Western Action toward Russia Foreshadows US Strategic Adjustment
Just as the situation in Ukraine appeared to be settling into an impasse, the U.S. and Europe suddenly chose to raise the ante on July 16, making simultaneous announcements regarding further sanctions against Russia. Compared to the largely symbolic punitive measures adopted in the past, this round, consisting of the "toughest sanctions to date," will pack far greater a punch, and not only affect Russia's top brass, but also its energy, defense and financial sectors. Putting sanctions in place will inevitably hold major implications for Russia's relations with the West and hints at the heightened importance of dealing with Russia in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign strategy. A variety of signs indicate that Washington is seriously considering a new strategic posture, one in which the "pivot to Asia" will feature far less prominently.
As per the announcement by President Obama, the U.S. will freeze the assets of several Russian arms producers, prohibit U.S. citizens from providing new financing for several major Russian banks and energy companies and add four more Russian government officials to its blacklist. The EU has followed suit with its declarations that the European Investment Bank is to temporarily suspend the opening of new financial ventures in Russia, the European Commission will reassess cooperation programs between the EU and Russia and that the EU will broaden its sanctions toward organizations and individuals, with the first batch of names to be finalized by the end of July.
This sudden "crackdown" on Russia by the West is, in truth, somewhat puzzling. Half a year prior, street protests were spreading throughout Ukraine like wildfire, and with victory uncertain for either side, the West refused to show its hand. Russia used a national referendum to repossess Crimea in blitzkrieg fashion; at that crucial moment, when Ukraine most needed the support of foreign powers as its territorial integrity was threatened, the West did not act but continued to bide its time. And as the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine gained steam, the country slid into civil war, and massive amounts of Russian troops pressured the border in what appeared to be preparations to intervene at any moment — yet the West remained on the sidelines.
Despite several symbolic gestures, therefore, it has been a decidedly hesitant bout between East and West, full of minor scuffles and sideways jabs, all without landing a single solid blow upon the Russian homeland. Now, the Ukrainian election has concluded, and the battle in the eastern part of the country has effectively reached a stalemate. Russian President Putin has not only refrained from sending troops into Ukraine, but has also asked the Duma to revoke the authorization for such action as a means to ease tensions, additionally withdrawing troops that had been temporarily dispatched to the Russia-Ukraine border. So, in a seemingly incomprehensible turn of events, the West has finally chosen to act during what some would call a most inopportune moment, taking advantage of the relative lull in action to direct a sucker punch at Russia itself.
Although sudden, the move it is not without its logic. The Ukrainian crisis caught the U.S. unprepared, and dealing with it required assessing the interests of each side, due consideration with respect to other areas in the globe and a well-formulated strategy. The U.S. turning on Russia is not an ad-hoc decision, but a conclusion derived from a thorough re-evaluation of its former Cold War adversary. Russia has subsequently become far more important within U.S. strategy, and responding to the Russian threat has now become the number one priority for the U.S.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. believed for a time that China was the only remaining power capable of challenging U.S. world supremacy; as a result, U.S. policymaking has largely revolved around responding to the threat from China. Its primary concern was undermining and containing China, a fact made abundantly clear with Obama's "pivot to Asia" strategy. And with Russia slipping into decline and dropping to second or third-tier status as a state, the U.S. also downgraded Russia in its estimations from global superpower to regional power, unable to constitute a substantial threat to U.S. hegemony. But following over 10 years of concentrated development, Russia has realized its dream of once more becoming a great power and returning to the fore of the international stage. Faced with a strong surge from Russia, there has been little the U.S. can do. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war demonstrated this and today's Ukrainian crisis even more so.
The U.S. abruptly ceasing to pull its punches toward Russia is very likely the harbinger of a larger strategic shift. Within the security strategy of the U.S., Russia has already been reinstated to the list of global powers, occupying a position level with that of China. For the U.S., the urgency and strategic significance of dealing with the Russian threat is now no less vital than counterbalancing China.
As per the announcement by President Obama, the U.S. will freeze the assets of several Russian arms producers, prohibit U.S. citizens from providing new financing for several major Russian banks and energy companies and add four more Russian government officials to its blacklist. The EU has followed suit with its declarations that the European Investment Bank is to temporarily suspend the opening of new financial ventures in Russia, the European Commission will reassess cooperation programs between the EU and Russia and that the EU will broaden its sanctions toward organizations and individuals, with the first batch of names to be finalized by the end of July.
This sudden "crackdown" on Russia by the West is, in truth, somewhat puzzling. Half a year prior, street protests were spreading throughout Ukraine like wildfire, and with victory uncertain for either side, the West refused to show its hand. Russia used a national referendum to repossess Crimea in blitzkrieg fashion; at that crucial moment, when Ukraine most needed the support of foreign powers as its territorial integrity was threatened, the West did not act but continued to bide its time. And as the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine gained steam, the country slid into civil war, and massive amounts of Russian troops pressured the border in what appeared to be preparations to intervene at any moment — yet the West remained on the sidelines.
Despite several symbolic gestures, therefore, it has been a decidedly hesitant bout between East and West, full of minor scuffles and sideways jabs, all without landing a single solid blow upon the Russian homeland. Now, the Ukrainian election has concluded, and the battle in the eastern part of the country has effectively reached a stalemate. Russian President Putin has not only refrained from sending troops into Ukraine, but has also asked the Duma to revoke the authorization for such action as a means to ease tensions, additionally withdrawing troops that had been temporarily dispatched to the Russia-Ukraine border. So, in a seemingly incomprehensible turn of events, the West has finally chosen to act during what some would call a most inopportune moment, taking advantage of the relative lull in action to direct a sucker punch at Russia itself.
Although sudden, the move it is not without its logic. The Ukrainian crisis caught the U.S. unprepared, and dealing with it required assessing the interests of each side, due consideration with respect to other areas in the globe and a well-formulated strategy. The U.S. turning on Russia is not an ad-hoc decision, but a conclusion derived from a thorough re-evaluation of its former Cold War adversary. Russia has subsequently become far more important within U.S. strategy, and responding to the Russian threat has now become the number one priority for the U.S.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. believed for a time that China was the only remaining power capable of challenging U.S. world supremacy; as a result, U.S. policymaking has largely revolved around responding to the threat from China. Its primary concern was undermining and containing China, a fact made abundantly clear with Obama's "pivot to Asia" strategy. And with Russia slipping into decline and dropping to second or third-tier status as a state, the U.S. also downgraded Russia in its estimations from global superpower to regional power, unable to constitute a substantial threat to U.S. hegemony. But following over 10 years of concentrated development, Russia has realized its dream of once more becoming a great power and returning to the fore of the international stage. Faced with a strong surge from Russia, there has been little the U.S. can do. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war demonstrated this and today's Ukrainian crisis even more so.
The U.S. abruptly ceasing to pull its punches toward Russia is very likely the harbinger of a larger strategic shift. Within the security strategy of the U.S., Russia has already been reinstated to the list of global powers, occupying a position level with that of China. For the U.S., the urgency and strategic significance of dealing with the Russian threat is now no less vital than counterbalancing China.