Has al-Maliki Turned Against America?
The United States proposed the solution it deems appropriate for the crisis in Iraq. Its request was clear: Iraq must quickly form a national unity government that incorporates more sides of Iraqi politics, especially the Sunnis and Kurds, and relinquishes the Nouri al-Maliki government’s ill-advised policies.
America’s request was based on information it understands: Its ally al-Maliki has, with the help of Iranian intervention, engaged in mistaken practices. This fired up the emotions of an important segment of Iraqi society, the Sunnis, who now feel weak and marginalized socially, politically and economically.
Today, President Barack Obama and his team believe that America should only give Iraq concentrated American support if the Iraqi leaders take necessary steps to unify, rather than divide, the different segments of Iraq and agree to form a government of national unity or national salvation.
Al-Maliki’s response came directly. He refused America’s suggestion, preferring to wait for the formation of a new government at the start of this month in accordance with the constitutions. This means imposing the Iranian formula and challenging the American administration.
America is interested in Iraq for multiple reasons. Firstly, the blame for bringing Iraq through years of war to its current state falls on American policy. Furthermore, members of Congress widely familiar with the sectarian practices of the Iraqi government are putting extreme pressure on Obama. Moreover, America, an ally of Iraq, has a commitment to supporting the Iraqi people's aspirations of freedom and democracy.
Washington, knowing that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is a more extreme terrorist organization than other jihadi groups, is worried that American weapons will fall into the hands of militants and may be used for purposes other than defending Iraq — perhaps even to attack some of America’s allies in the region. But it also knows that not all of the rebel fighters belong to ISIL and Takfiri organizations. There are fighters from other, more moderate organizations supported by Arab tribes in the western region, some of which fought against al-Qaida in the mid-2000s in what was then known as the Awakening Movement.
But America’s moral commitment, its desire to end the crisis to eradicate the terrorists, and more importantly, the previously mentioned impetuses behind the country’s interest in Iraq, are not enough to make it intervene militarily by sending American combat forces to confront the militants. This is a domestic matter that the al-Maliki government must deal with itself, save for limited support in proportion to what the situation on the ground calls for.
The true shock for America, a shock still in need of explanation, is the speed with which the Iraqi forces in Mosul and the cities that followed collapsed along with the resulting prospect of American weapons falling into rebel hands and being used against allied countries in the region.
America’s true concern, though, is the growth of Iranian influence in the Iraqi affair and the inability of the United States to keep control of the rest of its allies in the region.
From America’s perspective, Iran’s involvement in Iraq and the region as a whole will not help solve the crisis but exacerbate it by inflaming its sectarian dimension. Direct Iranian military intervention in Iraq infringes on areas of America’s influence. Moreover, it strains the atmosphere; the succession of information coming in about active Iranian combat units in Iraq is increasing the sectarian tension, especially now that the door has been opened to volunteers for defending Iraq on the pretext of protecting religious sites.
It is obvious that Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Iraq and the region brought no benefit. He failed to achieve the visit’s objectives after discovering that America’s ally is not as complaisant as it once was. Instead, Iraq, with Iranian support encased in sectarianism, has become strong enough to refuse America’s suggestions.
America’s request was based on information it understands: Its ally al-Maliki has, with the help of Iranian intervention, engaged in mistaken practices. This fired up the emotions of an important segment of Iraqi society, the Sunnis, who now feel weak and marginalized socially, politically and economically.
Today, President Barack Obama and his team believe that America should only give Iraq concentrated American support if the Iraqi leaders take necessary steps to unify, rather than divide, the different segments of Iraq and agree to form a government of national unity or national salvation.
Al-Maliki’s response came directly. He refused America’s suggestion, preferring to wait for the formation of a new government at the start of this month in accordance with the constitutions. This means imposing the Iranian formula and challenging the American administration.
America is interested in Iraq for multiple reasons. Firstly, the blame for bringing Iraq through years of war to its current state falls on American policy. Furthermore, members of Congress widely familiar with the sectarian practices of the Iraqi government are putting extreme pressure on Obama. Moreover, America, an ally of Iraq, has a commitment to supporting the Iraqi people's aspirations of freedom and democracy.
Washington, knowing that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is a more extreme terrorist organization than other jihadi groups, is worried that American weapons will fall into the hands of militants and may be used for purposes other than defending Iraq — perhaps even to attack some of America’s allies in the region. But it also knows that not all of the rebel fighters belong to ISIL and Takfiri organizations. There are fighters from other, more moderate organizations supported by Arab tribes in the western region, some of which fought against al-Qaida in the mid-2000s in what was then known as the Awakening Movement.
But America’s moral commitment, its desire to end the crisis to eradicate the terrorists, and more importantly, the previously mentioned impetuses behind the country’s interest in Iraq, are not enough to make it intervene militarily by sending American combat forces to confront the militants. This is a domestic matter that the al-Maliki government must deal with itself, save for limited support in proportion to what the situation on the ground calls for.
The true shock for America, a shock still in need of explanation, is the speed with which the Iraqi forces in Mosul and the cities that followed collapsed along with the resulting prospect of American weapons falling into rebel hands and being used against allied countries in the region.
America’s true concern, though, is the growth of Iranian influence in the Iraqi affair and the inability of the United States to keep control of the rest of its allies in the region.
From America’s perspective, Iran’s involvement in Iraq and the region as a whole will not help solve the crisis but exacerbate it by inflaming its sectarian dimension. Direct Iranian military intervention in Iraq infringes on areas of America’s influence. Moreover, it strains the atmosphere; the succession of information coming in about active Iranian combat units in Iraq is increasing the sectarian tension, especially now that the door has been opened to volunteers for defending Iraq on the pretext of protecting religious sites.
It is obvious that Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Iraq and the region brought no benefit. He failed to achieve the visit’s objectives after discovering that America’s ally is not as complaisant as it once was. Instead, Iraq, with Iranian support encased in sectarianism, has become strong enough to refuse America’s suggestions.
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