The US Cannot Neglect the Resistance of Israel and the Saudis
Published in Volkskrant
(Netherlands) on 9 November 2013
by Paul Brill (link to original)
(Netherlands) on 9 November 2013
by Paul Brill (link to original)
Translated from
by Nikki Rosenberg.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
Obama held a notable speech in Cairo in 2009, but it did not move mountains, according to foreign commentator Paul Brill.
If you had to make an outline of Barack Obama’s almost-five-year presidency, what are the positives and negatives? Roger Simon, political commentator with the web magazine Politico, was asked this question at the Melkweg in Amsterdam last Tuesday and came up with several correct observations concerning the presidential win-loss balance, but I think he was wrong about one thing: namely, labeling Obama’s renowned speech in Cairo, in which he spoke about a more obliging and humbler America, as the first serious outreach that an American president ever has made to the Islamic world and viewing this as a unique gesture.
The power of the word is terribly overexaggerated. Yes, Obama held a notable speech in Cairo; he has excelled with an oral piece more often. But did he move mountains that obstructed the passage to a more peaceful, democratic Middle East? Two years ago one could argue that Obama and his 2009 speech paved the way for what at the time was called the Arab Spring. But the political climate is back where it started; it has even cooled down a couple of degrees. The region is engaged in excitement and disputes as usual. The image of the United States in the Islamic world has degraded rather than improved.
No Verbal Feat
History has taught us that substantial approaches are usually not accompanied by verbal feats. Maybe the most significant American “gesture” toward the Arab world was in February 1945, when President Franklin Roosevelt had his historic meeting with Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder and first king of Saudi Arabia. The meeting took place aboard an American war ship in the Great Bitter Lake, which is located halfway down the Suez Canal, and was accompanied by a culture shock for both the Americans as well as the Saudis. Several stories were circulated about this meeting. But the two leaders — both aged and Roosevelt in rapidly decreasing health — developed a good relationship and forged the strategic alliance that, despite all the tensions, held up for more than 60 years and only recently has been put under serious pressure.
Another gesture of the same kind: President Dwight Eisenhower’s position toward the British-French-Israeli expedition in the Suez crisis of 1956. This did not come forth from a particular affection toward Gamal Abdel Nasser or Arab nationalism. Apart from his troubles concerning the fact that London and Paris had arranged certain things in secret, Eisenhower thought of the operation as a strange, late colonialist project that was improperly put together from a military-strategic perspective. But whatever the motives were, the consequence of Eisenhower’s effective pressure on American allies was an unknown wave of pro-American expressions from the Arab side. “I have never received so many compliments for American politics,” U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the White House.
These two examples show that interests and strategic considerations are more important than high-minded declarations. It is also exactly why the path toward a definite agreement between the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) and Iran is long and has many potentially fatal curves. No matter how intelligible and intelligent it is to follow the current diplomatic course, the fact remains that two crucial partners of the U.S. — Israel and Saudi Arabia — are filled with an intense distrust of Tehran’s reign.
Knock on the White House’s Door
Israel’s reservations always draw the most attention. They are surely relevant, even if it is just due to the impact on the American Congress, which can block alleviation of the U.S. sanctions against Iran. But the Israeli position knows a weakness, due to the country’s need to knock on the door of the White House when there is real danger — asking Brussels, Moscow or Beijing is of little use.
Saudi Arabia is a different, maybe even more unsettling story. It seems that it is on its way to securing an alternative safety umbrella. There are strong clues that a deal has been made in which Pakistan — financially supported by Riyadh for the past 20 years — will deliver nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia when the Saudis believe they need such a deterrent. This would undoubtedly mean that Saudi Arabia is less vulnerable to what the Americans do or do not want. In other words: Washington will have to demand far-reaching concessions of Iran to prevent the Pakistani word meaning the same as the American in Riyadh. The latter can hardly be seen as an improvement for the region.
If you had to make an outline of Barack Obama’s almost-five-year presidency, what are the positives and negatives? Roger Simon, political commentator with the web magazine Politico, was asked this question at the Melkweg in Amsterdam last Tuesday and came up with several correct observations concerning the presidential win-loss balance, but I think he was wrong about one thing: namely, labeling Obama’s renowned speech in Cairo, in which he spoke about a more obliging and humbler America, as the first serious outreach that an American president ever has made to the Islamic world and viewing this as a unique gesture.
The power of the word is terribly overexaggerated. Yes, Obama held a notable speech in Cairo; he has excelled with an oral piece more often. But did he move mountains that obstructed the passage to a more peaceful, democratic Middle East? Two years ago one could argue that Obama and his 2009 speech paved the way for what at the time was called the Arab Spring. But the political climate is back where it started; it has even cooled down a couple of degrees. The region is engaged in excitement and disputes as usual. The image of the United States in the Islamic world has degraded rather than improved.
No Verbal Feat
History has taught us that substantial approaches are usually not accompanied by verbal feats. Maybe the most significant American “gesture” toward the Arab world was in February 1945, when President Franklin Roosevelt had his historic meeting with Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder and first king of Saudi Arabia. The meeting took place aboard an American war ship in the Great Bitter Lake, which is located halfway down the Suez Canal, and was accompanied by a culture shock for both the Americans as well as the Saudis. Several stories were circulated about this meeting. But the two leaders — both aged and Roosevelt in rapidly decreasing health — developed a good relationship and forged the strategic alliance that, despite all the tensions, held up for more than 60 years and only recently has been put under serious pressure.
Another gesture of the same kind: President Dwight Eisenhower’s position toward the British-French-Israeli expedition in the Suez crisis of 1956. This did not come forth from a particular affection toward Gamal Abdel Nasser or Arab nationalism. Apart from his troubles concerning the fact that London and Paris had arranged certain things in secret, Eisenhower thought of the operation as a strange, late colonialist project that was improperly put together from a military-strategic perspective. But whatever the motives were, the consequence of Eisenhower’s effective pressure on American allies was an unknown wave of pro-American expressions from the Arab side. “I have never received so many compliments for American politics,” U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the White House.
These two examples show that interests and strategic considerations are more important than high-minded declarations. It is also exactly why the path toward a definite agreement between the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) and Iran is long and has many potentially fatal curves. No matter how intelligible and intelligent it is to follow the current diplomatic course, the fact remains that two crucial partners of the U.S. — Israel and Saudi Arabia — are filled with an intense distrust of Tehran’s reign.
Knock on the White House’s Door
Israel’s reservations always draw the most attention. They are surely relevant, even if it is just due to the impact on the American Congress, which can block alleviation of the U.S. sanctions against Iran. But the Israeli position knows a weakness, due to the country’s need to knock on the door of the White House when there is real danger — asking Brussels, Moscow or Beijing is of little use.
Saudi Arabia is a different, maybe even more unsettling story. It seems that it is on its way to securing an alternative safety umbrella. There are strong clues that a deal has been made in which Pakistan — financially supported by Riyadh for the past 20 years — will deliver nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia when the Saudis believe they need such a deterrent. This would undoubtedly mean that Saudi Arabia is less vulnerable to what the Americans do or do not want. In other words: Washington will have to demand far-reaching concessions of Iran to prevent the Pakistani word meaning the same as the American in Riyadh. The latter can hardly be seen as an improvement for the region.
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