Will the US Setback in Europe Lead to an Adjustment in Its Asia-Pacific Strategy?

Ultimately, Crimea has joined the Russian Federation. This is now a fact that the U.S. can no longer change. President Obama even announced that the U.S. would not provide military assistance to Ukraine or use military force to intervene in the Ukrainian crisis, but would still use economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation to punish Russia’s actions. Inevitably, the impact of these punishments is limited, but the U.S. needed to take a stance and implement some measures to make up for its frustrated leadership position.

It can be said that the U.S. made a major strategic error regarding the Ukrainian issue. In the contest between the U.S. and Russia, the U.S. lost this bout. Obama underestimated Putin and overestimated himself. Most importantly, the U.S. violated Russia’s baseline and touched on Russia’s core interests, when Russia already had no room left to concede. Besides, if you consider that the U.S. previously used "human rights above sovereignty" to support Kosovo’s referendum on independence, but is now using a nation’s inviolable sovereignty as a basis to oppose Crimea’s referendum on independence, this shows that the double standards of the U.S. sometimes can also hurt it. Its powerless response lets the world see the United States more clearly.

Looking at the region’s order or structure, with Crimea joining Russia, Europe’s post-Cold War regional structure has been broken. The U.S. may need to re-evaluate whether its "pivot to Asia" strategy is correct, and how to balance its strategic resources. Another question that emerges is whether the U.S. will slow down its rebalancing of the Asia-Pacific and rebalance Europe’s regional order? As of late, the U.S. has treated China as its foremost competitor, believing that Russia was no longer a great power. But when Russia started a war with Georgia in 2008, ultimately resulting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia gaining independence, and now with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, these events sufficiently show that the U.S. has underestimated Russia.

The "pivot to Asia," or the rebalancing of Asia policy, is a significant adjustment in the U.S. international strategy Obama has promoted with the utmost effort since he assumed his presidency; it is also an important diplomatic legacy. Because of this significance, the U.S. naturally will not slow its pace in rebalancing the Asia-Pacific. Or, the U.S. will draw a lesson from this Ukraine situation and make strategic adjustments to its rebalancing of the Asia policy, which would primarily be concentrated on its policy toward China.

According to surveys of the American public, academia, the strategic community and defense sector, in the past five to 10 years, China’s strength, influence and international position have clearly increased. In contrast, U.S. influence and its international position is on a downward trend. But in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. still has an outstanding advantage, dominating and leading this region. But the U.S. should not use these advantages to deliberately make things difficult for China and continuously crowd into China’s strategic space; otherwise, it might touch on China’s core interests. Yet not displacing China would also create a reaction like Russia’s. Furthermore, Japan has already made this kind of strategic mistake: from its nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands to Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine. Underestimating China’s reaction has led to Japan’s current strategic disadvantage. The U.S. should learn to cooperate with a growing China, use an appropriate identity, co-exist with China in the Asia-Pacific and together maintain safety, stability and prosperity in the region. Antagonism would only lead to mutual harm.

On the domestic front, many debates still exist in the U.S. over the understanding of China’s abrupt rise, and no consensus has been reached. Optimists believe that China can and should become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international community, and that the U.S. must adopt strategic restraint and a reconciliatory attitude toward China. Pessimists believe that China is bound to try and break the international order that the U.S. has established, and that the U.S. should be prepared for this.

Of course, China would not actively challenge the United States. This is inconsistent with how China views its own position, and is even less in line with its national interests. Maintaining stable and positive relations with the U.S. is advantageous to China’s development. On the other hand, challenging the U.S. would produce the very opposite of the desired result. Of course, as China strives for its own authority in the international community, a challenge against U.S. leadership authority will definitely take shape. This allows China to passively challenge international U.S. leadership authority.

Of course, the U.S. will not allow its influence to wane. In order to maintain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. will try measures from many angles out of necessity. While militarily the U.S. has reduced its defense budget, it still retains formidable advantages. In comparison, the advantages that China enjoys are still not equal.

Some believe that after this Ukraine incident, the U.S. will recognize the importance of establishing a new type of power relationship with China and perhaps take the initiative to express its good will, thereby balancing Russia. If indeed this happens, it would of course be positive for China. But China absolutely cannot depend on hoping for American good will. Used to playing power games, the U.S. might have already strategically balanced Asia and Europe long ago. However, in these international circumstances, it is also an undeniable fact that the U.S. has fewer cards to play.