bush did not show any signs of a desire to negotiate with rogue states. Indeed, a speech from the Bush administration shows the complete opposite of that. That is what Vice President Dick Cheney confirmed shortly after the events of Sept. 11: “I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies of the world are negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” [Mnookin, "Bargaining with the Devil," 267] The book shows that President Bush refused to negotiate with regimes. Particularly, it made him rely on the emotional intuition he had, not on the pragmatic options that were in the interests of the American people. Thus, Bush’s speeches were more moralizing than was necessary and often used sharp phrases like “devils” and “rogue states.”
The book goes on in to describe President Bush’s leadership character and its impact on his decision making. For instance, he did not negotiate with Saddam Hussein; rather, he invaded Iraq, just as he refused to negotiate directly with Iran and North Korea about their nuclear programs.
The book confirms that President Bush’s decisions might have relied often on his sentiments more than careful and pragmatic evaluation of the choices available to him.
It also shows that the speeches and strategies of President Obama correspond with his positions (according to the writer) in choosing to negotiate with states. President Obama states in his eloquent speeches that he does not hold in contempt any of the regimes with whom he differs. In other words, President Obama wants to negotiate with the devil. Indeed, his political speeches and strategy show his preference for that choice.
Thus, will we see in the coming days the entrance of the United States into a series of negotiations with the countries crossing every “red line,” confirming the opinion of the writer that negotiating with the devil will become an American strategic choice?!
*Editor’s Note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
Next article![]( "Culture War until the Dollar Burns")
