Kyiv could not and would not accept the November proposals. On the other hand, the Kremlin can throw the new plans right out the window just by flattering Trump.
You can at least admit one thing about Donald Trump: Negotiations to end the bloodshed in Ukraine have recently gained momentum. However, tangible results are not in sight — which is no surprise, given the amateurish diplomacy from the White House.
Above all, the U.S. has struggled to move beyond its 28-point plan from November. It read like Moscow's wish list — including demands that Ukraine surrender territories in the Donbas that Russia has not even conquered.
The fact that Kyiv would not agree must have been clear to the Americans. But Trump stood with the supposedly stronger side in order to achieve a deal as quickly as possible — meaning Moscow.
Vanity Is a Weakness
At least Trump brought Europeans on board when he backpedaled. The 28-point plan has become a 20-point plan. But now Moscow is waving it off and does not want to know anything about a ceasefire.
From the start, the U.S. should have sought a proposal that could serve as a basis for discussion by both sides. Instead, Trump began with Moscow's maximum demands, exposing his weakest point: Vladimir Putin is unlikely to let go anytime soon of the flattering claim that Trump's earlier plans were better than anything later developed with the Europeans.
Trumps 28-Punkte-Plan ist die Erbsünde der aktuellen Ukraine-Diplomatie
Kyjiw konnte und wollte die Vorschläge vom November nicht akzeptieren. Der Kreml hingegen kann neue Pläne abschmettern, indem er vor allem Trump schmeichelt
Wenigstens eines kann man Donald Trump zugestehen: Die Verhandlungen um ein Ende des Blutvergießens in der Ukraine haben zuletzt an Dynamik gewonnen. Greifbare Ergebnisse sind aber nicht in Sicht – was auch angesichts der dilettantischen Diplomatie des Weißen Hauses keine Überraschung darstellt.
Vor allem ist es ihr eigener 28-Punkte-Plan vom November, aus dessen Schatten die USA nur schwer heraustreten können. Er las sich großteils wie ein Wunschzettel Moskaus – inklusive der Forderung, die Ukraine möge Gebiete im Donbass aufgeben, die Russland noch gar nicht erobert hat.
Dass Kyjiw dabei kaum mitgehen kann, hätte den Amerikanern klar sein müssen. Doch Trump setzte auf das Recht des vermeintlich Stärkeren, der ihm den schnellsten Weg zum Deal öffnen sollte. Also auf Moskau.
Schwachstelle Eitelkeit
Immerhin: Beim Zurückrudern hat Trump auch die Europäer mit ins Boot geholt. Inzwischen sind aus den 28 Punkten 20 geworden. Doch nun winkt wiederum Moskau ab und will nicht einmal von einem Waffenstillstand etwas wissen.
Die USA hätten sich von Anfang an um einen Vorschlag bemühen sollen, der für beide Seiten als Gesprächsbasis infrage kommt. Stattdessen begann Trump mit Moskauer Maximalforderungen und legte dabei seine schwächste Stelle bloß: Putin wird sich das Schmeichel-Argument, wonach frühere Trump-Pläne besser gewesen seien als alles, was später mit den Europäern entwickelt wurde, kaum so schnell aus der Hand nehmen lassen.
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[T]he risk is that unconditional sanctions relief could once again reinforce Iran’s external projection of power rather than stabilize its domestic economy.
America’s Achilles’ heel is internal. If it loses this war, it will likely be because much of the media, politicians, and even some of Trump’s allies do not fully understand his policies.
The shift now underway is unlikely to take the form of a dramatic collapse of American power in the Gulf. It is more likely to be subtler and, for the region, more unsettling.
Here was the American president, surrounded by an ultimately submissive team, deciding to go to war on gut feeling and with no visible concern for what it would mean beyond [U.S.] borders.
America’s Achilles’ heel is internal. If it loses this war, it will likely be because much of the media, politicians, and even some of Trump’s allies do not fully understand his policies.
Israel must reduce its military dependence on the United States as much as possible and deepen its technological, military and moral value in American eyes.
European autonomy - military, technological, economic, and financial - is beginning to take shape as Europe hedges against current and future fluctuations in [U.S.] policy.
The shift now underway is unlikely to take the form of a dramatic collapse of American power in the Gulf. It is more likely to be subtler and, for the region, more unsettling.
If Russia and China were to provide Iran with military, intelligence and technological support, along with the necessary military equipment, particularly in the fields of air defense, aviation, electronics and drones ... then Iran would undoubtedly turn into a dangerous trap for the U.S.